BENEDICT DE SPINOZA'S POLITICAL TREATISE,



WHEREIN IS DEMONSTRATED, HOW THE SOCIETY IN WHICH MONARCHICAL DOMINION

FINDS PLACE, AS ALSO THAT IN WHICH THE DOMINION IS ARISTOCRATIC, SHOULD

BE ORDERED, SO AS NOT TO LAPSE INTO A TYRANNY, BUT TO PRESERVE INVIOLATE

THE PEACE AND FREEDOM OF THE CITIZENS.



[TRACTATUS POLITICUS.]



Edited with an Introduction

by R. H. M. Elwes

Translated by A. H. Gosset

Published by G. Bell & Son

London

1883




------------------------



FROM THE EDITOR'S PREFACE TO THE POSTHUMOUS WORKS OF BENEDICT DE SPINOZA.



OUR author composed the Political Treatise shortly before his death [in

1677]. Its reasonings are exact, its style clear. Abandoning the

opinions of many political writers, he most firmly propounds therein his

own judgment; and throughout draws his conclusions from his premisses.

In the first five chapters, he treats of political science in general --

in the sixth and seventh, of monarchy; in the eighth, ninth, and tenth,

of aristocracy; lastly, the eleventh begins the subject of democratic

government. But his untimely death was the reason that he did not finish

this treatise, and that he did not deal with the subject of laws, nor

with the various questions about politics, as may be seen from the

following "Letter of the Author to a Friend, which may properly be

prefixed to this Political Treatise, and serve it for a Preface:" --



"Dear Friend, -- Your welcome letter was delivered to me yesterday. I

heartily thank you for the kind interest you take in me. I would not

miss this opportunity, were I not engaged in something, which I think

more useful, and which, I believe, will please you more -- that is, in

preparing a Political Treatise, which I began some time since, upon your

advice. Of this treatise, six chapters are already finished. The first

contains a kind of introduction to the actual work; the second treats of

natural right; the third, of the right of supreme authorities. In the

fourth, I inquire, what political matters are subject to the direction

of supreme authorities; in the fifth, what is the ultimate and highest

end which a society can contemplate; and, in the sixth, how a monarchy

should be ordered, so as not to lapse into a tyranny. I am at present

writing the seventh chapter, wherein I make a regular demonstration of

all the heads of my preceding sixth chapter, concerning the ordering of

a well-regulated monarchy. I shall afterwards pass to the subjects of

aristocratic and popular dominion, and, lastly, to that of laws and

other particular questions about politics. And so, farewell."



The author's aim appears clearly from this letter; but being hindered by

illness, and snatched away by death, he was unable, as the reader will

find for himself, to continue this work further than to the end of the

subject of aristocracy.





------------------------



A POLITICAL TREATISE.



CHAPTER I.



INTRODUCTION.



PHILOSOPHERS conceive of the passions which harass us as vices into

which men fall by their own fault, and, therefore, generally deride,

bewail, or blame them, or execrate them, if they wish to seem unusually

pious. And so they think they are doing something wonderful, and

reaching the pinnacle of learning, when they are clever enough to bestow

manifold praise on such human nature, as is nowhere to be found, and to

make verbal attacks on that which, in fact, exists. For they conceive of

men, not as they are, but as they themselves would like them to be.

Whence it has come to pass that, instead of ethics, they have generally

written satire, and that they have never conceived a theory of politics,

which could be turned to use, but such as might be taken for a chimera,

or might have been formed in Utopia, or in that golden age of the poets

when, to be sure, there was least need of it. Accordingly, as in all

sciences, which have a useful application, so especially in that of

politics, theory is supposed to be at variance with practice; and no men

are esteemed less fit to direct public affairs than theorists or

philosophers.



2. But statesmen, on the other hand, are suspected of plotting against

mankind, rather than consulting their interests, and are esteemed more

crafty than learned. No doubt nature has taught them, that vices will

exist, while men do. And so, while they study to anticipate human

wickedness, and that by arts, which experience and long practice have

taught, and which men generally use under the guidance more of fear than

of reason, they are thought to be enemies of religion, especially by

divines, who believe that supreme authorities should handle public

affairs in accordance with the same rules of piety, as bind a private

individual. Yet there can be no doubt, that statesmen have written about

politics far more happily than philosophers. For, as they had experience

for their mistress, they taught nothing that was inconsistent with

practice.



3. And, certainly, I am fully persuaded that experience has revealed all

conceivable sorts of commonwealth, which are consistent with men's

living in unity, and likewise the means by which the multitude may be

guided or kept within fixed bounds. So that I do not believe that we can

by meditation discover in this matter anything not yet tried and

ascertained, which shall be consistent with experience or practice. For

men are so situated, that they cannot live without some general law. But

general laws and public affairs are ordained and managed by men of the

utmost acuteness, or, if you like, of great cunning or craft. And so it

is hardly credible, that we should be able to conceive of anything

serviceable to a general society, that occasion or chance has not

offered, or that men, intent upon their common affairs, and seeking

their own safety, have not seen for themselves.



4. Therefore, on applying my mind to politics, I have resolved to

demonstrate by a certain and undoubted course of argument, or to deduce

from the very condition of human nature, not what is new and unheard of,

but only such things as agree best with practice. And that I might

investigate the subject-matter of this science with the same freedom of

spirit as we generally use in mathematics, I have laboured carefully,

not to mock, lament, or execrate, but to understand human actions; and

to this end I have looked upon passions, such as love, hatred, anger,

envy, ambition, pity, and the other perturbations of the mind, not in

the light of vices of human nature, but as properties, just as pertinent

to it, as are heat, cold, storm, thunder, and the like to the nature of

the atmosphere, which phenomena, though inconvenient, are yet necessary,

and have fixed causes, by means of which we endeavour to understand

their nature, and the mind has just as much pleasure in viewing them

aright, as in knowing such things as flatter the senses.



5. For this is certain, and we have proved its truth in our Ethics, [1]

that men are of necessity liable to passions, and so constituted as to

pity those who are ill, and envy those who are well off; and to be prone

to vengeance more than to mercy: and moreover, that every individual

wishes the rest to live after his own mind, and to approve what he

approves, and reject what he rejects. And so it comes to pass, that, as

all are equally eager to be first, they fall to strife, and do their

utmost mutually to oppress one another; and he who comes out conqueror

is more proud of the harm he has done to the other, than of the good he

has done to himself. And although all are persuaded, that religion, on

the contrary, teaches every man to love his neighbour as himself, that

is to defend another's right just as much as his own, yet we showed that

this persuasion has too little power over the passions. It avails,

indeed, in the hour of death, when disease has subdued the very

passions, and man lies inert, or in temples, where men hold no traffic,

but least of all, where it is most needed, in the law-court or the

palace. We showed too, that reason can, indeed, do much to restrain and

moderate the passions, but we saw at the same time, that the road, which

reason herself points out, is very steep; [2] so that such as persuade

themselves, that the multitude or men distracted by politics can ever be

induced to live according to the bare dictate of reason, must be

dreaming of the poetic golden age, or of a stage-play.



6. A dominion then, whose well-being depends on any man's good faith,

and whose affairs cannot be properly administered, unless those who are

engaged in them will act honestly, will be very unstable. On the

contrary, to insure its permanence, its public affairs should be so

ordered, that those who administer them, whether guided by reason or

passion, cannot be led to act treacherously or basely. Nor does it

matter to the security of a dominion, in what spirit men are led to

rightly administer its affairs. For liberality of spirit, or courage, is

a private virtue; but the virtue of a state is its security.



7. Lastly, inasmuch as all men, whether barbarous or civilized,

everywhere frame customs, and form some kind of civil state, we must

not, therefore, look to proofs of reason for the causes and natural

bases of dominion, but derive them from the general nature or position

of mankind, as I mean to do in the next chapter.



------



1. Ethics, iv. 4, Coroll. iii. 31, note; 32, note.



2. Ibid., v. 42, note. 





------------------------



CHAPTER II.



OF NATURAL RIGHT.



IN our Theologico-Political Treatise we have treated of natural and

civil right, [1] and in our Ethics have explained the nature of

wrong-doing, merit, justice, injustice, [2] and lastly, of human

liberty. [3] Yet, lest the readers of the present treatise should have

to seek elsewhere those points, which especially concern it, I have

determined to explain them here again, and give a deductive proof of

them.



2. Any natural thing whatever can be just as well conceived, whether it

exists or does not exist. As then the beginning of the existence of

natural things cannot be inferred from their definition, so neither can

their continuing to exist. For their ideal essence is the same, after

they have begun to exist, as it was before they existed. As then their

beginning to exist cannot be inferred from their essence, so neither can

their continuing to exist; but they need the same power to enable them

to go on existing, as to enable them to begin to exist. From which it

follows, that the power, by which natural things exist, and therefore

that by which they operate, can be no other than the eternal power of

God itself. For were it another and a created power, it could not

preserve itself, much less natural things, but it would itself, in order

to continue to exist, have need of the same power which it needed to be

created.



3. From this fact therefore, that is, that the power whereby natural

things exist and operate is the very power of God itself, we easily

understand what natural right is. For as God has a right to everything,

and God's right is nothing else, but his very power, as far as the

latter is considered to be absolutely free; it follows from this, that

every natural thing has by nature as much right, as it has power to

exist and operate; since the natural power of every natural thing,

whereby it exists and operates, is nothing else but the power of God,

which is absolutely free.



4. And so by natural right I understand the very laws or rules of

nature, in accordance with which everything takes place, in other words,

the power of nature itself. And so the natural right of universal

nature, and consequently of every individual thing, extends as far as

its power: and accordingly, whatever any man does after the laws of his

nature, he does by the highest natural right, and he has as much right

over nature as he has power.



5. If then human nature had been so constituted, that men should live

according to the mere dictate of reason, and attempt nothing

inconsistent therewith, in that case natural right, considered as

special to mankind, would be determined by the power of reason only. But

men are more led by blind desire, than by reason: and therefore the

natural power or right of human beings should be limited, not by reason,

but by every appetite, whereby they are determined to action, or seek

their own preservation. I, for my part, admit, that those desires, which

arise not from reason, are not so much actions as passive affections of

man. But as we are treating here of the universal power or right of

nature, we cannot here recognize any distinction between desires, which

are engendered in us by reason, and those which are engendered by other

causes; since the latter, as much as the former, are effects of nature,

and display the natural impulse, by which man strives to continue in

existence. For man, be he learned or ignorant, is part of nature, and

everything, by which any man is determined to action, ought to be

referred to the power of nature, that is, to that power, as it is

limited by the nature of this or that man. For man, whether guided by

reason or mere desire, does nothing save in accordance with the laws and

rules of nature, that is, by natural right. (Section 4.)



6. But most people believe, that the ignorant rather disturb than follow

the course of nature, and conceive of mankind, in nature as of one

dominion within another. For they maintain, that the human mind is

produced by no natural causes, but created directly by God, and is so

independent of other things, that it has an absolute power to determine

itself, and make a right use of reason. Experience, however, teaches us

but too well, that it is no more in our power to have a sound mind, than

a sound body. Next, inasmuch as everything whatever, as far as in it

lies, strives to preserve its own existence, we cannot at all doubt,

that, were it as much in our power to live after the dictate of reason,

as to be led by blind desire, all would be led by reason, and order

their lives wisely; which is very far from being the case. For



     "Each is attracted by his own delight." [4]



Nor do divines remove this difficulty, at least not by deciding, that

the cause of this want of power is a vice or sin in human nature,

deriving its origin from our first parents' fall. For if it was even in

the first man's power as much to stand as to fall, and he was in

possession of his senses, and had his nature unimpaired, how could it

be, that he fell in spite of his knowledge and foresight? But they say,

that he was deceived by the devil. Who then was it, that deceived the

devil himself? Who, I say, so maddened the very being that excelled all

other created intelligences, that he wished to be greater than God? For

was not his effort too, supposing him of sound mind, to preserve himself

and his existence, as far as in him lay? Besides, how could it happen,

that the first man himself, being in his senses, and master of his own

will, should be led astray, and suffer himself to be taken mentally

captive? For if he had the power to make a right use of reason, it was

not possible for him to be deceived, for as far as in him lay, he of

necessity strove to preserve his existence and his soundness of mind.

But the hypothesis is, that he had this in his power; therefore he of

necessity maintained his soundness of mind, and could not be deceived.

But this from his history, is known to be false. And, accordingly, it

must be admitted, that it was not in the first man's power to make a

right use of reason, but that, like us, he was subject to passions.



7. But that man, like other beings, as far as in him lies, strives to

preserve his existence, no one can deny. For if any distinction could be

conceived on this point, it must arise from man's having a free will.

But the freer we conceived man to be, the more we should be forced to

maintain, that he must of necessity preserve his existence and be in

possession of his senses; as anyone will easily grant me, that does not

confound liberty with contingency. For liberty is a virtue, or

excellence. Whatever, therefore, convicts a man of weakness cannot be

ascribed to his liberty. And so man can by no means be called free,

because he is able not to exist or not to use his reason, but only in so

far as he preserves the power of existing and operating according to the

laws of human nature. The more, therefore, we consider man to be free,

the less we can say, that he can neglect to use reason, or choose evil

in preference to good; and, therefore, God, who exists in absolute

liberty, also understands and operates of necessity, that is, exists,

understands, and operates according to the necessity of his own nature.

For there is no doubt, that God operates by the same liberty whereby he

exists. As then he exists by the necessity of his own nature, by the

necessity of his own nature also he acts, that is, he acts with absolute

liberty.



8. So we conclude, that it is not in the power of any man always to use

his reason, and be at the highest pitch of human liberty, and yet that

everyone always, as far as in him lies, strives to preserve his own

existence; and that (since each has as much right as he has power)

whatever anyone, be he learned or ignorant, attempts and does, he

attempts and does by supreme natural right. From which it follows that

the law and ordinance of nature, under which all men are born, and for

the most part live, forbids nothing but what no one wishes or is able to

do, and is not opposed to strifes, hatred, anger, treachery, or, in

general, anything that appetite suggests. For the bounds of nature are

not the laws of human reason, which do but pursue the true interest and

preservation of mankind, but other infinite laws, which regard the

eternal order of universal nature, whereof man is an atom; and according

to the necessity of this order only are all individual beings determined

in a fixed manner to exist and operate. Whenever, then, anything in

nature seems to us ridiculous, absurd, or evil, it is because we have

but a partial knowledge of things, and are in the main ignorant of the

order and coherence of nature as a whole, and because we want everything

to be arranged according to the dictate of our own reason; although, in

fact, what our reason pronounces bad, is not bad as regards the order

and laws of universal nature, but only as regards the laws of our own

nature taken separately.



9. Besides, it follows that everyone is so far rightfully dependent on

another, as he is under that other's authority, and so far independent,

as he is able to repel all violence, and avenge to his heart's content

all damage done to him, and in general to live after his own mind.



10. He has another under his authority, who holds him bound, or has

taken from him arms and means of defence or escape, or inspired him with

fear, or so attached him to himself by past favour, that the man obliged

would rather please his benefactor than himself, and live after his mind

than after his own. He that has another under authority in the first or

second of these ways, holds but his body, not his mind. But in the third

or fourth way he has made dependent on himself as well the mind as the

body of the other; yet only as long as the fear or hope lasts, for upon

the removal of the feeling the other is left independent.



11. The judgment can be dependent on another, only as far as that other

can deceive the mind; whence it follows that the mind is so far

independent, as it uses reason aright. Nay, inasmuch as human power is

to be reckoned less by physical vigour than by mental strength, it

follows that those men are most independent whose reason is strongest,

and who are most guided thereby. And so I am altogether for calling a

man so far free, as he is led by reason; because so far he is determined

to action by such causes, as can be adequately understood by his

unassisted nature, although by these causes he be necessarily determined

to action. For liberty, as we showed above (Sec. 7), does not take away

the necessity of acting, but supposes it.



12. The pledging of faith to any man, where one has but verbally

promised to do this or that, which one might rightfully leave undone, or

vice versā, remains so long valid as the will of him that gave his word

remains unchanged. For he that has authority to break faith has, in

fact, bated nothing of his own right, but only made a present of words.

If, then, he, being by natural right judge in his own case, comes to the

conclusion, rightly or wrongly (for "to err is human"), that more harm

than profit will come of his promise, by the judgment of his own mind he

decides that the promise should be broken, and by natural right (Sec. 9)

he will break the same.



13. If two come together and unite their strength, they have jointly

more power, and consequently more right over nature than both of them

separately, and the more there are that have so joined in alliance, the

more right they all collectively will possess.



14. In so far as men are tormented by anger, envy, or any passion

implying hatred, they are drawn asunder and made contrary one to

another, and therefore are so much the more to be feared, as they are

more powerful, crafty, and cunning than the other animals. And because

men are in the highest degree liable to these passions (Chap. I, Sec.

5), therefore men are naturally enemies. For he is my greatest enemy,

whom I must most fear and be on my guard against.



15. But inasmuch as (Sec. 6) in the state of nature each is so long

independent, as he can guard against oppression by another, and it is in

vain for one man alone to try and guard against all, it follows hence

that so long as the natural right of man is determined by the power of

every individual, and belongs to everyone, so long it is a nonentity,

existing in opinion rather than fact, as there is no assurance of making

it good. And it is certain that the greater cause of fear every

individual has, the less power, and consequently the less right, he

possesses. To this must be added, that without mutual help men can

hardly support life and cultivate the mind. And so our conclusion is,

that that natural right, which is special to the human race, can hardly

be conceived, except where men have general rights, and combine to

defend the possession of the lands they inhabit and cultivate, to

protect themselves, to repel all violence, and to live according to the

general judgment of all. For (Sec. 18) the more there are that combine

together, the more right they collectively possess. And if this is why

the schoolmen want to call man a sociable animal -- I mean because men

in the state of nature can hardly be independent -- I have nothing to

say against them.



16. Where men have general rights, and are all guided, as it were, by

one mind, it is certain (Sec. 13), that every individual has the less

right the more the rest collectively exceed him in power; that is, he

has, in fact, no right over nature but that which the common law allows

him. But whatever he is ordered by the general consent, he is bound to

execute, or may rightfully be compelled thereto (Sec. 4).



17. This right, which is determined by the power of a multitude, is

generally called Dominion. And, speaking generally, he holds dominion,

to whom are entrusted by common consent affairs of state -- such as the

laying down, interpretation, and abrogation of laws, the fortification

of cities, deciding on war and peace, &c. But if this charge belong to a

council, composed of the general multitude, then the dominion is called

a democracy; if the council be composed of certain chosen persons, then

it is an aristocracy; and if, lastly, the care of affairs of state and,

consequently, the dominion rest with one man, then it has the name of

monarchy.



18. From what we have proved in this chapter, it becomes clear to us

that, in the state of nature, wrong-doing is impossible; or, if anyone

does wrong, it is to himself, not to another. For no one by the law of

nature is bound to please another, unless he chooses, nor to hold

anything to be good or evil, but what he himself, according to his own

temperament, pronounces to be so; and, to speak generally, nothing is

forbidden by the law of nature, except what is beyond everyone's power

(Secs. 5 and 8). But wrongdoing is action, which cannot lawfully be

committed. But if men by the ordinance of nature were bound to be led by

reason, then all of necessity would be so led. For the ordinances of

nature are the ordinances of God (Secs. 2, 3), which God has instituted

by the liberty, whereby he exists, and they follow, therefore, from the

necessity of the divine nature (Sec. 7), and, consequently, are eternal,

and cannot be broken. But men are chiefly guided by appetite, without

reason; yet for all this they do not disturb the course of nature, but

follow it of necessity. And, therefore, a man ignorant and weak of mind,

is no more bound by natural law to order his life wisely, than a sick

man is bound to be sound of body.



19. Therefore wrong-doing cannot be conceived of, but under dominion --

that is, where, by the general right of the whole dominion, it is

decided what is good and what evil, and where no one does anything

rightfully, save what he does in accordance with the general decree or

consent (Sec. 16). For that, as we said in the last section, is

wrong-doing, which cannot lawfully be committed, or is by law forbidden.

But obedience is the constant will to execute that, which by law is

good, and by the general decree ought to be done.



20. Yet we are accustomed to call that also wrong, which is done against

the sentence of sound reason, and to give the name of obedience to the

constant will to moderate the appetite according to the dictate of

reason: a manner of speech which I should quite approve, did human

liberty consist in the licence of appetite, and slavery in the dominion

of reason. But as human liberty is the greater, the more man can be

guided by reason, and moderate his appetite, we cannot without great

impropriety call a rational life obedience, and give the name of

wrong-doing to that which is, in fact, a weakness of the mind, not a

licence of the mind directed against itself, and for which a man may be

called a slave, rather than free (Secs. 7 and 11).



21. However, as reason teaches one to practise piety, and be of a calm

and gentle spirit, which cannot be done save under dominion; and,

further, as it is impossible for a multitude to be guided, as it were,

by one mind, as under dominion is required, unless it has laws ordained

according to the dictate of reason; men who are accustomed to live under

dominion are not, therefore, using words so improperly, when they call

that wrong-doing which is done against the sentence of reason, because

the laws of the best dominion ought to be framed according to that

dictate (Sec. 18). But, as for my saying (Sec. 18) that man in a state

of nature, if he does wrong at all, does it against himself, see, on

this point, Chap. IV., Secs. 4, 5, where is shown, in what sense we can

say, that he who holds dominion and possesses natural right, is bound by

laws and can do wrong.



