128. PROCEEDINGS IN PARLIAMENT (1763-84)
(A) Proceedings in the Case of John Wilkes (1763)[1]
[15 November 1763.] Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer informed the house that he was commanded by the king to acquaint the house that, his majesty having received information that John Wilkes, esquire, a member of this house, was the author of a most seditious and dangerous libel, published since the last session of parliament, he had caused the said John Wilkes, esquire, to be apprehended and secured, in order to his being tried for the same by due course of law. And Mr. Wilkes having been discharged out of custody by the court of common pleas upon account of his privilege as a member of this house, and having, when called upon by the legal process of the court of king's bench, stood out and declined to appear and answer to an information which has since been exhibited against him by his majesty's attorney general for the same offence — in this situation, his majesty being desirous to show all possible attention to the privileges of the house of commons in every instance wherein they can be supposed to be concerned, and at the same time thinking it of the utmost importance not to suffer the public justice of the kingdom to be eluded, has chosen to direct the said libel, and also copies of the examinations upon which Mr. Wilkes was apprehended and secured, to be laid before this house for their consideration. And Mr. Chancellor of the Exchequer delivered the said papers in at the table.
Resolved, nemine contradicente, that an humble address be presented to his majesty, to return his majesty the thanks of this house for his most gracious message and for the tender regard therein expressed for the privileges of this house, and to assure his majesty that this house will forthwith take into their most serious consideration the very important matter communicated by his majesty's message.... Resolved that the paper entitled the North Briton, no. 45, is a false, scandalous, and seditious libel, containing expressions of the most unexampled insolence and contumely towards his majesty, the grossest aspersions upon both houses of parliament, and the most audacious defiance of the authority of the whole legislature; and most manifestly tending to alienate the affections of the people from his majesty, to withdraw them from their obedience to the laws of the realm, and to excite them to traitorous insurrections against his majesty's government. Resolved that the said paper be burnt by the hands of the common hangman....
[24 November 1763.] Resolved that privilege of parliament does not extend to the case of writing and publishing seditious libels, nor ought to be allowed to obstruct the ordinary course of the laws in the speedy and effectual prosecution of so heinous and dangerous an offence.
Journals of the Commons, XXIX, 667, 675.
[29 November.] ... We cannot hear without the utmost concern and astonishment a doctrine advanced now for the first time in this house, which we apprehend to be new, dangerous, and unwarrantable — viz., that the personal privilege of both houses of parliament has never held and ought not to hold in the case of any criminal prosecution whatsoever — by which all the records of parliament, all history, all the authorities of the gravest and soberest judges are entirely rescinded, and the fundamental principles of the constitution with regard to the independence of parliament torn up and buried under the ruins of our most established rights. We are at a loss to conceive with what view such a sacrifice should be proposed, unless to amplify in effect the jurisdiction of the inferior by annihilating the ancient immunities of this superior court. The very question itself proposed to us from the commons and now agreed to by the lords, from the letter and spirit of it, contradicts this assertion; for, whilst it only narrows privilege in criminal matters, it establishes the principle....
This resolution does not only infringe the privilege of parliament, but points to the restraint of the personal liberty of every common subject in these realms; seeing that it does in effect affirm that all men, without exception, may be bound to the peace for this offence. By this doctrine every man's liberty, privileged as well as unprivileged, is surrendered into the hands of a secretary of state. He is by this means empowered, in the first instance, to pronounce the paper to be a seditious libel — a matter of such difficulty that some have pretended it is too high to be entrusted to a special jury of the first rank and condition. He is to understand and decide by himself the meaning of every innuendo. He is to determine the tendency thereof and brand it with his own epithets. He is to adjudge the party guilty and make him author or publisher, as he sees good. And, lastly, he is to give sentence by committing the party. All these authorities are given to one single magistrate, unassisted by counsel, evidence, or jury, in a case where the law says no action will lie against him because he acts in the capacity of a judge.
From what has been observed, it appears to us that the exception of a seditious libel from privilege is neither founded on usage or written precedents; and therefore this resolution is of the first impression. Nay, it is not only a new law narrowing the known and ancient rule, but it is likewise a law ex post facto, pendente lite, et ex parts, now first declared to meet with the circumstances of a particular case....
