Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957)



Commentary by Jon Roland



It is a fundamental principle of law that an agent cannot acquire additional 

powers from his principal by entering into an agreement with the agent of 

another principal. He may make agreements, if he has the authority to make 

any agreements at all, only to exercise powers already delegated to him. 

Officials of the U.S. government are agents of the people under the terms of 

the Constitution, which defines and limits the powers that they may 

exercise, and those limits apply not only within the territorial boundaries 

of the United States, but everywhere and over all persons, regardless of 

whether they are citizens or not.



The correct opinion in this case is that of Black. The concurring opinions 

of Frankfurter and Harlan are erroneous in that they base their position on 

the offense being capital. Clark, in dissent, is correct in saying the 

capital nature of the charge is irrelevant, but incorrect in saying that 

treaties may extend U.S. criminal jurisdiction in the way he suggests, to 

other than U.S. military personnel, on territory that is not embassy 

territory but merely foreign territory under temporary U.S. control under 

the terms of a status of forces agreement. He would, however, have been 

correct if the territory had been that of a U.S. embassy or equivalent 

diplomatic facility, and the offense had been prosecuted under civilian 

criminal statutes authorized by the "laws of nations" clause.



For more on this see also



Conflict of Criminal Laws, Edward S. Stimson (1936) — Jurisdiction for a 

criminal offense is limited to the territory where the offender is when the 

offense is committed, not where the effects occur. 

     

Rights of foreigners in the "war on terrorism" — Article: November 26, 2001 

     

The meaning of "offenses against the laws of nations"