22. As far as religion is concerned, it is further clear, that a man is

most free and most obedient to himself when he most loves God, and

worships him in sincerity. But so far as we regard, not the course of

nature, which we do not understand, but the dictates of reason only,

which respect religion, and likewise reflect that these dictates are

revealed to us by God, speaking, as it were, within ourselves, or else

were revealed to prophets as laws; so far, speaking in human fashion, we

say that man obeys God when he worships him in sincerity, and, on the

contrary, does wrong when he is led by blind desire. But, at the same

time, we should remember that we are subject to God's authority, as clay

to that of the potter, who of the same lump makes some vessels unto

honour, and others unto dishonour. [5] And thus man can, indeed, act

contrarily to the decrees of God, as far as they have been written like

laws in the minds of ourselves or the prophets, but against that eternal

decree of God, which is written in universal nature, and has regard to

the course of nature as a whole, he can do nothing.



23. As, then, wrong-doing and obedience, in their strict sense, so also

justice and injustice cannot be conceived of, except under dominion. For

nature offers nothing that can be called this man's rather than

another's; but under nature everything belongs to all -- that is, they

have authority to claim it for themselves. But under dominion, where it

is by common law determined what belongs to this man, and what to that,

he is called just who has a constant will to render to every man his

own, but he unjust who strives, on the contrary, to make his own that

which belongs to another.



24. But that praise and blame are emotions of joy and sadness,

accompanied by an idea of human excellence or weakness as their cause,

we have explained in our Ethics.



------



1. Theologico-Political Treatise, Chap. xvi.



2. Ethics, iv. 37, note 2. 



3. Ibid., ii. 48, 49, note. 



4. Virgil, Ecl. ii. 65. 



5. Romans ix. 21.





------------------------



CHAPTER III.



OF THE RIGHT OF SUPREME AUTHORITIES. 



UNDER every dominion the state is said to be Civil; but the entire body

subject to a dominion is called a Commonwealth, and the general business

of the dominion, subject to the direction of him that holds it, has the

name of Affairs of State. Next we call men Citizens, as far as they

enjoy by the civil law all the advantages of the commonwealth, and

Subjects, as far as they are bound to obey its ordinances or laws.

Lastly, we have already said that, of the civil state, there are three

kinds -- democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy (Chap. II. Sec. 17). Now,

before I begin to treat of each kind separately, I will first deduce all

the properties of the civil state in general. And of these, first of all

comes to be considered the supreme right of the commonwealth, or the

right of the supreme authorities. 



2. From Chap. II. Sec. 15, it is clear that the right of the supreme

authorities is nothing else than simple natural right, limited, indeed,

by the power, not of every individual, but of the multitude, which is

guided, as it were, by one mind -- that is, as each individual in the

state of nature, so the body and mind of a dominion have as much right

as they have power. And thus each single citizen or subject has the less

right, the more the commonwealth exceeds him in power (Chap. II. Sec.

16), and each citizen consequently does and has nothing, but what he may

by the general decree of the commonwealth defend.



3. If the commonwealth grant to any man the right, and therewith the

authority (for else it is but a gift of words, Chap. II. Sec. 12), to

live after his own mind, by that very act it abandons its own right, and

transfers the same to him, to whom it has given such authority. But if

it has given this authority to two or more, I mean authority to live

each after his own mind, by that very act it has divided the dominion,

and if, lastly, it has given this same authority to every citizen, it

has thereby destroyed itself, and there remains no more a commonwealth,

but everything returns to the state of nature; all of which is very

manifest from what goes before. And thus it follows, that it can by no

means be conceived, that every citizen should by the ordinance of the

commonwealth live after his own mind, and accordingly this natural right

of being one's own judge ceases in the civil state. I say expressly "by

the ordinance of the commonwealth," for, if we weigh the matter aright,

the natural right of every man does not cease in the civil state. For

man, alike in the natural and in the civil state, acts according to the

laws of his own nature, and consults his own interest. Man, I say, in

each state is led by fear or hope to do or leave undone this or that;

but the main difference between the two states is this, that in the

civil state all fear the same things, and all have the same ground of

security, and manner of life; and this certainly does not do away with

the individual's faculty of judgment. For he that is minded to obey all

the commonwealth's orders, whether through fear of its power or through

love of quiet, certainly consults after his own heart his own safety and

interest.



4. Moreover, we cannot even conceive, that every citizen should be

allowed to interpret the commonwealth's decrees or laws. For were every

citizen allowed this, he would thereby be his own judge, because each

would easily be able to give a colour of right to his own deeds, which

by the last section is absurd. 



5. We see then, that every citizen depends not on himself, but on the

commonwealth, all whose commands he is bound to execute, and has no

right to decide, what is equitable or iniquitous, just or unjust. But,

on the contrary, as the body of the dominion should, so to speak, be

guided by one mind, and consequently the will of the commonwealth must

be taken to be the will of all; what the state decides to be just and

good must be held to be so decided by every individual. And so, however

iniquitous the subject may think the commonwealth's decisions, he is

none the less bound to execute them. 



6. But (it may be objected) is it not contrary to the dictate of reason

to subject one's self wholly to the judgment of another, and

consequently, is not the civil state repugnant to reason? Whence it

would follow, that the civil state is irrational, and could only be

created by men destitute of reason, not at all by such as are led by it.

But since reason teaches nothing contrary to nature, sound reason cannot

therefore dictate, that every one should remain independent, so long as

men are liable to passions (Chap. II. Sec. 15), that is, reason

pronounces against such independence (Chap. I. Sec. 5). Besides, reason

altogether teaches to seek peace, and peace cannot be maintained, unless

the commonwealth's general laws be kept unbroken. And so, the more a man

is guided by reason, that is (Chap. II. Sec. 11), the more he is free,

the more constantly he will keep the laws of the commonwealth, and

execute the commands of the supreme authority, whose subject he is.

Furthermore, the civil state is naturally ordained to remove general

fear, and prevent general sufferings, and therefore pursues above

everything the very end, after which everyone, who is led by reason,

strives, but in the natural state strives vainly (Chap. II. Sec. 15).

Wherefore, if a man, who is led by reason, has sometimes to do by the

commonwealth's order what he knows to be repugnant to reason, that harm

is far compensated by the good, which he derives from the existence of a

civil state. For it is reason's own law, to choose the less of two

evils; and accordingly we may conclude, that no one is acting against

the dictate of his own reason, so far as he does what by the law of the

commonwealth is to be done. And this anyone will more easily grant us,

after we have explained, how far the power and consequently the right of

the commonwealth extends.



7. For, first of all, it must be considered, that, as in the state of

nature the man who is led by reason is most powerful and most

independent, so too that commonwealth will be most powerful and most

independent, which is founded and guided by reason. For the right of the

commonwealth is determined by the power of the multitude, which is led,

as it were, by one mind. But this unity of mind can in no wise be

conceived, unless the commonwealth pursues chiefly the very end, which

sound reason teaches is to the interest of all men.



8. In the second place it comes to be considered, that subjects are so

far dependent not on themselves, but on the commonwealth, as they fear

its power or threats, or as they love the civil state (Chap. II. Sect.

10). Whence it follows, that such things, as no one can be induced to do

by rewards or threats, do not fall within the rights of the

commonwealth. For instance, by reason of his faculty of judgment, it is

in no man's power to believe. For by what rewards or threats can a man

be brought to believe, that the whole is not greater than its part, or

that God does not exist, or that that is an infinite being, which he

sees to be finite, or generally anything contrary to his sense or

thought? So, too, by what rewards or threats can a man be brought to

love one, whom he hates, or to hate one, whom he loves? And to this head

must likewise be referred such things as are so abhorrent to human

nature, that it regards them as actually worse than any evil, as that a

man should be witness against himself, or torture himself, or kill his

parents, or not strive to avoid death, and the like, to which no one can

be induced by rewards or threats. But if we still choose to say, that

the commonwealth has the right or authority to order such things, we can

conceive of it in no other sense, than that in which one might say, that

a man has the right to be mad or delirious. For what but a delirious

fancy would such a right be, as could bind no one? And here I am

speaking expressly of such things as cannot be subject to the right of a

commonwealth and are abhorrent to human nature in general. For the fact,

that a fool or madman can by no rewards or threats be induced to execute

orders, or that this or that person, because he is attached to this or

that religion, judges the laws of a dominion worse than any possible

evil, in no wise makes void the laws of the commonwealth, since by them

most of the citizens are restrained. And so, as those who are without

fear or hope are so far independent (Chap. II. Sec. 10), they are,

therefore, enemies of the dominion (Chap. II. Sec. 14), and may lawfully

be coerced by force.



9. Thirdly and lastly, it comes to be considered, that those things are

not so much within the commonwealth's right, which cause indignation in

the majority. For it is certain, that by the guidance of nature men

conspire together, either through common fear, or with the desire to

avenge some common hurt; and as the right of the commonwealth is

determined by the common power of the multitude, it is certain that the

power and right of the commonwealth are so far diminished, as it gives

occasion for many to conspire together. There are certainly some

subjects of fear for a commonwealth, and as every separate citizen or in

the state of nature every man, so a commonwealth is the less

independent, the greater reason it has to fear. So much for the right of

supreme authorities over subjects. Now before I treat of the right of

the said authorities as against others, we had better resolve a question

commonly mooted about religion.



10. For it may be objected to us, Do not the civil state, and the

obedience of subjects, such as we have shown is required in the civil

state, do away with religion, whereby we are bound to worship God? But

if we consider the matter, as it really is, we shall find nothing that

can suggest a scruple. For the mind, so far as it makes use of reason,

is dependent, not on the supreme authorities, but on itself (Chap. II.

Sec. 11). And so the true knowledge and the love of God cannot be

subject to the dominion of any, nor yet can charity towards one's

neighbour (Sec. 8). And if we further reflect, that the highest exercise

of charity is that which aims at keeping peace and joining in unity, we

shall not doubt that he does his duty, who helps everyone, so far as the

commonwealth's laws, that is so far as unity and quiet allow. As for

external rites, it is certain, that they can do no good or harm at all

in respect of the true knowledge of God, and the love which necessarily

results from it; and so they ought not to be held of such importance,

that it should be thought worth while on their account to disturb public

peace and quiet. Moreover it is certain, that I am not a champion of

religion by the law of nature, that is (Chap. II. Sec. 3), by the divine

decree. For I have no authority, as once the disciples of Christ had, to

cast out unclean spirits and work miracles; which authority is yet so

necessary to the propagating of religion in places where it is

forbidden, that without it one not only, as they say, wastes one's time

[1] and trouble, but causes besides very many inconveniences, whereof

all ages have seen most mournful examples. Everyone therefore, wherever

he may be, can worship God with true religion, and mind his own

business, which is the duty of a private man. But the care of

propagating religion should be left to God, or the supreme authorities,

upon whom alone falls the charge of affairs of state. But I return to my

subject.



11. After explaining the right of supreme authorities over citizens and

the duty of subjects, it remains to consider the right of such

authorities against the world at large, which is now easily intelligible

from what has been said. For since (Sec. 2) the right of the supreme

authorities is nothing else but simple natural right, it follows that

two dominions stand towards each other in the same relation as do two

men in the state of nature, with this exception, that a commonwealth can

provide against being oppressed by another; which a man in the state of

nature cannot do, seeing that he is overcome daily by sleep, often by

disease or mental infirmity, and in the end by old age, and is besides

liable to other inconveniences, from which a commonwealth can secure

itself.



12. A commonwealth then is so far independent, as it can plan and

provide against oppression by another (Chap. II. Secs. 9, 15), and so

far dependent on another commonwealth, as it fears that other's power,

or is hindered by it from executing its own wishes, or lastly, as it

needs its help for its own preservation or increase (Chap. II. Secs. 10,

15). For we cannot at all doubt, that if two commonwealths are willing

to offer each other mutual help, both together are more powerful, and

therefore have more right, than either alone (Chap. II. Sec. 13).



13. But this will be more clearly intelligible, if we reflect, that two

commonwealths are naturally enemies. For men in the state of nature are

enemies (Chap. II. Sec. 14). Those, then, who stand outside a

commonwealth, and retain their natural rights, continue enemies.

Accordingly, if one commonwealth wishes to make war on another and

employ extreme measures to make that other dependent on itself, it may

lawfully make the attempt, since it needs but the bare will of the

commonwealth for war to be waged. But concerning peace it can decide

nothing, save with the concurrence of another commonwealth's will.

Whence it follows, that laws of war regard every commonwealth by itself,

but laws of peace regard not one, but at the least two commonwealths,

which are therefore called "contracting powers."



14. This "contract" remains so long unmoved as the motive for entering

into it, that is, fear of hurt or hope of gain, subsists. But take away

from either commonwealth this hope or fear, and it is left independent

(Chap. II. Sec. 10), and the link, whereby the commonwealths were

mutually bound, breaks of itself. And therefore every commonwealth has

the right to break its contract, whenever it chooses, and cannot be said

to act treacherously or perfidiously in breaking its word, as soon as

the motive of hope or fear is removed. For every contracting party was

on equal terms in this respect, that whichever could first free itself

of fear should be independent, and make use of its independence after

its own mind; and, besides, no one makes a contract respecting the

future, but on the hypothesis of certain precedent circumstances. But

when these circumstances change, the reason of policy applicable to the

whole position changes with them; and therefore every one of the

contracting commonwealths retains the right of consulting its own

interest, and consequently endeavours, as far as possible, to be free

from fear and thereby independent, and to prevent another from coming

out of the contract with greater power. If then a commonwealth complains

that it has been deceived, it cannot properly blame the bad faith of

another contracting commonwealth, but only its own folly in having

entrusted its own welfare to another party, that was independent, and

had for its highest law the welfare of its own dominion.



15. To commonwealths, which have contracted a treaty of peace, it

belongs to decide the questions, which may be mooted about the terms or

rules of peace, whereby they have mutually bound themselves, inasmuch as

laws of peace regard not one commonwealth, but the commonwealths which

contract taken together (Sec. 18). But if they cannot agree together

about the conditions, they by that very fact return to a state of war.



16. The more commonwealths there are, that have contracted a joint

treaty of peace, the less each of them by itself is an object of fear to

the remainder, or the less it has the authority to make war. But it is

so much the more bound to observe the conditions of peace; that is (Sec.

13), the less independent, and the more bound to accommodate itself to

the general will of the contracting parties.



17. But the good faith, inculcated by sound reason and religion, is not

hereby made void; for neither reason nor Scripture teaches one to keep

one's word in every case. For if I have promised a man, for instance, to

keep safe a sum of money he has secretly deposited with me, I am not

bound to keep my word, from the time that I know or believe the deposit

to have been stolen, but I shall act more rightly in endeavouring to

restore it to its owners. So likewise, if the supreme authority has

promised another to do something, which subsequently occasion or reason

shows or seems to show is contrary to the welfare of its subjects, it is

surely bound to break its word. As then Scripture only teaches us to

keep our word in general, and leaves to every individual's judgment the

special cases of exception, it teaches nothing repugnant to what we have

just proved.



18. But that I may not have so often to break the thread of my

discourse, and to resolve hereafter similar objections, I would have it

known that all this demonstration of mine proceeds from the necessity of

human nature, considered in what light you will -- I mean, from the

universal effort of all men after self-preservation, an effort inherent

in all men, whether learned or unlearned. And therefore, however one

considers men are led, whether by passion or by reason, it will be the

same thing; for the demonstration, as we have said, is of universal

application.



------



1. Literally, "oil and trouble " -- a common proverbial expression in

Latin.





------------------------



CHAPTER IV.



OF THE FUNCTIONS OF SUPREME AUTHORITIES.



THAT the right of the supreme authorities is limited by their power, we

showed in the last chapter, and saw that the most important part of that

right is, that they are, as it were, the mind of the dominion, whereby

all ought to be guided; and accordingly, that such authorities alone

have the right of deciding what is good, evil, equitable, or iniquitous,

that is, what must be done or left undone by the subjects severally or

collectively. And, accordingly, we saw that they have the sole right of

laying down laws, and of interpreting the same, whenever their meaning

is disputed, and of deciding whether a given case is in conformity with

or violation of the law (Chap. III. Secs. 3-5); and, lastly, of waging

war, and of drawing up and offering propositions for peace, or of

accepting such when offered (Chap. III. Secs. 12, 13).



2. As all these functions, and also the means required to execute them,

are matters which regard the whole body of the dominion, that is, are

affairs of state, it follows, that affairs of state depend on the

direction of him only, who holds supreme dominion. And hence it follows,

that it is the right of the supreme authority alone to judge the deeds

of every individual, and demand of him an account of the same; to punish

criminals, and decide questions of law between citizens, or appoint

jurists acquainted with the existing laws, to administer these matters

on its behalf; and, further, to use and order all means to war and

peace, as to found and fortify cities, levy soldiers, assign military

posts, and order what it would have done, and, with a view to peace, to

send and give audience to ambassadors; and, finally, to levy the costs

of all this.



3. Since, then, it is the right of the supreme authority alone to handle

public matters, or choose officials to do so, it follows, that that

subject is a pretender to the dominion, who, without the supreme

council's knowledge, enters upon any public matter, although he believe

that his design will be to the best interest of the commonwealth.



4. But it is often asked, whether the supreme authority is bound by

laws, and, consequently, whether it can do wrong. Now as the words "law"

and "wrong-doing" often refer not merely to the laws of a commonwealth,

but also to the general rules which concern all natural things, and

especially to the general rules of reason, we cannot, without

qualification, say that the commonwealth is bound by no laws, or can do

no wrong. For were the commonwealth bound by no laws or rules, which

removed, the commonwealth were no commonwealth, we should have to regard

it not as a natural thing, but as a chimera. A commonwealth then does

wrong, when it does, or suffers to be done, things which may be the

cause of its own ruin; and we can say that it then does wrong, in the

sense in which philosophers or doctors say that nature does wrong; and

in this sense we can say, that a commonwealth does wrong, when it acts

against the dictate of reason. For a commonwealth is most independent

when it acts according to the dictate of reason (Chap. III. Sec. 7); so

far, then, as it acts against reason, it fails itself, or does wrong.

And we shall be able more easily to understand this if we reflect, that

when we say, that a man can do what he will with his own, this authority

must be limited not only by the power of the agent, but by the capacity

of the object. If, for instance, I say that I can rightfully do what I

will with this table, I do not certainly mean, that I have the right to

make it eat grass. So, too, though we say, that men depend not on

themselves, but on the commonwealth, we do not mean, that men lose their

human nature and put on another; nor yet that the commonwealth has the

right to make men wish for this or that, or (what is just as impossible)

regard with honour things which excite ridicule or disgust. But it is

implied, that there are certain intervening circumstances, which

supposed, one likewise supposes the reverence and fear of the subjects

towards the commonwealth, and which abstracted, one makes abstraction

likewise of that fear and reverence, and therewith of the commonwealth

itself. The commonwealth, then, to maintain its independence, is bound

to preserve the causes of fear and reverence, otherwise it ceases to be

a commonwealth. For the person or persons that hold dominion, can no

more combine with the keeping up of majesty the running with harlots

drunk or naked about the streets, or the performances of a stage-player,

or the open violation or contempt of laws passed by themselves, than

they can combine existence with non-existence. But to proceed to slay

and rob subjects, ravish maidens, and the like, turns fear into

indignation and the civil state into a state of enmity.



5. We see, then, in what sense we may say, that a commonwealth is bound

by laws and can do wrong. But if by "law" we understand civil law, and

by "wrong" that which, by civil law, is forbidden to be done, that is,

if these words be taken in their proper sense, we cannot at all say,

that a commonwealth is bound by laws, or can do wrong. For the maxims

and motives of fear and reverence, which a commonwealth is bound to

observe in its own interest, pertain not to civil jurisprudence, but to

the law of nature, since (Sec. 4) they cannot be vindicated by the civil

law, but by the law of war. And a commonwealth is bound by them in no

other sense than that in which in the state of nature a man is bound to

take heed, that he preserve his independence and be not his own enemy,

lest he should destroy himself; and in this taking heed lies not the

subjection, but the liberty of human nature. But civil jurisprudence

depends on the mere decree of the commonwealth, which is not bound to

please any but itself, nor to hold anything to be good or bad, but what

it judges to be such for itself. And, accordingly, it has not merely the

right to avenge itself, or to lay down and interpret laws, but also to

abolish the same, and to pardon any guilty person out of the fullness of

its power.



6. Contracts or laws, whereby the multitude transfers its right to one

council or man, should without doubt be broken, when it is expedient for

the general welfare to do so. But to decide this point, whether, that

is, it be expedient for the general welfare to break them or not, is

within the right of no private person, but of him only who holds

dominion (Sec. 3); therefore of these laws he who holds dominion remains

sole interpreter. Moreover, no private person can by right vindicate

these laws, and so they do not really bind him who holds dominion.