This method of relaxing the rule of privilege, case by case, is pregnant with this further inconvenience, that it renders the rule precarious and uncertain. Who can foretell where the house will stop, when they have, by one infringement of their own standing orders, made a precedent whereon future infringements may with equal reason be founded? How shall the subject be able to proceed with safety in this perilous business? How can the judges decide, on these or the like questions, if privilege is no longer to be found in records, and journals, and standing orders? Upon any occasion, privilege may be enlarged; no court will venture for the future, without trembling, either to recognize or to deny it.
Journals of the Lords, XXX, 426 f.
(B) Minority Protest in the Lords on the Repeal of the Stamp Act (1766)[2]
1. Because ... we are of opinion that the total repealing of that law, especially while such resistance continues, would ... make the authority of Great Britain contemptible hereafter; and that such a submission of king, lords, and commons, under such circumstances, in so strange and unheard-of a contest, would in effect surrender their ancient inalienable rights of supreme jurisdiction and give them exclusively to the subordinate provincial legislatures established by prerogative — which was never intended or thought of and is not in the power of prerogative to bestow, as they are inseparable from the three estates of the realm assembled in parliament.
2. Because the law which this bill now proposes to repeal was passed in the other house with very little opposition, and in this without one dissentient voice ...; which, we presume, if it had been wholly and fundamentally wrong, could not possibly have happened....
3. Because, if any particular parts of that law — the principle of which has been experienced and submitted to in this country without repining for near a century past — had been found liable to just and reasonable objections, they might have been altered by a bill to explain and amend it without repealing the whole....
4. Because it appears to us that a most essential branch of that [legislative] authority, the power of taxation, cannot be properly, equitably, or impartially exercised if it does not extend ... to all the members of the state in proportion to their respective abilities....
5. Because the ability of our North American colonies to bear without inconvenience the proportion laid on them by the Stamp Act of last year appears to us most unquestionable....
6. Because, not only the right, but the expediency and necessity of the supreme legislature's exerting its authority to lay a general tax on our American colonies ... appears to us undeniable.... Every province being separate and independent ... and having no common council empowered by the constitution of the colonies to act for all or bind all, such a tax cannot regularly or without infinite difficulty be imposed upon them at any time, even for their immediate defence and protection, by their own provincial assemblies; but requires the intervention and superintending power of the parliament of Great Britain....
Ibid., XXXI, 303 f.
(C) Proceedings on the Middlesex Election (1769)[3]
[17 February.] Ordered that the deputy clerk of the crown do attend this house immediately, with the return to the writ for electing a knight of the shire to serve in this present parliament for the county of Middlesex, in the room of John Wilkes, esquire, expelled this house. And the deputy clerk of the crown attending according to order, the said writ and returns were read.
A motion was made, and the question being proposed — that John Wilkes, esquire, having been in this session of parliament expelled this house, was and is incapable of being elected a member to serve in this present parliament — the house was moved that the entry in the journal of the house of the 6th day of March, 1711, in relation to the proceedings of the house upon the return of a burgess to serve ... in the room of Robert Walpole, esquire, expelled the house,[4] might be read. And the same was read accordingly. The house was also moved that the resolution of the house of Friday, the 3d day of this instant February, relating to the expulsion of John Wilkes, esquire, then a member of this house, might be read.
And the same being read accordingly, an amendment was proposed to be made to the question by inserting after the word "house" these words: "for having been the author and publisher of what this house hath resolved to be an insolent, scandalous, and seditious libel; and for having been convicted in the court of king's bench of having printed and published a seditious libel and three obscene and impious libels; and having by the judgment of the said court been sentenced to undergo twenty-two months' imprisonment and being in execution under the said judgment." And the question being put that those words be there inserted ... , it passed in the negative. Then the main question being put ... , it was resolved in the affirmative.
A motion being made [and passed in the affirmative] ..., resolved that the late election of a knight of the shire to serve in this present parliament for the county of Middlesex is a void election. Ordered that Mr. Speaker do issue his warrant to the clerk of the crown to make out a new writ for the electing of a knight of the shire to serve in this present parliament for the county of Middlesex in the room of John Wilkes, esquire, who is adjudged incapable of being elected a member to serve in this present parliament, and whose election for the said county has been declared void....
[15 April.] The orders of the day for taking into consideration the poll taken at the last election of a knight of the shire to serve in this present parliament for the county of Middlesex ... being read ... , a motion was made, and the question ... proposed, that Henry Lawes Luttrell, esquire, ought to have been returned a knight of the shire to serve in this present parliament for the county of Middlesex.... Then the question being put ... , the house divided ... [197 to 143]. So it was resolved in the affirmative. Ordered that the deputy clerk of the crown do amend the return for the county of Middlesex by razing out the name of John Wilkes, esquire, and inserting the name of Henry Lawes Luttrell, esquire, instead thereof. And the deputy clerk of the crown, attending according to order, amended the said return accordingly....
[8 May.] A motion being made, and the question being put — that Henry Lawes Luttrell, esquire, is duly elected a knight of the shire to serve in this present parliament for the county of Middlesex — the house divided ... [221 to 152]. So it was resolved in the affirmative.
Journals of the Commons, XXXII, 228, 386 f., 451.
... Then it was moved to resolve that the house of commons, in the exercise of its judicature in matters of election, is bound to judge according to the law of the land and the known and established law and custom of parliament, which is part thereof. Which being objected to, and a question stated thereupon, after debate, the previous question was put.... It was resolved in the negative. Dissentient: —
1. Because the resolution proposed was in our judgment highly necessary to lay the foundation of a proceeding which might tend to quiet the minds of the people, by doing them justice at a time when a decision of the other house — which appears to us inconsistent with the principles of the constitution and irreconcilable to the law of the land — has spread so universal an alarm and produced so general a discontent throughout the kingdom.
2. Because, although we do not deny that the determination on the right to a seat in the house of commons is competent to the jurisdiction of that house alone, yet, when to this it is added that whatever they, in the exercise of that jurisdiction, think fit to declare to be law is therefore to be so considered, because there lies no appeal, we conceive ourselves called upon to give that proposition the strongest negative. For, if admitted, the law of the land, by which all courts of judicature without exception are equally bound to proceed, is at once overturned and resolved into the will and pleasure of a majority of one house of parliament, who, in assuming it, assume a power to overrule at pleasure the fundamental right of election, which the constitution has placed in other hands — those of their constituents. And if ever this pretended power should come to be exercised to the full extent of the principle, that house will be no longer a representative of the people, but a separate body, altogether independent of them, self-existing and self-elected.
3. Because, when we are told that expulsion implies incapacity, and the proof insisted upon is that the people have acquiesced in the principle by not re-electing persons who have been expelled, we equally deny the position as false, and reject the proof offered as in no way supporting the position to which it is applied. We are sure the doctrine is not to be found in any statute or law book, nor in the journals of the house of commons; neither is it consonant with any just or known analogy of law....
4. Because, as the constitution hath been once already destroyed by the assumption and exercise of the very power which is now claimed, the day may come again when freedom of speech may be criminal in that house, and every member who shall have virtue enough to withstand the usurpations of the time, and assert the rights of the people, will for that offence be expelled by a factious and corrupt majority, and by that expulsion rendered incapable of serving the public. In which case the electors will find themselves reduced to the miserable alternative of giving up altogether their right of election or of choosing only such as are enemies of their country, and will be passive at least, if not active, in subverting the constitution.
5. Because, although it has been objected in the debate that it is unusual and irregular in either house of parliament to examine into the judicial proceedings of the other (whose decisions, as they cannot be drawn into question by appeal, are, it is said, to be submitted to without examination of the principles of them elsewhere), we conceive the argument goes directly to establish the exploded doctrine of passive obedience and non-resistance, which, as applied to the acts of any branch of the supreme power, we hold to be equally dangerous. And though it is generally true that neither house ought lightly and wantonly to interpose even an opinion upon matters which the constitution hath entrusted to the jurisdiction of the other, we conceive it to be no less true that, where under colour of a judicial proceeding either house arrogates to itself the powers of the whole legislature and makes the law which it professes to declare, the other not only may but ought to assert its own right and those of the people; that this house has done so in former instances, particularly in the famous case of Ashby and White....[5]
6. Because, upon the whole, we deem the power which the house of commons have assumed to themselves, of creating an incapacity unknown to the law and thereby depriving, in effect, all the electors of Great Britain of their invaluable right of free election confirmed to them by so many solemn statutes, a flagrant usurpation, as highly repugnant to every essential principle of the constitution as the claim of ship money by King Charles I, or that of the suspending and dispensing power by King James II — this being indeed, in our opinion, a suspending and dispensing power assumed and exercised by the house of commons against the ancient and fundamental liberties of the kingdom.
Journals of the Lords, XXXII, 417-18.