Notwithstanding, if they are of such a nature that they cannot be

broken, without at the same time weakening the commonwealth's strength,

that is, without at the same time changing to indignation the common

fear of most of the citizens, by this very fact the commonwealth is

dissolved, and the contract comes to an end; and therefore such contract

is vindicated not by the civil law, but by the law of war. And so he who

holds dominion is not bound to observe the terms of the contract by any

other cause than that, which bids a man in the state of nature to beware

of being his own enemy, lest he should destroy himself, as we said in

the last section.





------------------------



CHAPTER V.



OF THE BEST STATE OF A DOMINION.



IN Chap. II. Sec. 2, we showed, that man is then most independent, when

he is most led by reason, and, in consequence (Chap. III. Sec. 7), that

that commonwealth is most powerful and most independent, which is

founded and guided by reason. But, as the best plan of living, so as to

assure to the utmost self-preservation, is that which is framed

according to the dictate of reason, therefore it follows, that that in

every kind is best done, which a man or commonwealth does, so far as he

or it is in the highest degree independent. For it is one thing to till

a field by right, and another to till it in the best way. One thing, I

say, to defend or preserve one's self, and to pass judgment by right,

and another to defend or preserve one's self in the best way, and to

pass the best judgment; and, consequently, it is one thing to have

dominion and care of affairs of state by right, and another to exercise

dominion and direct affairs of state in the best way. And so, as we have

treated of the right of every commonwealth in general, it is time to

treat of the best state of every dominion.



2. Now the quality of the state of any dominion is easily perceived from

the end of the civil state, which end is nothing else but peace and

security of life. And therefore that dominion is the best, where men

pass their lives in unity, and the laws are kept unbroken. For it is

certain, that seditions, wars, and contempt or breach of the laws are

not so much to be imputed to the wickedness of the subjects, as to the

bad state of a dominion. For men are not born fit for citizenship, but

must be made so. Besides, men's natural passions are everywhere the

same; and if wickedness more prevails, and more offences are committed

in one commonwealth than in another, it is certain that the former has

not enough pursued the end of unity, nor framed its laws with sufficient

forethought; and that, therefore, it has failed in making quite good its

right as a commonwealth. For a civil state, which has not done away with

the causes of seditions, where war is a perpetual object of fear, and

where, lastly, the laws are often broken, differs but little from the

mere state of nature, in which everyone lives after his own mind at the

great risk of his life.



3. But as the vices and inordinate licence and contumacy of subjects

must be imputed to the commonwealth, so, on the other hand, their virtue

and constant obedience to the laws are to be ascribed in the main to the

virtue and perfect right of the commonwealth, as is clear from Chap. II.

Sec. 15. And so it is deservedly reckoned to Hannibal as an

extraordinary virtue, that in his army there never arose a sedition. [1]



4. Of a commonwealth, whose subjects are but hindered by terror from

taking arms, it should rather be said, that it is free from war, than

that it has peace. For peace is not mere absence of war, but is a virtue

that springs from force of character: for obedience (Chap. II. Sec. 19)

is the constant will to execute what, by the general decree of the

commonwealth, ought to be done. Besides that commonwealth, whose peace

depends on the sluggishness of its subjects, that are led about like

sheep, to learn but slavery, may more properly be called a desert than a

commonwealth.



5. When, then, we call that dominion best, where men pass their lives in

unity, I understand a human life, defined not by mere circulation of the

blood, and other qualities common to all animals, but above all by

reason, the true excellence and life of the mind.



6. But be it remarked that, by the dominion which I have said is

established for this end, I intend that which has been established by a

free multitude, not that which is acquired over a multitude by right of

war. For a free multitude is guided more by hope than fear; a conquered

one, more by fear than hope: inasmuch as the former aims at making use

of life, the latter but at escaping death. The former, I say, aims at

living for its own ends, the latter is forced to belong to the

conqueror; and so we say that this is enslaved, but that free. And,

therefore, the end of a dominion, which one gets by right of war, is to

be master, and have rather slaves than subjects. And although between

the dominion created by a free multitude, and that gained by right of

war, if we regard generally the right of each, we can make no essential

distinction; yet their ends, as we have already shown, and further the

means to the preservation of each are very different.



7. But what means a prince, whose sole motive is lust of mastery, should

use to establish and maintain his dominion, the most ingenious

Machiavelli has set forth at large, [2] but with what design one can

hardly be sure. If, however, he had some good design, as one should

believe of a learned man, it seems to have been to show, with how little

foresight many attempt to remove a tyrant, though thereby the causes

which make the prince a tyrant can in no wise be removed, but, on the

contrary, are so much the more established, as the prince is given more

cause to fear, which happens when the multitude has made an example of

its prince, and glories in the parricide as in a thing well done.

Moreover, he perhaps wished to show how cautious a free multitude should

be of entrusting its welfare absolutely to one man, who, unless in his

vanity he thinks he can please everybody, must be in daily fear of

plots, and so is forced to look chiefly after his own interest, and, as

for the multitude, rather to plot against it than consult its good. And

I am the more led to this opinion concerning that most far-seeing man,

because it is known that he was favourable to liberty, for the

maintenance of which he has besides given the most wholesome advice.



------



1. Justin, Histories, xxxii. iv. 12.



2. In his book called "Il Principe," or "The Prince." 





------------------------



CHAPTER VI.



OF MONARCHY.



INASMUCH as men are led, as we have said, more by passion than reason,

it follows, that a multitude comes together, and wishes to be guided, as

it were, by one mind, not at the suggestion of reason, but of some

common passion -- that is (Chap. III. Sec. 9), common hope, or fear, or

the desire of avenging some common hurt. But since fear of solitude

exists in all men, because no one in solitude is strong enough to defend

himself, and procure the necessaries of life, it follows that men

naturally aspire to the civil state; nor can it happen that men should

ever utterly dissolve it.



2. Accordingly, from the quarrels and seditions which are often stirred

up in a commonwealth, it never results that the citizens dissolve it, as

often happens in the case of other associations; but only that they

change its form into some other -- that is, of course, if the disputes

cannot be settled, and the features of the commonwealth at the same time

preserved. Wherefore, by means necessary to preserve a dominion, I

intend such things as are necessary to preserve the existing form of the

dominion, without any notable change.



3. But if human nature were so constituted, that men most desired what

is most useful, no art would be needed to produce unity and confidence.

But, as it is admittedly far otherwise with human nature, a dominion

must of necessity be so ordered, that all, governing and governed alike,

whether they will or no, shall do what makes for the general welfare;

that is, that all, whether of their own impulse, or by force or

necessity, shall be compelled to live according to the dictate of

reason. And this is the case, if the affairs of the dominion be so

managed, that nothing which affects the general welfare is entirely

entrusted to the good faith of any one. For no man is so watchful, that

he never falls asleep; and no man ever had a character so vigorous and

honest, but he sometimes, and that just when strength of character was

most wanted, was diverted from his purpose and let himself be overcome.

And it is surely folly to require of another what one can never obtain

from one's self; I mean, that he should be more watchful for another's

interest than his own, that he should be free from avarice, envy, and

ambition, and so on; especially when he is one, who is subject daily to

the strongest temptations of every passion. 



4. But, on the other hand, experience is thought to teach, that it makes

for peace and concord, to confer the whole authority upon one man. For

no dominion has stood so long without any notable change, as that of the

Turks, and on the other hand there were none so little lasting, as

those, which were popular or democratic, nor any in which so many

seditions arose. Yet if slavery, barbarism, and desolation are to be

called peace, men can have no worse misfortune. No doubt there are

usually more and sharper quarrels between parents and children, than

between masters and slaves; yet it advances not the art of housekeeping,

to change a father's right into a right of property, and count children

but as slaves. Slavery then, not peace, is furthered by handing over to

one man the whole authority. For peace, as we said before, consists not

in mere absence of war, but in a union or agreement of minds.



5. And in fact they are much mistaken, who suppose that one man can by

himself hold the supreme right of a commonwealth. For the only limit of

right, as we showed (Chap. II.), is power. But the power of one man is

very inadequate to support so great a load. And hence it arises, that

the man, whom the multitude has chosen king, looks out for himself

generals, or counsellors, or friends, to whom he entrusts his own and

the common welfare; so that the dominion, which is thought to be a

perfect monarchy, is in actual working an aristocracy, not, indeed, an

open but a hidden one, and therefore the worst of all. Besides which, a

king, who is a boy, or ill, or overcome by age, is but king on

sufferance; and those in this case have the supreme authority, who

administer the highest business of the dominion, or are near the king's

person; not to mention, that a lascivious king often manages everything

at the caprice of this or that mistress or minion. "I had heard," says

Orsines, "that women once reigned in Asia, but for a eunuch to reign is

something new." [1]



6. It is also certain, that a commonwealth is always in greater danger

from its citizens than from its enemies; for the good are few. Whence it

follows, that he, upon whom the whole right of the dominion has been

conferred, will always be more afraid of citizens than of enemies, and

therefore will look to his own safety, and not try to consult his

subjects' interests, but to plot against them, especially against those

who are renowned for learning, or have influence through wealth. 



7. It must besides be added, that kings fear their sons also more than

they love them, and so much the more as the latter are skilled in the

arts of war and peace, and endeared to the subjects by their virtues.

Whence it comes, that kings try so to educate their sons, that they may

have no reason to fear them. Wherein ministers very readily obey the

king, and will be at the utmost pains, that the successor may be an

inexperienced king, whom they can hold tightly in hand.



8. From all which it follows, that the more absolutely the

commonwealth's right is transferred to the king, the less independent he

is, and the more unhappy is the condition of his subjects. And so, that

a monarchical dominion may be duly established, it is necessary to lay

solid foundations, to build it on; from which may result to the monarch

safety, and to the multitude peace; and, therefore, to lay them in such

a way, that the monarch may then be most independent, when he most

consults the multitude's welfare. But I will first briefly state, what

these foundations of a monarchical dominion are, and afterwards prove

them in order.



9. One or more cities must be founded and fortified, whose citizens,

whether they live within the walls, or outside for purposes of

agriculture, are all to enjoy the same right in the commonwealth; yet on

this condition, that every city provide an ascertained number of

citizens for its own and the general defence. But a city, which cannot

supply this, must be held in subjection on other terms. 



10. The militia must be formed out of citizens alone, none being exempt,

and of no others. And, therefore, all are to be bound to have arms, and

no one to be admitted into the number of the citizens, till he has

learnt his drill, and promised to practise it at stated times in the

year. Next, the militia of each clan is to be divided into battalions

and regiments, and no captain of a battalion chosen, that is not

acquainted with military engineering. Moreover, though the commanders of

battalions and regiments are to be chosen for life, yet the commander of

the militia of a whole clan is to be chosen only in time of war, to hold

command for a year at most, without power of being continued or

afterwards re-appointed. And these last are to be selected out of the

king's counsellors, of whom we shall speak in the fifteenth and

following sections, or out of those who have filled the post of

counsellor.



11. The townsmen and countrymen of every city, that is, the whole of the

citizens, are to be divided into clans, distinguished by some name and

badge, and all persons born of any of these clans are to be received

into the number of citizens, and their names inscribed on the roll of

their clan, as soon as they have reached the age, when they can carry

arms and know their duty; with the exception of those, who are infamous

from some crime, or dumb, or mad, or menials supporting life by some

servile office.



12. The fields, and the whole soil, and, if it can be managed, the

houses should be public property, that is, the property of him, who

holds the right of the commonwealth: and let him let them at a yearly

rent to the citizens, whether townsmen or countrymen, and with this

exception let them all be free or exempt from every kind of taxation in

time of peace. And of this rent a part is to be applied to the defences

of the state, a part to the king's private use. For it is necessary in

time of peace to fortify cities against war, and also to have ready

ships and other munitions of war.



13. After the selection of the king from one of the clans, none are to

be held noble, but his descendants, who are therefore to be

distinguished by royal insignia from their own and the other clans.



14. Those male nobles, who are the reigning king's collaterals, and

stand to him in the third or fourth degree of consanguinity, must not

marry, and any children they may have had, are to be accounted bastards,

and unworthy of any dignity, nor may they be recognized as heirs to

their parents, whose goods must revert to the king.



15. Moreover the king's counsellors, who are next to him in dignity,

must be numerous, and chosen out of the citizens only; that is

(supposing there to be no more than six hundred clans) from every clan

three or four or five, who will form together one section of this

council; and not for life, but for three, four, or five years, so that

every year a third, fourth, or fifth part may be replaced by selection,

in which selection it must be observed as a first condition, that out of

every clan at least one counsellor chosen be a jurist.



16. The selection must be made by the king himself, who should fix a

time of year for the choice of fresh counsellors. Each clan must then

submit to the king the names of all its citizens, who have reached their

fiftieth year, and have been duly put forward as candidates for this

office, and out of these the king will choose whom he pleases. But in

that year, when the jurist of any clan is to be replaced, only the names

of jurists are to be submitted to the king. Those who have filled this

office of counsellor for the appointed time, are not to be continued

therein, nor to be replaced on the list of candidates for five years or

more. But the reason why one is to be chosen every year out of every

clan is, that the council may not be composed alternately of untried

novices, and of veterans versed in affairs, which must necessarily be

the case, were all to retire at once, and new men to succeed them. But

if every year one be chosen out of every family, then only a fifth,

fourth, or at most a third part of the council will consist of novices.

Further, if the king be prevented by other business, or for any other

reason, from being able to spare time for this choice, then let the

counsellors themselves choose others for a time, until the king either

chooses different ones, or confirms the choice of the council.



17. Let the primary function of this council be to defend the

fundamental laws of the dominion, and to give advice about

administration, that the king may know, what for the public good ought

to be decreed: and that on the understanding, that the king may not

decide in any matter, without first hearing the opinion of this council.

But if, as will generally happen, the council is not of one mind, but is

divided in opinion, even after discussing the same subject two or three

times, there must be no further delay, but the different opinions are to

be submitted to the king, as in the twenty-fifth section of this chapter

we shall show.



18. Let it be also the duty of this council to publish the king's orders

or decrees, and to see to the execution of any decree concerning affairs

of state, and to supervise the administration of the whole dominion, as

the king's deputies.



19. The citizens should have no access to the king, save through this

council, to which are to be handed all demands or petitions, that they

may be presented to the king. Nor should the envoys of other

commonwealths be allowed to obtain permission to address the king, but

through the council. Letters, too, sent from elsewhere to the king, must

be handed to him by the council. And in general the king is to be

accounted as the mind of the commonwealth, but the council as the senses

outside the mind, or the commonwealth's body, through whose intervention

the mind understands the state of the commonwealth, and acts as it

judges best for itself.



20. The care of the education of the king's sons should also fall on

this council, and the guardianship, where a king has died, leaving as

his successor an infant or boy. Yet lest meanwhile the council should be

left without a king, one of the elder nobles of the commonwealth should

be chosen to fill the king's place, till the legitimate heir has reached

the age at which he can support the weight of government.



21. Let the candidates for election to this council be such as know the

system of government, and the foundations, and state or condition of the

commonwealth, whose subjects they are. But he that would fill the place

of a jurist must, besides the government and condition of the

commonwealth, whose subject he is, be likewise acquainted with those of

the other commonwealths, with which it has any intercourse. But none are

to be placed upon the list of candidates, unless they have reached their

fiftieth year without being convicted of crime.



22. In this council no decision is to be taken about the affairs of the

dominion, but in the presence of all the members. But if anyone be

unable through illness or other cause to attend, he must send in his

stead one of the same clan, who has filled the office of counsellor or

been put on the list of candidates. Which if he neglect to do, and the

council through his absence be forced to adjourn any matter, let him be

fined a considerable sum. But this must be understood to mean, when the

question is of a matter affecting the whole dominion, as of peace or

war, of abrogating or establishing a law, of trade, &c. But if the

question be one that affects only a particular city or two, as about

petitions, &c., it will suffice that a majority of the council attend.



23. To maintain a perfect equality between the clans, and a regular

order in sitting, making proposals, and speaking, every clan is to take

in turn the presidency at the sittings, a different clan at every

sitting, and that which was first at one sitting is to be last at the

next. But among members of the same clan, let precedence go by priority

of election.



24. This council should be summoned at least four times a year, to

demand of the ministers account of their administration of the dominion,

to ascertain the state of affairs, and see if anything else needs

deciding. For it seems impossible for so large a number of citizens to

have constant leisure for public business. But as in the meantime public

business must none the less be carried on, therefore fifty or more are

to be chosen out of this council to supply its place after its

dismissal; and these should meet daily in a chamber next the king's, and

so have daily care of the treasury, the cities, the fortifications, the

education of the king's son, and in general of all those duties of the

great council, which we have just enumerated, except that they cannot

take counsel about new matters, concerning which no decision has been

taken.



25. On the meeting of the council, before anything is proposed in it,

let five, six, or more jurists of the clans, which stand first in order

of place at that session, attend on the king, to deliver to him

petitions or letters, if they have any, to declare to him the state of

affairs, and, lastly, to understand from him what he bids them propose

in his council; and when they have heard this, let them return to the

council, and let the first in precedence open the matter of debate. But,

in matters which seem to any of them to be of some moment, let not the

votes be taken at once, but let the voting be adjourned to such a date

as the urgency of the matter allows. When, then, the council stands

adjourned till the appointed time, the counsellors of every clan will

meanwhile be able to debate the matter separately, and, if they think it

of great moment, to consult others that have been counsellors, or are

candidates for the council. And if within the appointed time the

counsellors of any clan cannot agree among themselves, that clan shall

lose its vote, for every clan can give but one vote. But, otherwise, let

the jurist of the clan lay before the council the opinion they have

decided to be best; and so with the rest. And if the majority of the

council think fit, after hearing the grounds of every opinion, to

consider the matter again, let the council be again adjourned to a date,

at which every clan shall pronounce its final opinion; and then, at

last, before the entire council, let the votes be taken, and that

opinion be invalidated which has not at least a hundred votes. But let

the other opinions be submitted to the king by all the jurists present

at the council, that, after hearing every party's arguments, he may

select which opinion he pleases. And then let the jurists leave him, and

return to the council; and there let all await the king at the time

fixed by himself, that all may hear which opinion of those proposed he

thinks fit to adopt, and what he decides should be done.



26. For the administration of justice, another council is to be formed

of jurists, whose business should be to decide suits, and punish

criminals, but so that all the judgments they deliver be tested by those

who are for the time members of the great council -- that is, as to

their having been delivered according to the due process of justice, and

without partiality. But if the losing party can prove, that any judge

has been bribed by the adversary, or that there is some mutual cause of

friendship between the judge and the adversary, or of hatred between the

judge and himself, or, lastly, that the usual process of justice has not

been observed, let such party be restored to his original position. But

this would, perhaps, not be observed by such as love to convict the

accused in a criminal case, rather by torture than proofs. But, for all

that, I can conceive on this point of no other process of justice than

the above, that befits the best system of governing a commonwealth.



27. Of these judges, there should be a large and odd number -- for

instance, sixty-one, or at least forty-one, -- and not more than one is

to be chosen of one clan, and that not for life, but every year a

certain proportion are to retire, and be replaced by as many others out

of different clans, that have reached their fortieth year.



28. In this council, let no judgment be pronounced save in the presence

of all the judges. But if any judge, from disease or other cause, shall

for a long time be unable to attend the council, let another be chosen

for that time to fill his place. But in giving their votes, they are all

not to utter their opinions aloud, but to signify them by ballot.



29. Let those who supply others' places in this and the first-mentioned

council first be paid out of the goods of those whom they have condemned

to death, and also out of the fines of which any are mulcted. Next,

after every judgment they pronounce in a civil suit, let them receive a

certain proportion of the whole sum at stake for the benefit of both

councils.



30. Let there be in every city other subordinate councils, whose members

likewise must not be chosen for life, but must be partially renewed

every year, out of the clans who live there only. But there is no need

to pursue this further.



31. No military pay is to be granted in time of peace; but, in time of

war, military pay is to be allowed to those only, who support their

lives by daily labour. But the commanders and other officers of the

battalions are to expect no other advantage from war but the spoil of

the enemy. 



32. If a foreigner takes to wife the daughter of a citizen, his children

are to be counted citizens, and put on the roll of their mother's clan.

But those who are born and bred within the dominion of foreign parents

should be allowed to purchase at a fixed price the right of citizenship

from the captains of thousands of any clan, and to be enrolled in that

clan. For no harm can arise thence to the dominion, even though the

captains of thousands, for a bribe, admit a foreigner into the number of

their citizens for less than the fixed price; but, on the contrary,

means should be devised for more easily increasing the number of

citizens, and producing a large confluence of men. As for those who are

not enrolled as citizens, it is but fair that, at least in war-time,

they should pay for their exemption from service by some forced labour

or tax.



33. The envoys to be sent in time of peace to other commonwealths must

be chosen out of the nobles only, and their expenses met by the state

treasury, and not the king's privy purse.



34. Those that attend the court, and are the king's servants, and are

paid out of his privy purse, must be excluded from every appointment and

office in the commonwealth. I say expressly, "and are paid out of the

king's privy purse," to except the body-guard. For there should be no

other body-guard, but the citizens of the king's city, who should take

turns to keep guard at court before the king's door.



35. War is only to be made for the sake of peace, so that, at its end,

one may be rid of arms. And so, when cities have been taken by right of

war, and terms of peace are to be made after the enemies are subdued,

the captured cities must not be garrisoned and kept; but either the

enemy, on accepting the terms of peace, should be allowed to redeem them

at a price, or, if by following that policy, there would, by reason of

the danger of the position, remain a constant lurking anxiety, they must

be utterly destroyed, and the inhabitants removed elsewhere.



36. The king must not be allowed to contract a foreign marriage, but

only to take to wife one of his kindred, or of the citizens; yet, on

condition that, if he marries a citizen, her near relations become

incapable of holding office in the commonwealth.



37. The dominion must be indivisible. And so, if the king leaves more

than one child, let the eldest one succeed; but by no means be it

allowed to divide the dominion between them, or to give it undivided to

all or several of them, much less to give a part of it as a daughter's

dowry. For that daughters should be admitted to the inheritance of a

dominion is in no wise to be allowed.



38. If the king die leaving no male issue, let the next to him in blood

be held the heir to the dominion, unless he chance to have married a

foreign wife, whom he will not put away.



39. As for the citizens, it is manifest (Chap. III. Sec. 5) that every

one of them ought to obey all the commands of the king, and the decrees

published by the great council, although he believe them to be most

absurd, and otherwise he may rightfully be forced to obey. And these are

the foundations of a monarchical dominion, on which it must be built, if

it is to be stable, as we shall show in the next chapter.



40. As for religion, no temples whatever ought to be built at the public

expense; nor ought laws to be established about opinions, unless they be

seditious and overthrow the foundations of the commonwealth. And so let

such as are allowed the public exercise of their religion build a temple

at their own expense. But the king may have in his palace a chapel of

his own, that he may practise the religion to which he belongs.



------



1. Curtius, x. 1.







------------------------



CHAPTER VII.



OF MONARCHY (CONTINUATION).



AFTER explaining the foundations of a monarchical dominion, I have taken

in hand to prove here in order the fitness of such foundations. And to

this end the first point to be noted is, that it is in no way repugnant

to experience, for laws to be so firmly fixed, that not the king himself

can abolish them. For though the Persians worshipped their kings as

gods, yet had not the kings themselves authority to revoke laws once

established, as appears from Daniel, [1] and nowhere, as far as I know,

is a monarch chosen absolutely without any conditions expressed. Nor yet

is it repugnant to reason or the absolute obedience due to a king. For

the foundations of the dominion are to be considered as eternal decrees

of the king, so that his ministers entirely obey him in refusing to

execute his orders, when he commands anything contrary to the same.

Which we can make plain by the example of Ulysses. [2] For his comrades

were executing his own order, when they would not untie him, when he was

bound to the mast and captivated by the Sirens' song, although he gave

them manifold orders to do so, and that with threats. And it is ascribed

to his forethought, that he afterwards thanked his comrades for obeying

him according to his first intention. And, after this example of

Ulysses, kings often instruct judges, to administer justice without

respect of persons, not even of the king himself, if by some singular

accident he order anything contrary to established law. For kings are

not gods, but men, who are often led captive by the Sirens' song. If

then everything depended on the inconstant will of one man, nothing

would be fixed. And so, that a monarchical dominion may be stable, it

must be ordered, so that everything be done by the king's decree only,

that is, so that every law be an explicit will of the king, but not

every will of the king a law; as to which see Chap. VI. Sects. 3, 5, 6.



2. It must next be observed, that in laying foundations it is very

necessary to study the human passions: and it is not enough to have

shown, what ought to be done, but it ought, above all, to be shown how

it can be effected, that men, whether led by passion or reason, should

yet keep the laws firm and unbroken. For if the constitution of the

dominion, or the public liberty depends only on the weak assistance of

the laws, not only will the citizens have no security for its

maintenance (as we showed in the third section of the last chapter), but

it will even turn to their ruin. For this is certain, that no condition

of a commonwealth is more wretched than that of the best, when it begins

to totter, unless at one blow it falls with a rush into slavery, which

seems to be quite impossible. And, therefore, it would be far better for

the subjects to transfer their rights absolutely to one man, than to

bargain for unascertained and empty, that is unmeaning, terms of

liberty, and so prepare for their posterity a way to the most cruel

servitude. But if I succeed in showing that the foundation of

monarchical dominion, which I stated in the last chapter, are firm and

cannot be plucked up, without the indignation of the larger part of an

armed multitude, and that from them follow peace and security for king

and multitude, and if I deduce this from general human nature, no one

will be able to doubt, that these foundations are the best and the true

ones (Chap. III. Sec. 9, and Chap. VI. Sects. 3, 8). But that such is

their nature, I will show as briefly as possible.



3. That the duty of him, who holds the dominion, is always to know its

state and condition, to watch over the common welfare of all, and to

execute whatever is to the interest of the majority of the subjects, is

admitted by all. But as one person alone is unable to examine into

everything, and cannot always have his mind ready and turn it to

meditation, and is often hindered by disease, or old age, or other

causes, from having leisure for public business; therefore it is

necessary that the monarch have counsellors to know the state of

affairs, and help the king with their advice, and frequently supply his

place; and that so it come to pass, that the dominion or commonwealth

may continue always in one and the same mind. 



4. But as human nature is so constituted, that everyone seeks with the

utmost passion his own advantage, and judges those laws to be most

equitable, which he thinks necessary to preserve and increase his

substance, and defends another's cause so far only as he thinks he is

thereby establishing his own; it follows hence, that the counsellors

chosen must be such, that their private affairs and their own interests

depend on the general welfare and peace of all. And so it is evident,

that if from every sort or class of citizens a certain number be chosen,

what has most votes in such a council will be to the interest of the

greater part of the subjects. And though this council, because it is

composed of so large a number of citizens, must of necessity be attended

by many of very simple intellect, yet this is certain, that everyone is

pretty clever and sagacious in business which he has long and eagerly

practised. And, therefore, if none be chosen but such as have till their

fiftieth year practised their own business without disgrace, they will

be fit enough to give their advice about their own affairs, especially

if, in matters of considerable importance, a time be allowed for

consideration. Besides, it is far from being the fact, that a council

composed of a few is not frequented by this kind of men. For, on the

contrary, its greatest part must consist of such, since everyone, in

that case, tries hard to have dullards for colleagues, that they may

hang on his words, for which there is no opportunity in large councils.



5. Furthermore, it is certain, that everyone would rather rule than be

ruled. "For no one of his own will yields up dominion to another," as

Sallust has it in his first speech to Caesar. [3] And, therefore, it is

clear, that a whole multitude will never transfer its right to a few or

to one, if it can come to an agreement with itself, without proceeding

from the controversies, which generally arise in large councils, to

seditions. And so the multitude does not, if it is free, transfer to the

king anything but that, which it cannot itself have absolutely within

its authority, namely, the ending of controversies and the using

despatch in decisions. For as to the case which often arises, where a

king is chosen on account of war, that is, because war is much more

happily conducted by kings, it is manifest folly, I say, that men should

choose slavery in time of peace for the sake of better fortune in war;

if, indeed, peace can be conceived of in a dominion, where merely for

the sake of war the highest authority is transferred to one man, who is,

therefore, best able to show his worth and the importance to everyone of

his single self in time of war; whereas, on the contrary, democracy has

this advantage, that its excellence is greater in peace than in war.

However, for whatever reason a king is chosen, he cannot by himself, as

we said just now, know what will be to the interest of the dominion: but

for this purpose, as we showed in the last section, will need many

citizens for his counsellors. And as we cannot at all suppose, that any

opinion can be conceived about a matter proposed for discussion, which

can have escaped the notice of so large a number of men, it follows,

that no opinion can be conceived tending to the people's welfare,

besides all the opinions of this council, which are submitted to the

king. And so, since the people's welfare is the highest law, or the

king's utmost right, it follows, that the king's utmost right is but to

choose one of the opinions offered by the council, not to decree

anything, or offer any opinion contrary to the mind of all the council

at once (Chap. VI. Sec. 25). But if all the opinions offered in the

council were to be submitted to the king, then it might happen that the

king would always favour the small cities, which have the fewest votes.

For though by the constitution of the council it be ordained, that the

opinions should be submitted to the king without mention of their

supporters, yet they will never be able to take such good care, but that

some opinion will get divulged. And, therefore, it must of necessity be

provided, that that opinion, which has not gained at least a hundred

votes, shall be held void; and this law the larger cities will be sure

to defend with all their might.



6. And here, did I not study brevity, I would show other advantages of

this council; yet one, which seems of the greatest importance, I will

allege. I mean, that there can be given no greater inducement to virtue,

than this general hope of the highest honour. For by ambition are we all

most led, as in our Ethics we showed to be the case. [4]



7. But it cannot be doubted that the majority of this council will never

be minded to wage war, but rather always pursue and love peace. For

besides that war will always cause them fear of losing their property

and liberty, it is to be added, that war requires fresh expenditure,

which they must meet, and also that their own children and relatives,

though intent on their domestic cares, will be forced to turn their

attention to war and go a-soldiering, whence they will never bring back

anything but unpaid-for scars. For, as we said (Chap. VI. Sec. 31), no

pay is to be given to the militia, and (Chap. VI. Sec. 10) it is to be

formed out of citizens only and no others.



8. There is another accession to the cause of peace and concord, which

is also of great weight: I mean, that no citizen can have immovable

property (Chap. VI. Sec. 12). Hence all will have nearly an equal risk

in war. For all will be obliged, for the sake of gain, to practise

trade, or lend money to one another, if, as formerly by the Athenians, a

law be passed, forbidding to lend money at interest to any but

inhabitants; and thus they will be engaged in business, which either is

mutually involved, one man's with another's, or needs the same means for

its furtherance. And thus the greatest part of this council will

generally have one and the same mind about their common affairs and the

arts of peace. For, as we said (Sec. 4), every man defends another's

cause, so far as he thinks thereby to establish his own.



9. It cannot be doubted, that it will never occur to anyone to corrupt

this council with bribes. For were any man to draw over to his side some

one or two out of so great a number of men, he would gain nothing. For,

as we said, the opinion, which does not gain at least a hundred votes,

is void.



10. We shall also easily see, that, once this council is established its

members cannot be reduced to a less number, if we consider the common

passions of mankind. For all are guided mostly by ambition, and there is

no man who lives in health but hopes to attain extreme old age. If then

we calculate the number of those who actually reach their fiftieth or

sixtieth year, and further take into account the number that are every

year chosen of this great council, we shall see, that there can hardly

be a man of those who bear arms, but is under the influence of a great

hope of attaining this dignity. And so they will all, to the best of

their power, defend this law of the council. For be it noted, that

corruption, unless it creep in gradually, is easily prevented. But as it

can be more easily supposed, and would be less invidious, that a less

number should be chosen out of every clan, than that a less number

should be chosen out of a few clans, or that one or two clans should be

altogether excluded; therefore (Chap. VI. Sec. 15) the number of

counsellors cannot be reduced, unless a third, fourth, or fifth part be

removed simultaneously, which change is a very great one, and therefore

quite repugnant to common practice. Nor need one be afraid of delay or

negligence in choosing, because this is remedied by the council itself.

See Chap. VI. Sec. 16.



11. The king, then, whether he is induced by fear of the multitude, or

aims at binding to himself the majority of an armed multitude, or is

guided by a generous spirit, a wish that is, to consult the public

interest, will always confirm that opinion, which has gained most votes,

that is (Sec. 5), [5] which is to the interest of the greater part of

the dominion; and will study to reconcile the divergent opinions

referred to him, if it can be done, that he may attach all to himself

(in which he will exert all his powers), and that alike in peace and war

they may find out, what an advantage his single self is to them. And

thus he will then be most independent, and most in possession of

dominion, when he most consults the general welfare of the multitude.



12. For the king by himself cannot restrain all by fear. But his power,

as we have said, rests upon the number of his soldiers, and especially

on their valour and faith, which will always remain so long enduring

between men, as with them is joined need, be that need honourable or

disgraceful. And this is why kings usually are fonder of exciting than

restraining their soldiery, and shut their eyes more to their vices than

to their virtues, and generally, to hold under the best of them, seek

out, distinguish, and assist with money or favour the idle, and those

who have ruined themselves by debauchery, and shake hands with them, and

throw them kisses, and for the sake of mastery stoop to every servile

action. In order therefore that the citizens may be distinguished by the

king before all others, and, as far as the civil state and equity

permit, may remain independent, it is necessary that the militia should

consist of citizens only, and that citizens should be his counsellors;

and on the contrary citizens are altogether subdued, and are laying the

foundations of eternal war, from the moment that they suffer mercenaries

to be levied, whose trade is war, and who have most power in strifes and

seditions.



13. That the king's counsellors ought not to be elected for life, but

for three, four, or five years, is clear as well from the tenth, as from

what we said in the ninth section of this chapter. For if they were

chosen for life, not only could the greatest part of the citizens

conceive hardly any hope of obtaining this honour, and thus there would

arise a great inequality, and thence envy, and constant murmurs, and at

last seditions, which, no doubt, would be welcome to kings greedy of

mastery: but also the counsellors, being rid of the fear of their

successors, would assume a great licence in all respects, which the king

would be far from opposing. For the more the citizens hate them, the

more they will cling to the king, and be ready to flatter him. Nay, the

interval of five years seems even too much, for in such a space of time

it does not seem so impossible to corrupt by bribes or favour a very

large part of the council, however large it be. And therefore it will be

far safer, if every year two out of every clan retire, and be replaced

by as many more (supposing that there are to be five counsellors of each

clan), except in the year in which the jurist of any clan retires, and a

fresh one is chosen in his place.



14. Moreover, no king can promise himself more safety, than he who

reigns in a commonwealth of this sort. For besides that a king soon

perishes, when his soldiers cease to desire his safety, it is certain

that kings are always in the greatest danger from those who are nearest

their persons. The fewer counsellors, then, there are, and the more

powerful they consequently are, the more the king is in danger of their

transferring the dominion to another. Nothing in fact more alarmed

David, than that his own counsellor Ahitophel sided with Absalom. [6]

Still more is this the case, if the whole authority has been transferred

absolutely to one man, because it can then be more easily transferred

from one to another. For two private soldiers once took in hand to

transfer the Roman empire, and did transfer it. [7] I omit the arts and

cunning wiles, whereby counsellors have to assure themselves against

falling victims to their unpopularity; for they are but too well known,

and no one, who has read history, can be ignorant, that the good faith

of counsellors has generally turned to their ruin. And so, for their own

safety, it behoves them to be cunning, not faithful. But if the

counsellors are too numerous to unite in the same crime, and are all

equal, and do not hold their office beyond a period of four years, they

cannot be at all objects of fear to the king, except he attempt to take

away their liberty, wherein he will offend all the citizens equally.

For, as Antonio Perez [8] excellently observes, an absolute dominion is

to the prince very dangerous, to the subjects very hateful, and to the

institutes of God and man alike opposed, as innumerable instances show.



15. Besides these we have, in the last chapter, laid other foundations,

by which the king is greatly secured in his dominion, and the citizens

in their hold of peace and liberty, which foundations we will reason out

in their proper places. For I was anxious above everything to reason out

all those, which refer to the great council and are of the greatest

importance. Now I will continue with the others, in the same order in

which I stated them.



16. It is undoubted, that citizens are more powerful, and, therefore,

more independent, the larger and better fortified their towns are. For

the safer the place is, in which they are, the better they can defend

their liberty, and the less they need fear an enemy, whether without or

within; and it is certain that the more powerful men are by their

riches, the more they by nature study their own safety. But cities which

need the help of another for their preservation are not on terms of

equal right with that other, but are so far dependent on his right as

they need his help. For we showed in the second chapter, that right is

determined by power alone.



17. For the same reason, also, I mean that the citizens may continue

independent, and defend their liberty, the militia ought to be composed

of the citizens only, and none of them to be exempted. For an armed man

is more independent than an unarmed (Sec. 12); and those citizens

transfer absolutely their own right to another, and entrust it entirely

to his good faith, who have given him their arms and the defences of

their cities. Human avarice, by which most men are very much led, adds

its weight to this view. For it cannot be, that a mercenary force be

hired without great expense; and citizens can hardly endure the

exactions required to maintain an idle soldiery. But that no man, who

commands the whole or a large part of the militia, should, except under

pressure of necessity, be chosen for the extreme term of a year, all are

aware, who have read history, alike sacred and profane. For there is

nothing that reason more clearly teaches. For surely the might of

dominion is altogether entrusted to him, who is allowed enough time to

gain military glory, and raise his fame above the king's, or to make the

army faithful to himself by flattery, largesses, and the other arts,

whereby generals are accustomed to procure the enslavement of others,

and the mastery for themselves. Lastly, I have added this point for the

greater safety of the whole dominion, that these commanders of the

militia are to be selected from the king's counsellors or ex-counsellors

-- that is, from men who have reached the age at which mankind generally

prefer what is old and safe to what is new and dangerous. [9]



18. I said that the citizens were to be divided into clans, [10] and an

equal number of counsellors chosen from each, in order that the larger

towns might have, in proportion to the number of their citizens, a

greater number of counsellors, and be able, as is equitable, to

contribute more votes. For the power and, therefore, the right of a

dominion is to be estimated by the number of its citizens; and I do not

believe that any fitter means can be devised for maintaining this

equality between citizens, who are all by nature so constituted, that

everyone wishes to be attributed to his own stock, and be distinguished

by race from the rest.



19. Furthermore, in the state of nature, there is nothing which any man

can less claim for himself, and make his own, than the soil, and

whatever so adheres to the soil, that he cannot hide it anywhere, nor

carry it whither he pleases. The soil, therefore, and whatever adheres

to it in the way we have mentioned, must be quite common property of the

commonwealth -- that is, of all those who, by their united force, can

vindicate their claim to it, or of him to whom all have given authority

to vindicate his claim. And therefore the soil, and all that adheres to

it, ought to have a value with the citizens proportionate to the

necessity there is, that they may be able to set their feet thereon, and

defend their common right or liberty. But in the eighth section of this

chapter we have shown the advantages that the commonwealth must

necessarily derive hence.



20. In order that the citizens may be as far as possible equal, which is

of the first necessity in a commonwealth, none but the descendants of a

king are to be thought noble. But if all the descendants of kings were

allowed to marry wives, or beget children, they would grow, in process

of time, to a very large number, and would be, not only burdensome, but

also a cause of very great fear, to king and all. For men who nave too

much leisure generally meditate crime. And hence it is that kings are,

on account of their nobles, very much induced to make war, because kings

surrounded with nobles find more quiet and safety in war than in peace.

But I pass by this as notorious enough, and also the points which I have

mentioned in Secs. 15-27 of the last chapter. For the main points have

been proved in this chapter, and the rest are self-evident.



21. That the judges ought to be too numerous for a large proportion of

them to be accessible to the bribes of a private man, and that they

should not vote openly, but secretly, and that they deserve payment for

their time, is known to everyone [11] But they everywhere have by custom

a yearly salary; and so they make no great haste to determine suits, and

there is often no end to trials. Next, where confiscations accrue to the

king, there frequently in trials not truth nor right, but the greatness

of a man's riches is regarded. Informers are ever at work, and everyone

who has money is snatched as a prey, which evils, though grievous and

intolerable, are excused by the necessity of warfare, and continue even

in time of peace. But the avarice of judges that are appointed but for

two or three years at most is moderated by fear of their successors, not

to mention, again, that they can have no fixed property, but must lend

their money at interest to their fellow-citizens. And so they are forced

rather to consult their welfare than to plot against them, especially if

the judges themselves, as we have said, are numerous.



22. But we have said, that no military pay is to be voted [12] For the

chief reward of military service is liberty. For in the state of nature

everyone strives, for bare liberty's sake, to defend himself to the

utmost of his power, and expects no other reward of warlike virtue but

his own independence. But, in the civil state, all the citizens together

are to be considered as a man in the state of nature; and, therefore,

when all fight on behalf of that state, all are defending themselves,

and engaged on their own business. But counsellors, judges, magistrates,

and the like, are engaged more on others' business than on their own;

and so it is but fair to pay them for their time. Besides, in war, there

can be no greater or more honourable inducement to victory than the idea

of liberty. But if, on the contrary, a certain portion of the citizens

be designated as soldiers, on which account it will be necessary to

award them a fixed pay, the king will, of necessity, distinguish them

above the rest (as we showed. Sec. 12) -- that is, will distinguish men

who are acquainted only with the arts of war, and, in time of peace,

from excess of leisure, become debauched, and, finally, from poverty,

meditate nothing but rapine, civil discord, and wars. And so we can

affirm, that a monarchy of this sort is, in fact, a state of war, and in

it only the soldiery enjoy liberty, but the rest are slaves.