(D) Commons' Debate on the Reporting of Speeches (1778)
[29 January.] Colonel Luttrell ... complained that in a certain morning paper ... he had been grossly misrepresented.... He ... made many severe strictures on the conduct of the editor of that paper.... He considered such conduct as too heinous to be forgiven, and therefore he informed the house that, for his future safety and protection, he was determined to move that the standing order of the house for excluding strangers from the gallery should be strictly carried into execution....
Mr. Fox rose to say ... he was convinced the true and only method of preventing misrepresentation was by throwing open the gallery and making the debates and decisions of the house as public as possible. There was less danger of misrepresentation in a full company than a thin one, as there would be a greater number of persons to give evidence against the misrepresentation. The shutting of the gallery could not prevent the proceedings of the house from finding their way to public view; for during a certain period, when the gallery was kept empty, the debates were printed, let the manner of obtaining them be what it might. And in fact the public had a right to know what passed in parliament.
The speaker begged to have the sense of the house to direct his future conduct.
Mr. Rigby confessed that he wished to have the gallery shut, not only against gentlemen but ladies, as the latter as well as the former might dabble in party disputes and have their predilections and preferences for one party before another. He thought at this time it was very necessary to exclude every stranger, since in the course of next week a most serious inquiry would take place that might perhaps affect the lives and properties of individuals. He confessed it might be thought odious to make the motion; nevertheless, if the motion was made, he would second it.
Mr. Turner entreated the honourable gentleman to give up his intention of making the motion. He did not like a man that was afraid of having his speech published, a man that weighed his words. He wished to see gentlemen warm when circumstances required it; their fathers were warm before them; they were warm themselves; and he hoped their children would be so after them. For his part, he should be always happy to see the gallery crowded; and if one door was shut to exclude all the men, another should be opened to let in all the women.
The speaker said that the conversation did not a little affect him; for there was a standing order to keep the gallery shut against strangers, and he had, with the acquiescence of the house, relaxed it. He should therefore, as the affair happened to be mentioned, be glad, before the house rose, that they would come to some determination.
Mr. Burke paid a very generous compliment to the speaker for having relaxed in some measure from the rigour of a strict decree; in so doing he had acted wisely and politicly. He was sensible, no doubt, that summum ius was summa iniuria, and that some laws were better kept in the breach than in the observance. An odium still awaited the exertion of rigorous justice, and to render it respected it must be made gentle. As to the matter then in the contemplation of the house, he had not a doubt about the propriety of opening the doors to strangers, considering it either as the channel of information to the constituents of the members or as a school for the instruction of youth. Nay, as the source of information and amusement to the ladies, it was a matter of very serious concern and ought not to be done away and sported with at pleasure.
Mr. Vyner thought that, while every member had it in his power to order the strangers to withdraw whenever it might be inconvenient for them to remain, either from want of room or from secret business on the tapis, there was no need of taking away the right entirely.
General Conway spoke a few words to the impropriety of shutting the gallery and, as a proof that it was not one individual alone who suffered from newspaper exposure, he mentioned a falsehood asserted of himself, which he laughed at and despised.
Mr. T. Townshend declared it to be unconstitutional to shut the doors of the house generally against the people whom they sat there to represent. He mentioned the exceptions when it was necessary, and the rules of the house could not be dispensed with; and at the same time he passed a very severe censure on all shameful misrepresentations of the proceedings of the house, and of the speeches of members.
Colonel Luttrell owned that the arguments of the honourable gentleman (Mr. Burke) had staggered and influenced his former judgment, and he was now convinced it would be odious to carry the order to its rigour. He therefore should not press his motion....
Cobbett, Parliamentary History, XIX, 647-50.
(E) Commons' Debate on North's Government (1779)
Lord John Cavendish observed ... he would move an amendment to the question[6] by inserting after the words, "national defence" at the end of the fifth paragraph, these words: "to beseech his majesty to reflect upon the extent of territory, the power, the opulence, the reputation abroad, and the concord at home which distinguished the opening of his majesty's reign and marked it as the most splendid and happy period in the history of this nation; and, when he shall have turned his eyes on the endangered, impoverished, distracted, and even dismembered state of the whole — after all the grants of successive parliaments, liberal to profusion and trusting to the very utmost extent of rational confidence — his majesty will expect to receive the honest opinion of a faithful and affectionate parliament, who should think they betrayed his majesty, and those they represent, if they did not distinctly state to his majesty in words what the world has seen in most calamitous and disgraceful effects, that, if anything can prevent the consummation of public ruin, it can only be by new counsels and new counsellors without further loss of time — a real change from a sincere conviction of past errors, and not a mere palliation, which must prove fruitless." ...