23. Our remarks about the admission of foreigners (Chap. VI. Sec. 32) I

believe to be obvious. Besides, no one can doubt that the king's

blood-relations should be at a distance from him, and occupied, not by

warlike, but by peaceful business, whence they may get credit and the

dominion quiet. Though even this has not seemed a sufficient precaution

to the Turkish despots, who, therefore, make a point of slaughtering all

their brothers. And no wonder: for the more absolutely the right of

dominion has been conferred on one man, the more easily, as we showed by

an instance (Sec. 14), it can be transferred from one to another. But

that in such a monarchy, as we here suppose, in which, I mean, there is

not one mercenary soldier, the plan we have mentioned provides

sufficiently for the king's safety, is not to be doubted.



24. Nor can anyone hesitate about what we have said in the thirty-fourth

and thirty-fifth sections of the last chapter. But that the king must

not marry a foreigner [13] is easily proved. For not to mention that two

commonwealths, although united by a treaty, are yet in a state of

hostility (Chap. III. Sec. 14), it is very much to be avoided that war

should be stirred up, on account of the king's domestic affairs, both

because disputes and dissensions arise peculiarly from an alliance

founded on marriage, and because questions between two commonwealths are

mostly settled by war. Of this we read a fatal instance in Scripture.

For after the death of Solomon, who had married the king of Egypt's

daughter, his son Rehoboam waged a most disastrous war with Shishak,

king of the Egyptians, who utterly subdued him. [14] Moreover, the

marriage of Lewis XIV., king of France with the daughter of Philip IV.

was the seed of a fresh war. [15] And, besides these, very many

instances may be read in history.



25. The form of the dominion ought to be kept one and the same, and,

consequently, there should be but one king, and that of the same sex,

and the dominion should be indivisible. [16] But as to my saying that

the king's eldest son should succeed his father by right, or (if there

be no issue) the nearest to him in blood, it is clear as well from Chap.

VI. Sec. 13, as because the election of the king made by the multitude

should, if possible, last for ever. Otherwise it will necessarily

happen, that the supreme authority of the dominion will frequently pass

to the multitude, which is an extreme and, therefore, exceedingly

dangerous change. But those who, from the fact that the king is master

of the dominion, and holds it by absolute right, infer that he can hand

it over to whom he pleases, and that, therefore, the king's son is by

right heir to the dominion, are greatly mistaken. For the king's will

has so long the force of law, as he holds the sword of the commonwealth;

for the right of dominion is limited by power only. Therefore, a king

may indeed abdicate, but cannot hand the dominion over to another,

unless with the concurrence of the multitude or its stronger part. And

that this may be more clearly understood, we must remark, that children

are heirs to their parents, not by natural, but by civil law. For by the

power of the commonwealth alone is anyone master of definite property.

And, therefore, by the same power or right, whereby the will of any man

concerning his property is held good, by the same also his will remains

good after his own death, as long as the commonwealth endures. And this

is the reason, why everyone in the civil state maintains after death the

same right as he had in his lifetime, because, as we said, it is not by

his own power, but by that of the commonwealth, which is everlasting,

that he can decide anything about his property. But the king's case is

quite different. For the king's will is the civil law itself, and the

king the commonwealth itself. Therefore, by the death of the king, the

commonwealth is in a manner dead, and the civil state naturally returns

to the state of nature, and consequently the supreme authority to the

multitude, which can, therefore, lawfully lay down new and abolish old

laws. And so it appears that no man succeeds the king by right, but him

whom the multitude wills to be successor, or in a theocracy, such as the

commonwealth of the Hebrews once was, him whom God has chosen by a

prophet. We might likewise infer this from the fact that the king's

sword, or right, is in reality the will of the multitude itself, or its

stronger part; or else from the fact, that men endowed with reason never

so utterly abdicate their right, that they cease to be men, and are

accounted as sheep. But to pursue this further is unnecessary.



26. But the right of religion, or of worshipping God, no man can

transfer to another. However, we have treated of this point at length in

the last chapters of our Theologico-Political Treatise, which it is

superfluous to repeat here. And herewith I claim to have reasoned out

the foundations of the best monarchy, though briefly, yet with

sufficient clearness. But their mutual interdependence, or, in other

words, the proportions of my dominion, anyone will easily remark, who

will be at the pains to observe them as a whole with some attention. It

remains only to warn the reader, that I am here conceiving of that

monarchy, which is instituted by a free multitude, for which alone these

foundations can serve. For a multitude that has grown used to another

form of dominion will not be able without great danger of overthrow to

pluck up the accepted foundations of the whole dominion, and change its

entire fabric.



27. And what we have written will, perhaps, be received with derision by

those who limit to the populace only the vices which are inherent in all

mortals; and use such phrases as, "the mob, if it is not frightened,

inspires no little fear," and "the populace is either a humble slave, or

a haughty master," and "it has no truth or judgment," etc. But all have

one common nature. Only we are deceived by power and refinement. Whence

it comes that when two do the same thing we say, "this man may do it

with impunity, that man may not;" not because the deed, but because the

doer is different. Haughtiness is a property of rulers. Men are haughty,

but by reason of an appointment for a year; how much more then nobles,

that have their honours eternal! But their arrogance is glossed over

with importance, luxury, profusion, and a kind of harmony of vices, and

a certain cultivated folly, and elegant villainy, so that vices, each of

which looked at separately is foul and vile, because it is then most

conspicuous, appear to the inexperienced and untaught honourable and

becoming. "The mob, too, if it is not frightened, inspires no little

fear;" yes, for liberty and slavery are not easily mingled. Lastly, as

for the populace being devoid of truth and judgment, that is nothing

wonderful, since the chief business of the dominion is transacted behind

its back, and it can but make conjectures from the little, which cannot

be hidden. For it is an uncommon virtue to suspend one's judgment. So it

is supreme folly to wish to transact everything behind the backs of the

citizens, and to expect that they will not judge ill of the same, and

will not give everything an unfavourable interpretation. For if the

populace could moderate itself, and suspend its judgment about things

with which it is imperfectly acquainted, or judge rightly of things by

the little it knows already, it would surely be more fit to govern, than

to be governed. But, as we said, all have the same nature. All grow

haughty with rule, and cause fear if they do not feel it, and everywhere

truth is generally transgressed by enemies or guilty people; especially

where one or a few have mastery, and have respect in trials not to

justice or truth, but to amount of wealth.



28. Besides, paid soldiers, that are accustomed to military discipline,

and can support cold and hunger, are likely to despise a crowd of

citizens as very inferior for storming towns or fighting pitched

battles. But that my dominion is, therefore, more unhappy or less

durable, no one of sound mind will affirm. But, on the contrary,

everyone that judges things fairly will admit, that that dominion is the

most durable of all, which can content itself with preserving what it

has got, without coveting what belongs to others, and strives,

therefore, most eagerly by every means to avoid war and preserve peace.



29. But I admit that the counsels of such a dominion can hardly be

concealed. But everyone will also admit with me that it is far better

for the right counsels of a dominion to be known to its enemies, than

for the evil secrets of tyrants to be concealed from the citizens. They

who can treat secretly of the affairs of a dominion have it absolutely

under their authority, and, as they plot against the enemy in time of

war, so do they against the citizens in time of peace. Now that this

secrecy is often serviceable to a dominion, no one can deny; but that

without it the said dominion cannot subsist, no one will ever prove.

But, on the contrary, to entrust affairs of state absolutely to any man

is quite incompatible with the maintenance of liberty; and so it is

folly to choose to avoid a small loss by means of the greatest of evils.

But the perpetual refrain of those who lust after absolute dominion is,

that it is to the essential interest of the commonwealth that its

business be secretly transacted, and other like pretences, which end in

the more hateful a slavery, the more they are clothed with a show of

utility.



30. Lastly, although no dominion, as far as I know, has ever been

founded on all the conditions we have mentioned, yet from experience

itself we shall be able to prove that this form of monarchy is the best,

if we consider the causes of the preservation and overthrow of any

dominion that is not barbarous. But this I could not do without greatly

wearying the reader. However, I cannot pass over in silence one

instance, that seems worth remembering: I mean the dominion of the

Arragonese, who showed a singular loyalty towards their kings, and with

equal constancy preserved unbroken the constitution of the kingdom. For

as soon as they had cast off the slavish yoke of the Moors, they

resolved to choose themselves a king, but on what conditions they could

not quite make up their minds, and they therefore determined to consult

the sovereign pontiff of Rome. He, who in this matter certainly bore

himself as Christ's vicar, blamed them for so obstinately wishing to

choose a king, unwarned by the example of the Hebrews. However, if they

would not change their minds, then he advised them not to choose a king,

without first instituting customs equitable and suitable to the national

genius, and above all he would have them create some supreme council, to

balance the king's power like the ephors of the Lacedaemonians, and to

have absolute right to determine the disputes, which might arise between

the king and the citizens. So then, following this advice, they

established the laws, which seemed to them most equitable, of which the

supreme interpreter, and therefore supreme judge, was to be, not the

king, but the council, which they call the Seventeen, and whose

president has the title of Justice [17] This Justice then, and the

Seventeen, who are chosen for life, not by vote but by lot, have the

absolute right of revising and annulling all sentences passed upon any

citizen by other courts, civil or ecclesiastical, or by the king

himself, so that every citizen had the right to summon the king himself

before this council. Moreover, they once had the right of electing and

deposing the king. But after the lapse of many years the king, Don

Pedro, who is called the Dagger, by canvassing, bribery, promises, and

every sort of practice, at length procured the revocation of this right.

And as soon as he gained his point, he cut off, or, as I would sooner

believe, wounded his hand before them all, saying, that not without the

loss of royal blood could subjects be allowed to choose their king [18]

Yet he effected this change, but upon this condition, "That the subjects

have had and shall have the right of taking arms against any violence

whatever, whereby any may wish to enter upon the dominion to their hurt,

nay, against the king himself, or the prince, his heir, if he thus

encroach." By which condition they certainly rather rectified than

abolished that right. For, as we have shown (Chap. IV. Secs. 5, 6), a

king can be deprived of the power of ruling, not by the civil law, but

by the law of war, in other words the subjects may resist his violence

with violence. Besides this condition they stipulated others, which do

not concern our present design. Having by these customs given themselves

a constitution to the mind of all, they continued for an incredible

length of time unharmed, the king's loyalty towards his subjects being

as great as theirs towards him. But after that the kingdom fell by

inheritance to Ferdinand of Castile, who first had the surname of

Catholic; this liberty of the Arragonese began to displease the

Castilians, who therefore ceased not to urge Ferdinand to abolish these

rights. But he, not yet being accustomed to absolute dominion, dared

make no such attempt, but replied thus to his counsellors: that (not to

mention that he had received the kingdom of Arragon on those terms,

which they knew, and had most solemnly sworn to observe the same, and

that it was inhuman to break his word) he was of opinion, that his

kingdom would be stable, as long as its safety was as much to the

subjects' as to the king's interest, so that neither the king should

outweigh the subjects, nor yet the subjects the king; for that if either

party were too powerful, the weaker would not only try to recover its

former equality, but in vexation at its injury to retaliate upon the

other, whence would follow the ruin of either or both. Which very wise

language I could not enough wonder at, had it proceeded from a king

accustomed to command not freemen but slaves. Accordingly the Arragonese

retained their liberties after the time of Ferdinand, though no longer

by right but by the favour of their too powerful kings, until the reign

of Philip II., who oppressed them with better luck, but no less cruelty,

than he did the United Provinces. And although Philip III. is supposed

to have restored everything to its former position, yet the Arragonese,

partly from eagerness to flatter the powerful (for it is folly to kick

against the pricks), partly from terror, have kept nothing but the

specious names and empty forms of liberty.



31. We conclude, therefore, that the multitude may preserve under a king

an ample enough liberty; if it contrive that the king's power be

determined by the sole power, and preserved by the defence of the

multitude itself. And this was the single rule which I followed in

laying the foundations of monarchy.



------



1. Daniel vi. 15.



2. Hom. "Odys.," xii. 156-200.



3. Chap. I. Sec. 4 of the speech, or rather letter, which is not now

admitted to be a genuine work of Sallust.



4. Ethics, iii. 29, &c.



5. This seems to be a mistake for Sec. 4, "Id majori subditorum parti

utile erit, quod in hoc concilio plurima habuerit suffragia." "What has

most votes in such a council, will be to the interest of the greater

part of the subjects."



6. 2 Sam. xv. 31.



7. Tacitus, Histories, i., 7.



8. Antonio Perez, a publicist, and professor of law in the University of

Louvain in the first part of the seventeenth century.



9. Chap. VI. Sec. 10.



10. Chap. VI. Secs. 11, 15, 16.



11. Chap. VI. Secs. 27, 28.



12. Chap. VI. Sec. 31.



13. Chap. VI. Sec. 36.



14. 1 Kings xiv. 25; 2 Chron. xii.



15. The war between France and Spain, terminated by the first peace of

Aix-la-Chapelle, 1665.



16. Chap. VI. Sec. 37.



17. See Hallam's "History of the Middle Ages," Chap. IV., for the

constitutional history of Arragon. Hallam calls the Justiza the

Justiciary, but the literal translation, Justice, seems warranted by our

own English use of the word to designate certain judges.



18. Hallam says, that the king merely cut the obnoxious Privilege of

Union, which he describes rather differently, through with his sword.

The Privilege of Union was so utterly "eradicated from the records of

the kingdom, that its precise words have never been recovered."





------------------------



CHAPTER VIII.



OF ARISTOCRACY.



SO far of monarchy. But now we will say, on what plan an aristocracy is

to be framed, so that it may be lasting. We have defined an aristocratic

dominion as that, which is held not by one man, but by certain persons

chosen out of the multitude, whom we shall henceforth call patricians. I

say expressly, "that which is held by certain persons chosen." For the

chief difference between this and a democracy is, that the right of

governing depends in an aristocracy on election only, but in a democracy

for the most part on some right either congenital or acquired by fortune

(as we shall explain in its place); and therefore, although in any

dominion the entire multitude be received into the number of the

patricians, provided that right of theirs is not inherited, and does not

descend by some law to others, the dominion will for all that be quite

an aristocracy, because none are received into the number of the

patricians save by express election. But if these chosen persons were

but two, each of them will try to be more powerful than the other, and

from the too great power of each, the dominion will easily be split into

two factions; and in like manner into three, four, or five factions, if

three, four, or five persons were put into possession of it. But the

factions will be the weaker, the more there are to whom the dominion was

delegated. And hence it follows, that to secure the stability of an

aristocracy, it is necessary to consider the proportionate size of the

actual dominion, in order to determine the minimum number of patricians.



2. Let it be supposed, then, that for a dominion of moderate size it

suffices to be allowed a hundred of the best men, and that upon them has

been conferred the supreme authority of the dominion, and that they have

consequently the right to elect their patrician colleagues, when any of

the number die. These men will certainly endeavour to secure their

succession to their children or next in blood. And thus the supreme

authority of the dominion will always be with those, whom fortune has

made children or kinsmen to patricians. And, as out of a hundred men who

rise to office by fortune, hardly three are found that excel in

knowledge and counsel, it will thus come to pass, that the authority of

the dominion will rest, not with a hundred, but only with two or three

who excel by vigour of mind, and who will easily draw to themselves

everything, and each of them, as is the wont of human greed, will be

able to prepare the way to a monarchy. And so, if we make a right

calculation, it is necessary, that the supreme authority of a dominion,

whose size requires at least a hundred first-rate men, should be

conferred on not less than five thousand. For by this proportion it will

never fail, but a hundred shall be found excelling in mental vigour,

that is, on the hypothesis that, out of fifty that seek and obtain

office, one will always be found not less than first-rate, besides

others that imitate the virtues of the first-rate, and are therefore

worthy to rule.



3. The patricians are most commonly citizens of one city, which is the

head of the whole dominion, so that the commonwealth or republic has its

name from it, as once that of Rome, and now those of Venice, Genoa, etc.

But the republic of the Dutch has its name from an entire province,

whence it arises, that the subjects of this dominion enjoy a greater

liberty. Now, before we can determine the foundations on which this

aristocratic dominion ought to rest, we must observe a very great

difference, which exists between the dominion which is conferred on one

man and that which is conferred on a sufficiently large council. For, in

the first place, the power of one man is (as we said, Chap. VI. Sec. 5)

very inadequate to support the entire dominion; but this no one, without

manifest absurdity, can affirm of a sufficiently large council. For, in

declaring the council to be sufficiently large, one at the same time

denies, that it is inadequate to support the dominion. A king,

therefore, is altogether in need of counsellors, but a council like this

is not so in the least. In the second place, kings are mortal, but

councils are everlasting. And so the power of the dominion which has

once been transferred to a large enough council never reverts to the

multitude. But this is otherwise in a monarchy, as we showed (Chap. VII.

Sec. 25). Thirdly, a king's dominion is often on sufferance, whether

from his minority, sickness, or old age, or from other causes; but the

power of a council of this kind, on the contrary, remains always one and

the same. In the fourth place, one man's will is very fluctuating and

inconstant; and, therefore, in a monarchy, all law is, indeed, the

explicit will of the king (as we said. Chap. VII. Sec. 1), but not every

will of the king ought to be law; but this cannot be said of the will of

a sufficiently numerous council. For since the council itself, as we

have just shown, needs no counsellors, its every explicit will ought to

be law. And hence we conclude, that the dominion conferred upon a large

enough council is absolute, or approaches nearest to the absolute. For

if there be any absolute dominion, it is, in fact, that which is held by

an entire multitude.



4. Yet in so far as this aristocratic dominion never (as has just been

shown) reverts to the multitude, and there is under it no consultation

with the multitude, but, without qualification, every will of the

council is law, it must be considered as quite absolute, and therefore

its foundations ought to rest only on the will and judgment of the said

council, and not on the watchfulness of the multitude, since the latter

is excluded from giving its advice or its vote. The reason, then, why in

practice aristocracy is not absolute, is that the multitude is a cause

of fear to the rulers, and therefore succeeds in retaining for itself

some liberty, which it asserts and holds as its own, if not by an

express law, yet on a tacit understanding.



5. And thus it is manifest that this kind of dominion will be in the

best possible condition, if its institutions are such that it most

nearly approaches the absolute -- that is, that the multitude is as

little as possible a cause of fear, and retains no liberty, but such as

must necessarily be assigned it by the law of the dominion itself, and

is therefore not so much a right of the multitude as of the whole

dominion, asserted and maintained by the aristocrats only as their own.

For thus practice agrees best with theory, as appears from the last

section, and is also self-evident. For we cannot doubt that the dominion

rests the less with the patricians, the more rights the commons assert

for themselves, such as those which the corporations of artisans in

Lower Germany, commonly called Guilds, generally possess.



6. But the commons need not apprehend any danger of a hateful slavery

from this form of dominion, merely because it is conferred on the

council absolutely. For the will of so large a council cannot be so much

determined by lust as by reason; because men are drawn asunder by an

evil passion, and cannot be guided, as it were, by one mind, except so

far as they desire things honourable, or that have at least an

honourable appearance.



7. In determining, then, the foundations of an aristocracy, it is above

all to be observed, that they should rest on the sole will and power of

the supreme council, so that it may be as independent as possible, and

be in no danger from the multitude. In order to determine these

foundations, which are to rest, I say, upon the sole will and power of

the council, let us see what foundations of peace are peculiar to

monarchy, and unsuited to this form of dominion. For if we substitute

for these equivalent foundations fit for an aristocracy, and leave the

rest, as they are already laid, we shall have removed without doubt

every cause of seditions; or, at least, this kind of dominion will be no

less safe than the monarchical, but, on the contrary, so much the more

so, and of so much better a condition, as, without danger to peace and

liberty, it approaches nearer than monarchy to the absolute (Secs. 3,

6). For the greater the right of the supreme authority, the more the

form of dominion agrees with the dictate of reason (Chap. III. Sec. 5

[1]), and, therefore, the fitter it is to maintain peace and liberty.

Let us run through, therefore, the points we stated in our sixth

chapter, beginning with the ninth section, that we may reject what is

unfit for this kind of dominion, and see what agrees with it.



8. That it is necessary, in the first place, to found and fortify one or

more cities, no one can doubt. But that city is above all to be

fortified, which is the head of the whole dominion, and also those that

are on its frontiers. For that which is the head of the whole dominion,

and has the supreme right, ought to be more powerful than the rest. But

under this kind of dominion it is quite unnecessary to divide all the

inhabitants into clans.



9. As for the military, since under this dominion equality is not to be

looked for among all, but between the patricians only, and, in

particular, the power of the patricians is greater than that of the

commons, it is certain that it makes no difference to the laws or

fundamental principles of this dominion, that the military be formed of

others besides subjects. [2] But it is of the first importance that no

one be admitted into the number of the patricians, that has not a proper

knowledge of the art of war. But for the subjects to be excluded, as

some would have it, from military service, is surely folly. For besides

that the military pay given to subjects remains within the realm,

whereas, on the contrary, what is paid to a foreign soldiery is

altogether lost, the greatest strength of the dominion is also thereby

weakened. For it is certain that those fight with peculiar valour who

fight for altar and hearth. Whence, also, it is manifest that those are

no less wrong, who lay down that military commanders, tribunes,

centurions, etc., should be chosen from among the patricians only. For

with what courage will those soldiers fight who are deprived of all hope

of gaining glory and advancement? But, on the other hand, to establish a

law forbidding the patricians to hire foreign soldiers when

circumstances require it, whether to defend themselves, and suppress

seditions, or for any other reason, besides being inconsiderate, would

also be repugnant to the supreme right of the patricians, concerning

which see Secs. 3, 4, 5 of this chapter. But the general of a single

army, or of the entire military, is to be chosen but in time of war, and

among the patricians only, and is to hold the command for a year at

most, without power of being continued therein, or afterwards

reappointed. For this law, necessary as it is under a monarchy, is so

above all under this kind of dominion. For although it is much easier,

as we have said above, to transfer the dominion from one man to another

than from a free council to one man; yet it does often happen, that

patricians are subdued by their own generals, and that to the much

greater harm of the commonwealth. For when a monarch is removed, it is

but a change of tyrant, not of the form of dominion; but, under an

aristocracy, this cannot happen, without an upsetting of the form of

dominion, and a slaughter of the greatest men. Of which thing Rome has

offered the most mournful examples. But our reason for saying that,

under a monarchy, the militia should serve without pay, is here

inapplicable. For since the subjects are excluded from giving their

advice or votes, they are to be reckoned as foreigners, and are,

therefore, to be hired for service on no worse terms than foreigners.

And there is in this case no danger of their being distinguished above

the rest by the patricians: nay, further, to avoid the partial judgment

which everyone is apt to form of his own exploits, it is wiser for the

patricians to assign a fixed payment to the soldiers for their service.



10. Furthermore, for this same reason, that all but the patricians are

foreigners, it cannot be without danger to the whole dominion, that the

lands and houses and the whole soil should remain public property, and

be let to the inhabitants at a yearly rent. For the subjects having no

part in the dominion would easily, in bad times, all forsake their

cities, if they could carry where they pleased what goods they possess.

And, therefore, lands and farms are not to be let, but sold to the

subjects, yet on condition that they pay every year an aliquot part of

the year's produce, etc., as is done in Holland.



11. These points considered, I proceed to the foundations on which the

supreme council should rest and be established. We have shown (Sec. 2)

that, in a moderate-sized dominion, this council ought to have about

five thousand members. And so we must look for means of preventing the

dominion from gradually getting into fewer hands, and of insuring, on

the contrary, that the number of members be increased in proportion to

the growth of the dominion itself; and, next, that between the

patricians, equality be as far as possible maintained; and, further,

that there may be speed and expedition in their counsels, and that they

tend to the general good; and, lastly, that the power of the patricians

or council exceed the power of the multitude, yet so that the multitude

suffer no harm thereby.



12. But jealousy causes a great difficulty in maintaining our first

point. For men are, as we have said, by nature enemies, so that however

they be associated, and bound together by laws, they still retain their

nature. And hence I think it is, that democracies change into

aristocracies, and these at length into monarchies. For I am fully

persuaded that most aristocracies were formerly democracies. For when a

given multitude, in search of fresh territories, has found and

cultivated them, it retains, as a whole, its equal right of dominion,

because no man gives dominion to another spontaneously. But although

every one of them thinks it fair, that he should have the same right

against another that that other has against him, he yet thinks it

unfair, that the foreigners that join them should have equal right in

the dominion with themselves, who sought it by their own toil, and won

it at the price of their own blood. And this not even the foreigners

themselves deny, for, of course, they migrate thither, not to hold

dominion, but for the benefit of their own private business, and are

quite satisfied if they are but allowed the liberty of transacting that

business in safety. But meanwhile the multitude is augmented by the

influx of foreigners, who gradually acquire the national manners, until

at last they are distinguished by no other difference than that of

incapacity to get office; and while their number daily increases, that

of the citizens, on the contrary, is by many causes diminished. For

families often die out, and some persons are disqualified for their

crimes, and a great many are driven by domestic poverty to neglect

affairs of state, and meanwhile the more powerful aim at nothing else,

but to govern alone; and thus the dominion is gradually limited to a

few, and at length by faction to one. And here we might add other causes

that destroy dominions of this sort; but as they are well known, I pass

them by, and proceed now to state the laws by which this dominion, of

which we are treating, ought to be maintained.



13. The primary law of this dominion ought to be that which determines

the proportionate numbers of patricians and multitude. For a proportion

(Sec. 1) ought to be maintained between the multitude and the

patricians, so that with the increase of the former the number of the

latter should be raised. And this proportion (in accordance with our

remarks in the second section) ought to be about fifty to one, that is,

the inequality between the members of each should never be greater. For

(Sec. 1) without destroying the form of dominion, the number of

patricians may be greater than the number of the multitude. But there is

no danger except in the smallness of their number. But how it is to be

provided that this law be kept unbroken, I will presently show in its

own place.



14. Patricians, in some places, are chosen only out of particular

families. But it is ruinous to lay this down expressly by law. For not

to mention that families often die out, and that the other families can

never be excluded without disgrace, it is also repugnant to the form of

this dominion, that the dignity of patrician should be hereditary (Sec.

1). But on this system a dominion seems rather a democracy, such as we

have described in Sec. 12, that is in the hands of very few citizens.

But, on the other hand, to provide against the patricians choosing their

own sons and kinsmen, and thereby against the right of dominion

remaining in particular families, is impossible, and indeed absurd, as I

shall show (Sec. 39). But provided that they hold that right by no

express law, and that the rest (I mean, such as are born within the

dominion, and use the vulgar tongue, and have not a foreign wife, and

are not infamous, nor servants, nor earning their living by any servile

trade, among which are to be reckoned those of a wine-merchant, or

brewer) are not excluded, the form of the dominion will,

notwithstanding, be retained, and it will be possible to maintain the

proportion between the patricians and the multitude.



15. But if it be further by law appointed that no young men be chosen,

it will never happen that a few families hold the right of government in

their hands. And, therefore, be it by law appointed, that no man that

has not reached his thirtieth year be put on the list of candidates.



16. Thirdly, it is next to be ordained, that all the patricians must be

assembled at certain fixed times in a particular part of the city, and

that whoever does not attend the council, unless he be hindered by

illness or some public business, shall be fined some considerable

amount. For, were it otherwise, most of them would neglect the public,

for the sake of their own private affairs.



17. Let this council's functions be to pass and repeal laws, and to

choose their patrician colleagues, and all the ministers of the

dominion. For he, that has supreme right, as we have decided that this

council has, cannot give to anyone authority to pass and repeal laws,

without at the same time abdicating his own right, and transferring it

to him, to whom he gives that power. For he, that has but for one day

only authority to pass and repeal laws, is able to change the entire

form of the dominion. But one can, without forfeiting one's supreme

right, temporarily entrust to others the daily business of dominion to

be administered according to the established laws. Furthermore, if the

ministers of dominion were chosen by any other but this council, then

its members would be more properly called wards than patricians.



18. Hence some are accustomed to create for the council a ruler or

prince, either for life, as the Venetians, or for a time, as the

Genoese; but yet with such great precautions, as make it clear enough,

that it is not done without great risk. And assuredly we cannot doubt

but that the dominion thereby approaches the monarchical form, and as

far as we can conjecture from their histories, it was done for no other

reason, than that before the institution of these councils they had

lived under a ruler, or doge, as under a king. And so the creation of a

ruler is a necessary requisite indeed for the particular nation, but not

for the aristocratic dominion considered in itself.



19. But, inasmuch as the supreme authority of this dominion rests with

this council as a whole, not with every individual member of it (for

otherwise it would be but the gathering of an undisciplined mob), it is,

therefore, necessary that all the patricians be so bound by the laws as

to form, as it were, one body governed by one mind. But the laws by

themselves alone are weak and easily broken, when their vindicators are

the very persons who are able to transgress them, and the only ones who

are to take warning by the punishment, and must punish their colleagues

in order by fear of the same punishment to restrain their own desire:

for all this involves a great absurdity. And, therefore, means must be

sought to preserve order in this supreme council and keep unbroken the

constitution of the dominion, so that yet the greatest possible equality

may exist between patricians.



20. But since, from a single ruler or prince, able also to vote in the

debates, there must necessarily arise a great inequality, especially on

account of the power, which must of necessity be granted him, in order

to enable him to discharge his duty in safety; therefore, if we consider

the whole matter aright, nothing can be devised more useful to the

general welfare than the institution of another council of certain

patricians subordinate to the supreme council, whose only duty should be

to see that the constitution, as far as it concerns the councils and

ministers of the dominion, be kept unbroken, and who should, therefore,

have authority to summon to judgment and, in conformity with established

law, to condemn any delinquent who, as a minister of the dominion, has

transgressed the laws concerning his office. And these patricians we

shall hereafter call syndics.



21. And they are to be chosen for life. For, were they to be chosen for

a time, so that they should afterwards be eligible for other offices in

the dominion, we should fall into the very absurdity which we have just

pointed out in the nineteenth section. But lest they should become quite

haughty by very long rule, none are to be elected to this office, but

those who have reached their sixtieth year or more, and have discharged

the duties of senator, of which below.



22. Of these, too, we shall easily determine the number, if we consider

that these syndics stand to the patricians in the same relation as the

whole body of patricians together does to the multitude, which they

cannot govern, if they are fewer than a proper number. And, therefore,

the number of the syndics should be to that of patricians as their

number is to that of the multitude, that is (Sec. 13), as one to fifty.



23. Moreover, that this council may discharge its functions in security,

some portion of the soldiery must be assigned to it, and be subject to

its orders.



24. The syndics and other ministers of state are to have no salary, but

such emoluments, that they cannot maladminister affairs of state without

great loss to themselves. For we cannot doubt that it is fair, that the

ministers of this kind of dominion should be awarded a recompense for

their time, since the commons are the majority in this dominion, and the

patricians look after their safety, while they themselves have no

trouble with affairs of state, but only with their own private ones. But

since, on the other hand, no man (Chap. VII. Sec. 4) defends another's

cause, save in so far as he thereby hopes to establish his own interest,

things must, of necessity, be so ordered that the ministers, who have

charge of affairs of state, should most pursue their own interest, when

they are most watchful for the general good.



25. To the syndics then, whose duty, as we said, it is to see that the

constitution is kept unbroken, the following emoluments are to be

awarded: namely, that every householder that inhabits any place in the

dominion, be bound to pay every year a coin of small value, say a

quarter of an ounce of silver, to the syndics, that thus they may know

the number of inhabitants, and so observe what proportion of them the

patricians constitute; and next that every new patrician on his election

must pay the syndics some large sum, for instance, twenty or twenty-five

pounds of silver. Moreover, that money, in which the absent patricians

(I mean those who have failed to attend the meeting of the council) are

condemned, is also to be awarded to the syndics; and a part, too, of the

goods of defaulting ministers, who are bound to abide their judgment,

and who are fined a certain sum of money, or have their goods

confiscated, should be devoted to them, not to all indeed, but to those

only who sit daily, and whose duty it is to summon the council of

syndics, concerning whom see Sec. 28. But, in order that the council of

syndics may always be maintained at its full number, before all other

business in the supreme council, when it is assembled at the usual time,

inquiry is to be made about this. Which, if the syndics neglect, let it

then devolve upon the president of the senate (concerning which we shall

soon have occasion to speak), to admonish the supreme council on this

head, to demand of the president of the syndics the reason of his

silence, and to inquire what is the supreme council's opinion in the

matter. But if the president of the senate is likewise silent, let the

case be taken up by the president of the supreme court of justice, or if

he too is silent by some other patrician, and let him demand an

explanation of their silence from the presidents of the senate and the

court of justice, as well as from the president of the syndics. Lastly,

that that law, whereby young men are excluded, may likewise be strictly

observed, it is to be appointed that all who have reached the thirtieth

year of their age, and who are not by express law excluded, are to have

their names inscribed on a list, in presence of the syndics, and to

receive from them, at a fixed price, some sign of the honour conferred

on them, namely, that they may be allowed to wear a particular ornament

only permitted to them, to distinguish them and make them to be had in

honour by the rest; and, at the same time, be it ordained, that in

elections none may nominate as patrician anyone whose name is not

inscribed on the general list, and that under a heavy penalty. And,

further, let no one be allowed to refuse the burden of a duty or office,

which he is chosen to bear. Lastly, that all the absolutely fundamental

laws of the dominion may be everlasting, it must be ordained that if

anyone in the supreme council raise a question about any fundamental

law, as of prolonging the command of any general of an army, or of

diminishing the number of patricians, or the like, he is guilty of

treason, and not only is he to be condemned to death, and his goods

confiscated, but some sign of his punishment is to remain visible in

public for an eternal memorial of the event. But for the confirming of

the other general rights of the dominion, it is enough, if it be only

ordained, that no law can be repealed nor new law passed, unless first

the college of syndics, and then three-fourths or four-fifths of the

supreme council agree thereto.



26. Let the right also of summoning the supreme council and proposing

the matters to be decided in it, rest with the syndics, and let them

likewise be given the first place in the council, but without the right

to vote. But before they take their seats, they must swear by the safety

of that supreme council and by the public liberty, that they will strive

with the utmost zeal to preserve unbroken the ancient laws. and to

consult the general good. After which let them through their secretary

open in order the subjects of discussion.



27. But that all the patricians may have equal authority in making

decrees and electing the ministers of the dominion, and that speed and

expedition in all matters may be possible, the order observed by the

Venetians is altogether to be approved, for they appoint by lot a

certain number of the council to name the ministers, and when these have

named in order the candidates for office, every patrician signifies by

ballot his opinion, approving or rejecting the candidate in question, so

that it is not afterwards known, who voted in this or that sense.

Whereby it is contrived, not only that the authority of all the

patricians in the decision is equal, and that business is quickly

despatched, but also, that everyone has absolute liberty (which is of

the first necessity in councils) to give his opinion without danger of

unpopularity.



28. But in the councils of syndics and the other councils, the same

order is to be observed, that voting is to be by ballot. But the right

of convoking the council of syndics and of proposing the matters to be

decided in the same ought to belong to their president, who is to sit

every day with ten or more other syndics, to hear the complaints and

secret accusations of the commons against the ministers, and to look

after the accusers, if circumstances require, and to summon the supreme

council even before the appointed time, if any of them judge that there

is danger in the delay. Now this president and those who meet with him

every day are to be appointed by the supreme council and out of the

number of syndics, not indeed for life, but for six months, and they

must not have their term renewed but after the lapse of three or four

years. And these, as we said above, are to be awarded the goods that are

confiscated and the pecuniary fines, or some part of them. The remaining

points which concern the syndics we will mention in their proper places.



29. The second council, which is subordinate to the supreme one, we will

call the senate, and let its duty be to transact public business, for

instance, to publish the laws of the dominion, to order the

fortifications of the cities according to law, to confer military

commissions, to impose taxes on the subjects and apply the same, to

answer foreign embassies, and decide where embassies are to be sent. But

let the actual appointment of ambassadors be the duty of the supreme

council. For it is of the greatest consequence to see that no patrician

be called to any office in the dominion but by the supreme council

itself, lest the patricians themselves should try to curry favour with

the senate. Secondly, all matters are to be referred to the supreme

council, which in any way alter the existing state of things, as the

deciding on peace and war. Wherefore, that the senate's decrees

concerning peace and war may be valid, they must be confirmed by the

supreme council. And therefore I should say, that it belonged to the

supreme council only, not to the senate, to impose new taxes.



30. In determining the number of senators these points are to be taken

into consideration: first, that all the patricians should have an equal

hope of gaining senatorial rank; secondly, that notwithstanding the same

senators, whose time (for which they were elected) is elapsed, may be

continued after a short interval, that so the dominion may always be

governed by skilled and experienced men; and lastly, that among the

senators many may be found illustrious for wisdom and virtue. But to

secure all these conditions, there can be no other means devised, than

that it should be by law appointed, that no one who has not reached his

fiftieth year, be received into the number of senators, and that four

hundred, that is about a twelfth part of the patricians, be appointed

for a year, and that two years after that year has elapsed, the same be

capable of re-appointment. For in this manner about a twelfth part of

the patricians will be constantly engaged in the duty of senator, with

only short intervening periods; and this number surely, together with

that made up by the syndics, will be little less than the number of

patricians that have attained their fiftieth year. And so all the

patricians will always have a great hope of gaining the rank of senator

or syndic, and yet notwithstanding, the same patricians, at only short

intervals, will always hold senatorial rank, and (according to what we

said, Sec. 2) there will never be wanting in the senate distinguished

men, excelling in counsel and skill. And because this law cannot be

broken without exciting great jealousy on the part of many patricians,

it needs no other safeguard for its constant validity, than that every

patrician who has reached the age we mentioned, should offer the proof

thereof to the syndics, who shall put his name on the list of candidates

for the senatorial duties, and read the name before the supreme council,

so that he may occupy, with the rest of the same rank, a place set apart

in this supreme council for his fellows, next to the place of the

senators.



31. The emoluments of the senators should be of such a kind, that their

profit is greater from peace than from war. And therefore let there be

awarded to them a hundredth or a fiftieth part of the merchandise

exported abroad from the dominion, or imported into it from abroad. For

we cannot doubt, that by this means they will, as far as they can,

preserve peace, and never desire to protract war. And from this duty not

even the senators themselves, if any of them are merchants, ought to be

exempt; for such an immunity cannot be granted without great risk to

trade, as I think no one is ignorant. Nay, on the contrary, it must be

by law ordained, that no senator or ex-senator may fill any military

post; and further, that no one may be declared general or praetor, which

officers we said (Sec. 9) were to be only appointed in time of war,

whose father or grandfather is a senator, or has held the dignity of

senator within two years. Which laws we cannot doubt, that the

patricians outside the senate will defend with all their might: and so

it will be the case, that the senators will always have more profit from

peace than from war, and will, therefore, never advise war, except the

utmost need of the dominion compels them. But it may be objected to us,

that on this system, if, that is, syndics and senators are to be allowed

so great profits, an aristocracy will be as burdensome to the subjects

as any monarchy. But not to mention that royal courts require larger

expenditure, and are yet not provided in order to secure peace, and that

peace can never be bought too dear; it is to be added, first, that all

that under a monarchy is conferred on one or a few, is here conferred

upon very many. Next kings and their ministers do not bear the burden of

the dominion with the subjects, but under this form of dominion it is

just the reverse; for the patricians, who are always chosen from the

rich, bear the largest share of the weight of the commonwealth. Lastly,

the burdens of a monarchy spring not so much from its king's

expenditure, as from its secret policy. For those burdens of a dominion,

that are imposed on the citizens in order to secure peace and liberty,

great though they be, are yet supported and lightened by the usefulness

of peace. What nation ever had to pay so many and so heavy taxes as the

Dutch? Yet it not only has not been exhausted, but, on the contrary, has

been so mighty by its wealth, that all envied its good fortune. If

therefore the burdens of a monarchy were imposed for the sake of peace,

they would not oppress the citizens; but, as I have said, it is from the

secret policy of that sort of dominion, that the subjects faint under

their lord; that is, because the virtue of kings counts for more in time

of war than in time of peace, and because they, who would reign by

themselves, ought above all to try and have their subjects poor; not to

mention other things, which that most prudent Dutchman V. H. [3]

formerly remarked, because they do not concern my design, which is only

to describe the best state of every kind of dominion.



32. Of the syndics chosen by the supreme council, some should sit in the

senate, but without the right of voting, so that they may see whether

the laws concerning that assembly be duly observed, and may have the

supreme council convoked, when anything is to be referred to it from the

senate. For the supreme right of convoking this council, and proposing

to it subjects of discussion, is, as we have already said, with the

syndics. But before the votes of the contemporaries of the senators be

taken, the president of the senate for the time being shall explain the

state of affairs, and what the senate's own opinion is on the matter in

question, and why; after which the votes shall be collected in the

accustomed order.



33. The entire senate ought not to meet every day, but, like all great

councils, at a certain fixed time. But as in the mean time the business

of the dominion must be executed, it is, therefore, necessary that some

part of the senators be chosen, who, on the dismissal of the senate,

shall supply its place, and whose duty it shall be to summon the senate

itself, when need is; to execute its orders about affairs of state; to

read letters written to the senate and supreme council; and, lastly, to

consult about the matters to be proposed in the senate. But that all

these points, and the order of this assembly, as a whole, may be more

easily conceived, I will describe the whole matter more precisely.



34. The senators who, as we have said already, are to be chosen for a

year, are to be divided into four or six series, of which let the first

have the first seat in the senate for the first three or two months in

the year; and at the expiration of this time, let the second series take

the place of the first, and so on, observing their turns, so that that

series which was first in the first months may be last in the second

period. Furthermore, there are to be appointed as many presidents as

there are series, and the same number of vice-presidents to fill their

places when required -- that is, two are to be chosen out of every

series, one to be its president, the other its vice-president. And let

the president of the first series preside in the senate also, for the

first months; or, in his absence, let his vice-president fill his place;

and so on with the rest, observing the same order as above. Next, out of

the first series, some are to be chosen by vote or lot to fill the place

of the senate, when it is dismissed, in conjunction with the president

and vice-president of the same series; and that, for the same space of

time, as the said series occupies the first place in the senate; and

thus, when that time is past, as many are again to be chosen out of the

second series, by vote or lot, to fill, in conjunction with their

president and vice-president, the place of the first series, and supply

the lack of a senate; and so on with the rest. And there is no need that

the election of these men -- I mean those that I have said are to be

chosen for periods of three or two months, by vote or lot -- should be

made by the supreme council. For the reason which we gave in the

twenty-ninth section is not here applicable, much less the reason stated

in the seventeenth. It suffices, then, that they be elected by the

senate and the syndics present at its meeting.



35. But of these persons we cannot so precisely ascertain the number.

However, this is certain, that they must be too numerous to be easily

susceptible of corruption. For though they can by themselves determine

nothing concerning affairs of state, yet they can delay the senate, or,

what would be worst of all, delude it by putting forward matters of no

importance, and keeping back those that are of greater -- not to mention

that, if they were too few, the absence of one or two might delay public

business. But as, on the contrary, these consuls are for that very

reason appointed, because great councils cannot devote themselves every

day to public business, a remedy must be looked for necessarily here,

and their inadequacy of number be made up for by the shortness of their

term of office. And thus, if only thirteen or so be chosen for two or

three months, they will be too many to be corrupted in this short

period. And for this cause, also, did I recommend that their successors

should by no means be appointed, except at the very time when they do

succeed, and the others go away.



36. We have said, that it is also their duty, when any, though few, of

them think it needful, to convoke the senate, to put before it the

matters to be decided, to dismiss it, and to execute its orders about

public business. But I will now briefly state the order in which this

ought to be done, so that business may not be long protracted by useless

questions. Let, then, the consuls consult about the matter to be

proposed in the senate, and what is required to be done; and, if they

are all of one mind about it, then let them convoke the senate, and,

having duly explained the question, let them set forth what their

opinion is, and, without waiting for another's opinion, collect the

votes in their order. But if the consuls support more than one opinion,

then, in the senate, that opinion is first to be stated on the question

proposed, which was supported by the larger number of consuls. And if

the same is not approved by the majority of senate and consuls, but the

waverers and opponents together are in a majority, which is to be

determined by ballot, as we have already mentioned, then let them set

forth the second opinion, which had fewer votes than the former among

the consuls, and so on with the rest. But if none be approved by a

majority of the whole senate, the senate is to be adjourned to the next

day, or for a short time, that the consuls meanwhile may see, if they

can find other means, that may give more satisfaction. But if they do

not succeed in finding other means, or if the majority of the senate

refuses to approve such as they have found, then the opinion of every

senator is to be heard; and if the majority of the senate also refuses

to support any of these, then the votes are to be taken again on every

opinion, and not only the affirmative votes, as hitherto, but the

doubtful and negative are to be counted. And if the affirmative prove

more numerous than the doubtful or negative, then that opinion is to

hold good; but, on the contrary, to be lost, if the negative prove more

numerous than the doubtful or affirmative. But if on every opinion there

is a greater number of doubters than of voters for and against, then let

the council of syndics join the senate, and vote with the senators, with

only affirmative and negative votes, omitting those that signify a

hesitating mind. And the same order is to be observed about matters

referred by the senate to the supreme council. So much for the senate.



37. As for the court of justice or bench, it cannot rest upon the same

foundations as that which exists under a monarch, as we described it in

Chap. VI. Secs. 26, and following. For (Sec. 14) it agrees not with the

foundations of our present dominion, that any account be made of

families or clans. And there must be a further difference, because

judges chosen from the patricians only might indeed be restrained by the

fear of their patrician successors, from pronouncing any unjust judgment

against any of the patricians, and, perhaps, would hardly have the

courage to punish them after their deserts; but they would, on the other

hand, dare everything against the commons, and daily carry off the rich

among them for a prey. I know that the plan of the Genoese is therefore

approved by many, for they choose their judges not among the patricians,

but among foreigners. But this seems to me, considering the matter in

the abstract, absurdly ordained, that foreigners and not patricians

should be called in to interpret the laws. For what are judges but

interpreters of the laws? And I am therefore persuaded that herein also

the Genoese have had regard rather to the genius of their own race, than

to the very nature of this kind of dominion. We must, therefore, by

considering the matter in the abstract, devise the means which best

agree with the form of this government.



38. But as far as regards the number of the judges, the theory of this

constitution requires no peculiar number; but as under monarchical

dominion, so under this, it suffices that they be too numerous to be

corrupted by a private man. For their duty is but to provide against one

private person doing wrong to another, and therefore to decide disputes

between private persons, as well patricians as commons, and to exact

penalties from delinquents, and even from patricians, syndics, and

senators, as far as they have offended against the laws, whereby all are

bound. But disputes that may arise between cities that are subject to

the dominion, are to be decided in the supreme council.



39. Furthermore the principle regulating the time, for which the judges

should be appointed, is the same in both dominions, and also the

principle of a certain part of them retiring every year; and, lastly,

although it is not necessary for every one of them to be of a different

family, yet it is necessary that two related by blood should not sit on

the same bench together. And this last point is to be observed also in

the other councils, except the supreme one, in which it is enough, if it

be only provided by law that in elections no man may nominate a

relation, nor vote upon his nomination by another, and also that two

relations may not draw lots from the urn for the nomination of any

minister of the dominion. This, I say, is sufficient in a council that

is composed of so large a number of men, and has no special profits

assigned to it. And so utterly unharmed will the dominion be in this

quarter, that it is absurd to pass a law excluding from the supreme

council the relations of all the patricians, as we said in the

fourteenth section. But that it is absurd is manifest. For that law

could not be instituted by the patricians themselves, without their

thereby all absolutely abdicating their own right, and therefore not the

patricians themselves but the commons would defend this law, which is

directly contrary to what we proved in Secs. 5 and 6. But that law of

the dominion, whereby it is ordained that the same uniform proportion be

maintained between the numbers of the patricians and the multitude,

chiefly contemplates this end of preserving the patricians' right and

power, that is, provides against their becoming too few to be able to

govern the multitude.



40. But the judges are to be chosen by the supreme council out of the

patricians only, that is (Sec. 17) out of the actual authors of the

laws, and the judgments they pass, as well in civil as criminal cases,

shall be valid, if they were pronounced in due course of justice and

without partiality; into which matter the syndics shall be by law

authorized to inquire, and to judge and determine thereof.



41. The judges' emoluments ought to be the same, as we mentioned in the

twenty-ninth section of the sixth chapter; namely, that they receive

from the losing party upon every judgment which they pass in civil

cases, an aliquot part of the whole sum at stake. But as to their

sentences in criminal cases, let there be here this difference only,

that the goods which they confiscate, and every fine whereby lesser

crimes are punished, be assigned to themselves only, yet on this

condition, that they may never compel anyone to confess by torture, and

thus, precaution enough will be taken against their being unfair to the

commons, and through fear too lenient to the patricians. For besides

that this fear is tempered by avarice itself, and that veiled under the

specious name of justice, they are also numerous, and vote, not openly,

but by ballot, so that a man may be indignant at losing his case, but

can have no reason to impute it to a particular person. Moreover the

fear of the syndics will restrain them from pronouncing an inequitable,

or at least absurd sentence, or from acting any of them treacherously,

besides that in so large a number of judges there will always be one or

two, that the unfair stand in awe of. Lastly, as far as the commons are

concerned, they also will be adequately secured if they are allowed to

appeal to the syndics, who, as I have said, are by law authorized to

inquire, judge, and determine about the conduct of the judges. For it is

certain that the syndics will not be able to escape the hatred of the

patricians, and on the other hand, will always be most popular with the

commons, whose applause they will try as far as they can to bid for. To

which end, opportunity being given them, they will not fail to reverse

sentences pronounced against the laws of the court, and to examine any

judge, and to punish those that are partial, for nothing moves the

hearts of a multitude more than this. Nor is it an objection, but, on

the contrary, an advantage, that such examples can but rarely occur. For

not to mention that that commonwealth is ill ordered where examples are

daily made of criminals (as we showed Chap. V. Sec. 2), those events

must surely be very rare that are most renowned by fame.



42. Those who are sent as governors to cities and provinces ought to be

chosen out of the rank of senators, because it is the duty of senators

to look after the fortifications of cities, the treasury, the military,

etc. But those, who were sent to somewhat distant regions, would be

unable to attend the senate, and, therefore, those only are to be

summoned from the senate itself, who are destined to cities founded on

their native soil; but those whom they wish to send to places more

remote are to be chosen out of those, whose age is consistent with

senatorial rank. But not even thus do I think that the peace of the

dominion will be sufficiently provided for, that is, if the neighbouring

cities are altogether denied the right of vote, unless they are so weak,

that they can be openly set at naught, which cannot surely be supposed.

And so it is necessary, that the neighbouring cities be granted the

right of citizenship, and that from every one of them twenty, or thirty,

or forty chosen citizens (for the number should vary with the size of

the city) be enrolled among the patricians, out of whom three, four, or

five ought to be yearly elected to be of the senate, and one for life to

be a syndic. And let those who are of the senate be sent with their

syndic, to govern the city out of which they were chosen.



43. Moreover, judges are to be established in every city, chosen out of

the patricians of that city. But of these I think it unnecessary to

treat at length, because they concern not the foundations of this sort

of dominion in particular.



44. In every council the secretaries and other officials of this kind,

as they have not the right of voting, should be chosen from the commons.

But as these, by their long practice of business, are the most

conversant with the affairs to be transacted, it often arises that more

deference than right is shown to their advice, and that the state of the

whole dominion depends chiefly on their guidance: which thing has been

fatal to the Dutch. For this cannot happen without exciting the jealousy

of many of the noblest. And surely we cannot doubt, that a senate, whose

wisdom is derived from the advice, not of senators, but of officials,

will be most frequented by the sluggish, and the condition of this sort

of dominion will be little better than that of a monarchy directed by a

few counsellors of the king. (See Chap. VI. Secs. 5-7). However, to this

evil the dominion will be more or less liable, according as it was well

or ill founded. For the liberty of a dominion is never defended without

risk, if it has not firm enough foundations; and, to avoid that risk,

patricians choose from the commons ambitious ministers, who are

slaughtered as victims to appease the wrath of those, who are plotting

against liberty. But where liberty has firm enough foundations, there

the patricians themselves vie for the honour of defending it, and are

anxious that prudence in the conduct of affairs should flow from their

own advice only; and in laying the foundations of this dominion we have

studied above all these two points, namely, to exclude the commons from

giving advice as much as from giving votes (Secs. 3, 4), and, therefore,

to place the whole authority of the dominion with the whole body of

patricians, but its exercise with the syndics and senate, and, lastly,

the right of convoking the senate, and treating of matters affecting the

common welfare with consuls chosen from the senate itself. But, if it is

further ordained that the secretary, whether in the senate or in other

councils, be appointed for four or five years at most, and have attached

to him an assistant-secretary appointed for the same period, to bear

part of the work during that time, or that the senate have not one, but

several secretaries, employed one in one department, and another in

another, the power of the officials will never become of any

consequence.



45. Treasurers are likewise to be chosen from the commons, and are to be

bound to submit the treasury accounts to the syndics as well as to the

senate.



46. Matters concerning religion we have set forth at sufficient length

in our Theologico-Political Treatise. Yet certain points we then

omitted, of which it was not there the place to treat; for instance,

that all the patricians must be of the same religion, that is, of that

most simple and general religion, which in that treatise we described.

For it is above all to be avoided, that the patricians themselves should

be divided into sects, and show favour, some to this, and others to

that, and thence become mastered by superstition, and try to deprive the

subjects of the liberty of speaking out their opinions. In the second

place, though everyone is to be given liberty to speak out his opinion,

yet great conventicles are to be forbidden. And, therefore, those that

are attached to another religion are, indeed, to be allowed to build as

many temples as they please; yet these are to be small, and limited to a

certain standard of size, and on sites at some little distance one from

another. But it is very important, that the temples consecrated to the

national religion should be large and costly, and that only patricians

or senators should be allowed to administer its principal rites, and

thus that patricians only be suffered to baptize, celebrate marriages,

and lay on hands, and that in general they be recognized as the priests

of the temples and the champions and interpreters of the national

religion. But, for preaching, and to manage the church treasury and its

daily business, let some persons be chosen from the commons by the

senate itself, to be, as it were, the senate's deputies, and, therefore,

bound to render it account of everything.



47. And these are points that concern the foundations of this sort of

dominion; to which I will add some few others less essential indeed, but

yet of great importance. Namely, that the patricians, when they walk,

should be distinguished by some special garment, or dress, and be

saluted by some special title; and that every man of the commons should

give way to them; and that, if any patrician has lost his property by

some unavoidable misfortune, he should be restored to his old condition

at the public expense; but if, on the contrary, it be proved that he has

spent the same in presents, ostentation, gaming, debauchery, &c., or

that he is insolvent, he must lose his dignity, and be held unworthy of

every honour and office. For he, that cannot govern himself and his own

private affairs, will much less be able to advise on public affairs.



48. Those, whom the law compels to take an oath, will be much more

cautious of perjury, if they are bidden to swear by the country's safety

and liberty and by the supreme council, than if they are told to swear

by God. For he who swears by God, gives as surety some private advantage

to himself, whereof he is judge; but he, who by his oath gives as surety

his country's liberty and safety, swears by what is the common advantage

of all, whereof he is not judge, and if he perjures himself, thereby

declares that he is his country's enemy.



49. Academies, that are founded at the public expense, are instituted

not so much to cultivate men's natural abilities as to restrain them.

But in a free commonwealth arts and sciences will be best cultivated to

the full, if everyone that asks leave is allowed to teach publicly, and

that at his own cost and risk. But these and the like points I reserve

for another place. [4] For here I determined to treat only such matters

as concern an aristocratic dominion only.



------



1. Ought not this reference to be to Chap. III. Sec. 6?



2. Cf. Chap. VI. Sec. 10.



3. "This V. H. is Pieter de la Court (1618-85), an eminent publicist,

who wrote under the initials D. C. (De la Court), V. H. (Van den Hove,

the Dutch equivalent). He was a friend of John de Witt, and opposed to

the party of the Statholders." -- POLLOCK'S Life and Philosophy of

Spinoza, towards end of Chap. X.



4. This promise is not kept by the author, no doubt owing to his not

living to finish the work.





------------------------



CHAPTER IX.



OF ARISTOCRACY. CONTINUATION.



HITHERTO we have considered an aristocracy, so far as it takes its name

from one city, which is the head of the whole dominion. It is now time

to treat of that, which is in the hands of more than one city, and which

I think preferable to the former. But that we may notice its difference

and its superiority, we will pass in review the foundations of dominion,

one by one, rejecting those foundations, which are unsuited to the

present kind, and laying in their place others for it to rest upon.



2. The cities, then, which enjoy the right of citizenship, must be so

built and fortified, that, on the one hand, each city by itself may be

unable to subsist without the rest, and that yet, on the other hand, it

cannot desert the rest without great harm to the whole dominion. For

thus they will always remain united. But cities, which are so

constituted, that they can neither maintain themselves, nor be dangerous

to the rest, are clearly not independent, but absolutely subject to the

rest.



3. But the contents of the ninth and tenth sections of the last chapter

are deduced from the general nature of aristocracy, as are also the

proportion between the numbers of the patricians and the multitude, and

the proper age and condition of those that are to be made patricians; so

that on these points no difference can arise, whether the dominion be in

the hands of one or more cities. But the supreme council must here be on

a different footing. For if any city of the dominion were assigned for

the meeting of this supreme council, it would in reality be the head of

the dominion; and, therefore, either they would have to take turns, or a

place would have to be assigned for this council, that has not the right

of citizenship, and belongs equally to all. But either alternative is as

difficult to effect, as it is easy to state; I mean, either that so many

thousands of men should have to go often outside their cities, or that

they should have to assemble sometimes in one place, sometimes in

another.



4. But that we may conclude aright what should be done in this matter,

and on what plan the councils of this dominion ought to be formed, from

its own very nature and condition, these points are to be considered;

namely, that every city has so much more right than a private man, as it

excels him in power (Chap. II. Sec. 4), and consequently that every city

of this dominion has as much right within its walls, or the limits of

its jurisdiction, as it has power; and, in the next place, that all the

cities are mutually associated and united, not as under a treaty, but as

forming one dominion, yet so that every city has so much more right as

against the dominion than the others, as it exceeds the others in power.

For he who seeks equality between unequals, seeks an absurdity.

Citizens, indeed, are rightly esteemed equal, because the power of each,

compared with that of the whole dominion, is of no account. But each

city's power constitutes a large part of the power of the dominion

itself, and so much the larger, as the city itself is greater. And,

therefore, the cities cannot all be held equal. But, as the power of

each, so also its right should be estimated by its greatness. The bonds,

however, by which they should be bound into one dominion, are above all

a senate and a court of justice (Chap. IV. Sec. 1). But how by these

bonds they are all to be so united, that each of them may yet remain, as

far as possible, independent, I will here briefly show. 



5. I suppose then, that the patricians of every city, who, according to

its size, should be more, or fewer (Sec. 3), have supreme right over

their own city, and that, in that city's supreme council, they have

supreme authority to fortify the city and enlarge its walls, to impose

taxes, to pass and repeal laws, and, in general, to do everything which

they judge necessary to their city's preservation and increase. But to

manage the common business of the dominion, a senate is to be created on

just the same footing as we described in the last chapter, so that there

be between this senate and the former no difference, except that this

has also authority to decide the disputes, which may arise between

cities. For in this dominion, of which no city is head, it cannot be

done by the supreme council. (See Chap. VI. Sec. 38.)



6. But, in this dominion, the supreme council is not to be called

together, unless there is need to alter the form of the dominion itself,

or on some difficult business, to which the senators shall think

themselves unequal; and so it will very rarely happen, that all the

patricians are summoned to council. For we have said (Chap. VIII. Sec.

17), that the supreme council's function is to pass and repeal laws, and

to choose the ministers of the dominion. But the laws, or general

constitution of the whole dominion, ought not to be changed as soon as

instituted. If, however, time and occasion suggest the institution of

some new law or the change of one already ordained, the question may

first be discussed in the senate, and after the agreement of the senate

in the matter, then let envoys next be sent to the cities by the senate

itself, to inform the patricians of every city of the opinion of the

senate, and lastly, if the majority of the cities follow that opinion,

it shall then remain good, but otherwise be of no effect. And this same

order may be observed in choosing the generals of the army and the

ambassadors to be sent to other realms, as also about decrees concerning

the making of war or accepting conditions of peace. But in choosing the

other public officials, since (as we showed in Sec. 4) every city, as

far as can be, ought to remain independent, and to have as much more

right than the others in the dominion, as it exceeds them in power, the

following order must necessarily be observed. The senators are to be

chosen by the patricians of each city; that is, the patricians of one

city are to elect in their own council a fixed number of senators from

their colleagues of their own city, which number is to be to that of the

patricians of that city as one to twelve (Chap. VIII. Sec. 30); and they

are to designate whom they will to be of the first, second, third, or

other series; and in like manner the patricians of the other cities, in

proportion to their number, are to choose more or fewer senators, and

distribute them among the series, into a certain number of which we have

said the senate is to be divided. (Chap. VIII. Sec. 34.) By which means

it will result, that in every series of senators there will be found

senators of every city, more or fewer, according to its size. But the

presidents and vice-presidents of the series, being fewer in number than

the cities, are to be chosen by lot by the senate out of the consuls,

who are to be appointed first. The same order is to be maintained in

appointing the supreme judges of the dominion, namely, that the

patricians of every city are to elect from their colleagues in

proportion to their number more or fewer judges. And so it will be the

case, that every city in choosing officials will be as independent as

possible, and that each, in proportion to its power, will have the more

right alike in the senate and the court of justice; supposing, that is,

that the order observed by senate and court in deciding public affairs,

and settling disputes is such in all respects, as we have described it

in the thirty-third and thirty-fourth sections of the last chapter. [1]



7. Next, the commanders of battalions and military tribunes are also to

be chosen from the patricians. For as it is fair, that every city in

proportion to its size should be bound to levy a certain number of

soldiers for the general safety of the whole dominion, it is also fair,

that from the patricians of every city in proportion to the number of

regiments, which they are bound to maintain, they may appoint so many

tribunes, captains, ensigns, etc., as are needed to discipline that part

of the military, which they supply to the dominion.



8. No taxes are to be imposed by the senate on the subjects; but to meet

the expenditure, which by decree of the senate is necessary to carry on

public business, not the subjects, but the cities themselves are to be

called to assessment by the senate, so that every city, in proportion to

its size, should pay a larger or smaller share of the expense. And this

share indeed is to be exacted by the patricians of every city from their

own citizens in what way they please, either by compelling them to an

assessment, or, as is much fairer, by imposing taxes on them.



9. Further, although all the cities of this dominion are not maritime,

nor the senators summoned from the maritime cities only, yet may the

same emoluments be awarded to the senators, as we mentioned in the

thirty-first section of the last chapter. To which end it will be

possible to devise means, varying with the composition of the dominion,

to link the cities to one another more closely. But the other points

concerning the senate and the court of justice and the whole dominion in

general, which I delivered in the last chapter, are to be applied to

this dominion also. And so we see, that in a dominion which is in the

hands of several cities, it will not be necessary to assign a fixed time

or place for assembling the supreme council. But for the senate and

court of justice a place is to be appointed in a village, or in a city,

that has not the right of voting. But I return to those points, which

concern the cities taken by themselves.



10. The order to be observed by the supreme council of a single city, in

choosing officials of the dominion and of the city, and in making

decrees, should be the same that I have delivered in the twenty-seventh

and thirty-sixth sections of the last chapter. For the policy is the

same here as it was there. Next a council of syndics is to be formed,

subordinate to the council of the city, and having the same relation to

it as the council of syndics of the last chapter had to the council of

the entire dominion, and let its functions within the limits of the city

be also the same, and let it enjoy the same emoluments. But if a city,

and consequently the number of its patricians be so small that it cannot

create more than one syndic or two, which two are not enough to make a

council, then the supreme council of the city is to appoint judges to

assist the syndics in trials according to the matter at issue, or else

the dispute must be referred to the supreme council of syndics. For from

every city some also out of the syndics are to be sent to the place

where the senate sits, to see that the constitution of the whole

dominion is preserved unbroken, and they are to sit in the senate

without the right of voting.



11. The consuls of the cities are likewise to be chosen by the

patricians of their city, and are to constitute a sort of senate for it.

But their number I cannot determine, nor yet do I think it necessary,

since the city's business of great importance is transacted by its

supreme council, and matters concerning the whole dominion by the great

senate. But if they be few, it will be necessary that they give their

votes in their council openly, and not by ballot, as in large councils.

For in small councils, when votes are given secretly, by a little extra

cunning one can easily detect the author of every vote, and in many ways

deceive the less attentive.



12. Besides, in every city judges are to be appointed by its supreme

council, from whose sentence, however, let everyone but an openly

convicted criminal or confessed debtor have a right of appeal to the

supreme court of justice of the dominion. But this need not be pursued

further.



13. It remains, therefore, to speak of the cities which are not

independent. If these were founded in an actual province or district of

the dominion, and their inhabitants are of the same nation and language,

they ought of necessity, like villages, to be esteemed parts of the

neighbouring cities, so that each of them should be under the government

of this or that independent city. And the reason of this is, that the

patricians are chosen by the supreme council, not of the dominion, but

of every city, and in every city are more or fewer, according to the

number of inhabitants within the limits of its jurisdiction (Sec. 5).

And so it is necessary, that the multitude of the city, which is not

independent, be referred to the census of another which is independent,

and depend upon the latter's government. But cities captured by right of

war, and annexed to the dominion, are either to be esteemed associates

in the dominion, and though conquered put under an obligation by that

benefit, or else colonies to enjoy the right of citizenship are to be

sent thither, and the natives removed elsewhere or utterly destroyed.



14. And these are the things, which touch the foundations of the

dominion. But that its condition is better than that of the aristocracy,

which is called after one city only, I conclude from this, namely, that

the patricians of every city, after the manner of human desire, will be

eager to keep, and if possible increase their right, both in their city

and in the senate; and therefore will try, as far as possible, to

attract the multitude to themselves, and consequently to make a stir in

the dominion by good deeds rather than by fear, and to increase their

own number; because the more numerous they are, the more senators they

will choose out of their own council (Sec. 6), and hence the more right

(Sec. 6) they will possess in the dominion. Nor is it an objection, that

while every city is consulting its own interest and suspecting the rest,

they more often quarrel among themselves, and waste time in disputing.

For if, while the Romans are debating, Saguntum is lost: [2] on the

other hand, while a few are deciding everything in conformity with their

own passions only, liberty and the general good are lost. For men's

natural abilities are too dull to see through everything at once; but by

consulting, listening, and debating, they grow more acute, and while

they are trying all means, they at last discover those which they want,

which all approve, but no one would have thought of in the first

instance. But if anyone retorts, that the dominion of the Dutch has not

long endured without a count or one to fill his place, let him have this

reply, that the Dutch thought, that to maintain their liberty it was

enough to abandon their count, and to behead the body of their dominion,

but never thought of remoulding it, and left its limbs, just as they had

been first constituted, so that the county of Holland has remained

without a count, like a headless body, and the actual dominion has

lasted on without the name. And so it is no wonder that most of its

subjects have not known, with whom the authority of the dominion lay.

And even had this been otherwise, yet those who actually held dominion

were far too few to govern the multitude and suppress their powerful

adversaries. Whence it has come to pass, that the latter have often been

able to plot against them with impunity, and at last to overthrow them.

And so the sudden overthrow of the said republic [3] has not arisen from

a useless waste of time in debates, but from the misformed state of the

said dominion and the fewness of its rulers.



15. This aristocracy in the hands of several cities is also preferable

to the other, because it is not necessary, as in the first described, to

provide against its whole supreme council being overpowered by a sudden

attack, since (Sec. 9) no time or place is appointed for its meeting.

Moreover, powerful citizens in this dominion are less to be feared. For

where several cities enjoy liberty, it is not enough for him, who is

making ready his way to dominion, to seize one city, in order to hold

dominion over the rest. And, lastly, liberty under this dominion is

common to more. For where one city reigns alone, there the advantage of

the rest is only so far considered, as suits that reigning city.



------



1. So the text: but the court of justice is not described till the

thirty-seventh and following sections of Chap. VIII.



2. Livy, "Hist.," Bk. xxi. Chaps. VI. and following.



3. A.D. 1672. William Henry, Prince of Orange, afterwards William III.

of England, was made Statholder by a popular insurrection, consequent on

the invasion of the French.





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CHAPTER X.



OF ARISTOCRACY. CONCLUSION.



HAVING explained and made proof of the foundations of both kinds of

aristocracy, it remains to inquire whether by reason of any fault they

are liable to be dissolved or changed into another form. The primary

cause, by which dominions of this kind are dissolved, is that, which

that most acute Florentine [1] observes in his "Discourses on Livy" (Bk.

iii. Chap. I.), namely, that like a human body, "a dominion has daily

added to it something that at some time or other needs to be remedied."

And so, he says, it is necessary for something occasionally to occur, to

bring back the dominion to that first principle, on which it was in the

beginning established. And if this does not take place within the

necessary time, its blemishes will go on increasing, till they cannot be

removed, but with the dominion itself. And this restoration, he says,

may either happen accidentally, or by the design and forethought of the

laws or of a man of extraordinary virtue. And we cannot doubt, that this

matter is of the greatest importance, and that, where provision has not

been made against this inconvenience, the dominion will not be able to

endure by its own excellence, but only by good fortune; and on the other

hand that, where a proper remedy has been applied to this evil, it will

not be possible for it to fall by its own fault, but only by some

inevitable fate, as we shall presently show more clearly. The first

remedy, that suggested itself for this evil, was to appoint every five

years a supreme dictator for one or two months, who should have the

right to inquire, decide, and make ordinances concerning the acts of the

senators and of every official, and thereby to bring back the dominion

to its first principle. But he who studies to avoid the inconveniences,

to which a dominion is liable, must apply remedies that suit its nature,

and can be derived from its own foundations; otherwise in his wish to

avoid Charybdis he falls upon Scylla. It is, indeed, true that all, as

well rulers as ruled, ought to be restrained by fear of punishment or

loss, so that they may not do wrong with impunity or even advantage;

but, on the other hand, it is certain, that if this fear becomes common

to good and bad men alike, the dominion must be in the utmost danger.

Now as the authority of a dictator is absolute, it cannot fail to be a

terror to all, especially if, as is here required, he were appointed at

a stated time, because in that case every ambitious man would pursue

this office with the utmost energy; and it is certain that in time of

peace virtue is thought less of than wealth, so that the more haughty a

man he is, the more easily he will get office. And this perhaps is why

the Romans used to make a dictator at no fixed time, but under pressure

of some accidental necessity. Though for all that, to quote Cicero's

words, "the tumour of a dictator was displeasing to the good." [2] And

to be sure, as this authority of a dictator is quite royal, it is

impossible for the dominion to change into a monarchy without great

peril to the republic, although it happen for ever so short a time.

Furthermore, if no fixed time were appointed for creating a dictator, no

notice would be paid to the interval between one dictator and another,

which is the very thing that we said was most to be observed; and the

whole thing would be exceedingly vague, and therefore easily neglected.

Unless, then, this authority of a dictator be eternal and fixed, and

therefore impossible to be conferred on one man without destroying the

form of dominion, the dictatorial authority itself, and consequently the

safety and preservation of the republic will be very uncertain.



2. But, on the other hand, we cannot doubt (Chap. VI. Sec. 3), that, if

without destroying the form of dominion, the sword of the dictator might

be permanent, and only terrible to the wicked, evils will never grow to

such a pitch, that they cannot be eradicated or amended. In order,

therefore, to secure all these conditions, we have said, that there is

to be a council of syndics subordinate to the supreme council, to the

end that the sword of the dictator should be permanent in the hands not

of any natural person, but of a civil person, whose members are too

numerous to divide the dominion amongst themselves (Chap. IX. Secs. 1,

2), or to combine in any wickedness. To which is to be added, that they

are forbidden to fill any other office in the dominion, that they are

not the paymasters of the soldiery, and, lastly, that they are of an age

to prefer actual security to things new and perilous. Wherefore the

dominion is in no danger from them, and consequently they cannot, and in

fact will not be a terror to the good, but only to the wicked. For as

they are less powerful to accomplish criminal designs, so are they more

so to restrain wickedness. For, not to mention that they can resist it

in its beginnings (since the council lasts for ever), they are also

sufficiently numerous to dare to accuse and condemn this or that

influential man without fear of his enmity; especially as they vote by

ballot, and the sentence is pronounced in the name of the entire

council.



3. But the tribunes of the commons at Rome were likewise regularly

appointed; but they were too weak to restrain the power of a Scipio, and

had besides to submit to the senate their plans for the public welfare,

[3] which also frequently eluded them, by contriving that the one whom

the senators were least afraid of should be most popular with the

commons. Besides which, the tribunes' authority was supported against

the patricians by the favour of the commons. and whenever they convoked

the commons, it looked as if they were raising a sedition rather than

assembling a council. Which inconveniences have certainly no place in

the dominion which we have described in the last two chapters.



4. However, this authority of the syndics will only be able to secure

the preservation of the form of the dominion, and thus to prevent the

laws from being broken, or anyone from gaining by transgressing; but

will by no means suffice to prevent the growth of vices, which cannot be

forbidden by law, such as those into which men fall from excess of

leisure, and from which the ruin of a dominion not uncommonly follows.

For men in time of peace lay aside fear, and gradually from being fierce

savages become civilized or humane, and from being humane become soft

and sluggish, and seek to excel one another not in virtue, but in

ostentation and luxury. And hence they begin to put off their native

manners and to put on foreign ones, that is, to become slaves.



5. To avoid these evils many have tried to establish sumptuary laws; but

in vain. For all laws which can be broken without any injury to another,

are counted but a laughing-stock, and are so far from bridling the

desires and lusts of men, that on the contrary they stimulate them. For

"we are ever eager for forbidden fruit, and desire what is denied." [4]

Nor do idle men ever lack ability to elude the laws which are instituted

about things, which cannot absolutely be forbidden, as banquets, plays,

ornaments, and the like, of which only the excess is bad; and that is to

be judged according to the individual's fortune, so that it cannot be

determined by any general law.



6. I conclude, therefore, that the common vices of peace, of which we

are here speaking, are never to be directly, but indirectly forbidden;

that is, by laying such foundations of dominion, that the result may be,

that the majority, I do not say are anxious to live wisely (for that is

impossible), but are guided by those passions whence the republic has

most advantage. And therefore the chief point to be studied is, that the

rich may be, if not thrifty, yet avaricious. For there is no doubt,

that, if this passion of avarice, which is general and lasting, be

encouraged by the desire of glory, most people would set their chief

affection upon increasing their property without disgrace, in order to

acquire honours, while avoiding extreme infamy. If then we examine the

foundations of both kinds of aristocracy which I have explained in the

last two chapters, we shall see, that this very result follows from

them. For the number of rulers in both is so large, that most of the

rich have access to government and to the offices of the dominion open

to them.



7. But if it be further ordained (as we said, Chap. VIII. Sec. 47), that

patricians who are insolvent be deposed from patrician rank, and that

those who have lost their property by misfortune be restored to their

former position, there is no doubt that all will try their best to keep

their property. Moreover, they will never desire foreign costumes, nor

disdain their native ones, if it is by law appointed, that patricians

and candidates for office should be distinguished by a special robe,

concerning which see Chap. VIII. Secs. 25, 47. And besides these, other

means may be devised in every dominion agreeable to the nature of its

situation and the national genius, and herein it is above all to be

studied, that the subjects may do their duty rather spontaneously than

under pressure of the law.



8. For a dominion, that looks no farther than to lead men by fear, will

be rather free from vices, than possessed of virtue. But men are so to

be led, that they may think that they are not led, but living after

their own mind, and according to their free decision; and so that they

are restrained only by love of liberty, desire to increase their

property, and hope of gaining the honours of the dominion. But effigies,

triumphs, and other incitements to virtue, are signs rather of slavery

than liberty. For rewards of virtue are granted to slaves, not freemen.

I admit, indeed, that men are very much stimulated by these incitements;

but, as in the first instance, they are awarded to great men, so

afterwards, with the growth of envy, they are granted to cowards and men

swollen with the extent of their wealth, to the great indignation of all

good men. Secondly, those, who boast of their ancestors' effigies and

triumphs, think they are wronged, if they are not preferred to others.

Lastly, not to mention other objections, it is certain that equality,

which once cast off the general liberty is lost, can by no means be

maintained, from the time that peculiar honours are by public law

decreed to any man renowned for his virtue.



9. After which premisses, let us now see whether dominions of this kind

can be destroyed by any cause to which blame attaches. But if any

dominion can be everlasting, that will necessarily be so, whose

constitution being once rightly instituted remains unbroken. For the

constitution is the soul of a dominion. Therefore, if it is preserved,

so is the dominion. But a constitution cannot remain unconquered, unless

it is defended alike by reason and common human passion: otherwise, if

it relies only on the help of reason, it is certainly weak and easily

overcome. Now since the fundamental constitution of both kinds of

aristocracy has been shown to agree with reason and common human

passion, we can therefore assert that these, if any kinds of dominion,

will be eternal, in other words, that they cannot be destroyed by any

cause to which blame attaches, but only by some inevitable fate.



10. But it may still be objected to us, that, although the constitution

of dominion above set forth is defended by reason and common human

passion, yet for all that it may at some time be overpowered. For there

is no passion, that is not sometimes overpowered, by a stronger contrary

one; for we frequently see the fear of death overpowered by the greed

for another's property. Men, who are running away in panic fear from the

enemy, can be stopped by the fear of nothing else, but throw themselves

into rivers, or rush into fire, to escape the enemy's steel. In whatever

degree, therefore, a commonwealth is rightly ordered, and its laws well

made; yet in the extreme difficulties of a dominion, when all, as

sometimes happens, are seized by a sort of panic terror, all, without

regard to the future or the laws, approve only that which their actual

fear suggests, all turn towards the man who is renowned for his

victories, and set him free from the laws, and (establishing thereby the

worst of precedents), continue him in command, and entrust to his

fidelity all affairs of state: and this was, in fact, the cause of the

destruction of the Roman dominion. But to answer this objection, I say,

first, that in a rightly constituted republic such terror does not arise

but from a due cause. And so such terror and consequent confusion can be

attributed to no cause avoidable by human foresight. In the next place,

it is to be observed, that in a republic such as we have above

described, it is impossible (Chap. VIII. Secs. 9, 25) for this or that

man so to distinguish himself by the report of his virtue, as to turn

towards himself the attention of all, but he must have many rivals

favoured by others. And so, although from terror there arise some

confusion in the republic, yet no one will be able to elude the law and

declare the election of anyone to an illegal military command, without

its being immediately disputed by other candidates; and to settle the

dispute, it will, in the end, be necessary to have recourse to the

constitution ordained once for all, and approved by all, and to order

the affairs of the dominion according to the existing laws. I may

therefore absolutely assert, that as the aristocracy, which is in the

hands of one city only, so especially that which is in the hands of

several, is everlasting, or, in other words, can be dissolved or changed

into another form by no internal cause.



------



1. Machiavelli.



2. Cic. ad Quint. Grat. iii. 8, 4. The better reading is "rumour," not

"tumour." "The good" in such a passage means the aristocratic party.



3. Not by law, except before B.C. 287 and in the interval between the

dictatorship of Sulla and the consulship of Pompey and Crassus. But in

the golden age of the republic the senate in fact controlled the

tribunes. 



4. Ovid, "Amores," III. iv. 17.





------------------------



CHAPTER XI.



OF DEMOCRACY.



I PASS, at length, to the third and perfectly absolute dominion, which

we call democracy. The difference between this and aristocracy consists,

we have said, chiefly in this, that in an aristocracy it depends on the

supreme council's will and free choice only, that this or that man is

made a patrician, so that no one has the right to vote or fill public

offices by inheritance, and that no one can by right demand this right,

as is the case in the dominion, whereof we are now treating. For all,

who are born of citizen parents, or on the soil of the country, or who

have deserved well of the republic, or have accomplished any other

conditions upon which the law grants to a man right of citizenship; they

all, I say, have a right to demand for themselves the right to vote in

the supreme council and to fill public offices, nor can they be refused

it, but for crime or infamy.



2. If, then, it is by a law appointed, that the elder men only, who have

reached a certain year of their age, or the first-born only, as soon as

their age allows, or those who contribute to the republic a certain sum

of money, shall have the right of voting in the supreme council and

managing the business of the dominion; then, although on this system the

result might be, that the supreme council would be composed of fewer

citizens than that of the aristocracy of which we treated above, yet,

for all that, dominions of this kind should be called democracies,

because in them the citizens, who are destined to manage affairs of

state, are not chosen as the best by the supreme council, but are

destined to it by a law. And although for this reason dominions of this

kind, that is, where not the best, but those who happen by chance to be

rich, or who are born eldest, are destined to govern, are thought

inferior to an aristocracy; yet, if we reflect on the practice or

general condition of mankind, the result in both cases will come to the

same thing. For patricians will always think those the best, who are

rich, or related to themselves in blood, or allied by friendship. And,

indeed, if such were the nature of patricians, that they were free from

all passion, and guided by mere zeal for the public welfare in choosing

their patrician colleagues, no dominion could be compared with

aristocracy. But experience itself teaches us only too well, that things

pass in quite a contrary manner, above all, in oligarchies, where the

will of the patricians, from the absence of rivals, is most free from

the law. For there the patricians intentionally keep away the best men

from the council, and seek for themselves such colleagues in it, as hang

upon their words, so that in such a dominion things are in a much more

unhappy condition, because the choice of patricians depends entirely

upon the arbitrary will of a few, which is free or unrestrained by any

law. But I return to my subject.



3. From what has been said in the last section, it is manifest that we

can conceive of various kinds of democracy. But my intention is not to

treat of every kind, but of that only, "wherein all, without exception,

who owe allegiance to the laws of the country only, and are further

independent and of respectable life, have the right of voting in the

supreme council and of filling the offices of the dominion." I say

expressly. "who owe allegiance to the laws of the country only," to

exclude foreigners, who are treated as being under another's dominion. I

added, besides, "who are independent," except in so far as they are

under allegiance to the laws of the dominion, to exclude women and

slaves, who are under the authority of men and masters, and also

children and wards, as long as they are under the authority of parents

and guardians. I said, lastly, "and of respectable life," to exclude,

above all, those that are infamous from crime, or some disgraceful means

of livelihood.



4. But, perhaps, someone will ask, whether women are under men's

authority by nature or institution? For if it has been by mere

institution, then we had no reason compelling us to exclude women from

government. But if we consult experience itself, we shall find that the

origin of it is in their weakness. For there has never been a case of

men and women reigning together, but wherever on the earth men are

found, there we see that men rule, and women are ruled, and that on this

plan, both sexes live in harmony. But on the other hand, the Amazons,

who are reported to have held rule of old, did not suffer men to stop in

their country, but reared only their female children, killing the males

to whom they gave birth. [1] But if by nature women were equal to men,

and were equally distinguished by force of character and ability, in

which human power and therefore human right chiefly consist; surely

among nations so many and different some would be found, where both

sexes rule alike, and others, where men are ruled by women, and so

brought up, that they can make less use of their abilities. And since

this is nowhere the case, one may assert with perfect propriety, that

women have not by nature equal right with men: but that they necessarily

give way to men, and that thus it cannot happen, that both sexes should

rule alike, much less that men should be ruled by women. But if we

further reflect upon human passions, how men, in fact, generally love

women merely from the passion of lust, and esteem their cleverness and

wisdom in proportion to the excellence of their beauty, and also how

very ill-disposed men are to suffer the women they love to show any sort

of favour to others, and other facts of this kind, we shall easily see

that men and women cannot rule alike without great hurt to peace. But of

this enough.



------



1. Justin, Histories, ii. 4. 





------------------------



END