Mr. T. Townshend declared he thought it impossible that we could ever have been brought into the calamitous state in which we were then reduced, if to the inability of our ministers base treachery were not added. Treachery, he was perfectly satisfied, was somewhere lurking in our councils and had surrounded the throne; otherwise, in spite of the blunders of administration, we should be in infinitely a better state of defence than we were.... Of late years a most dangerous doctrine had gone forth and been most sedulously propagated by the followers of administration, and perhaps some of its members — though neither had the confidence publicly to avow it — which directly tended to overthrow the constitution: that the king was his own minister, his own admiral-in-chief, his own general, his own secretary, his own president of the council, his own financier. Thus his majesty was made the shield behind which knavery, servility, and every species of folly, treachery, and villainy might screen themselves from punishment.... The failure of every measure is thus laid at the door of the sovereign who, according to both the letter and spirit of the constitution, can do no wrong, and the responsibility of the servants transferred to the personal and political character of the master. These were doctrines which afforded but a flimsy and wretched protection from punishment; for an impartial and uncorrupt parliament would know where responsibility ought to rest, would fix it accordingly, and would direct it to the quarter where both justice, the constitution, and the laws pointed, and where at some future day, he predicted, it would be loudly and peremptorily demanded....
Lord North said he rose in this stage of the debate lest his silence should be interpreted as proceeding from a desire to shun the warm conflict so eagerly urged by the noble lord who moved the amendment and the two honourable gentlemen who followed on the same side. An indirect charge of treachery had been made against him by the right honourable gentleman who spoke last. This seemed of late a favourite topic with gentlemen in the opposition. But why did they not pursue their accusations and follow them up with specific proofs, and by so doing endeavour to fix the guilt and bring it home fairly and directly to its proper object and compel the miscreant to undergo that fate which treachery deserves? An honourable gentleman (Mr. J. Grenville) asked him what he would do when he should find himself deserted by his friends in parliament. He was prepared to answer him: he would instantly retire; for, whenever the majority of the house should disapprove of a minister's conduct, he must give way. Like a torrent, their disapprobation must and ought to sweep ministers before it. For God forbid, explained his lordship, that there should be a voice in the nation stronger than that of parliament! Whenever my accounting day shall come, I shall meet it without fear. There are laws for the protection of innocence and, if my accusers are not enemies to law, I am safe. My innocence will be my shield and the laws will defend me.... The amendment certainly contained no language that was unparliamentary. It was the duty of parliament to cause ministers to be removed, but justice required that proof should be first made of their delinquency. To remove the servants of the crown without assigning any cause for it, or attributing to them without trial what on trial would be found not imputable to them, would be unjust and unprecedented. Therefore, though he admitted to the fullest extent the right of the house to address the throne for a removal of ministers, as there was nothing specifically charged in the amendment, he certainly would not vote for it. And as it reflected a censure upon him, as included in ... praying for new counsels and new counsellors, the house, he was sure, would not be surprised that he did not support it....
Mr. Fox ... [said] he saw very early indeed in the present reign the plan of government which had been laid down and had since been invariably pursued in every department. It was not the mere rumour of the streets that the king was his own minister; the fatal truth was evident and had made itself visible in every circumstance of the war carried on against America and the West Indies. There was not the least intelligence in the West Indies perceptible between the king's officers in the most kindred departments. Had not all such intelligence been destroyed by an invisible cabinet influence, could it ever have happened that there should be in one of our lately captured islands 150 pieces of ordnance and only 40 men to work them? Could there have been in one place cannon without balls, and in another balls without cannon? In short, could mere ignorance in ministers produce of itself so many complicated blunders as the last seven years have furnished, to render the present reign the most disgraceful period in the annals of this country? ...
The noble lord in the blue ribbon had disclaimed the doctrine held out by the followers of administration relative to the king's being his own minister; but yet it was most certain that such a doctrine was daily dispersed by his followers, probably with an intention of paying their court to him by propagating opinions the most disagreeable to their patron! The doctrine, however, was in itself highly dangerous to the constitution, as it tended to take responsibility from the shoulders of the ministers and place it on a personage who could do no wrong and could not be called to account. However, he would observe that, though in general the evils of a reign were attributed to the wicked counsels of an abandoned ministry, yet, when these evils reached to a certain height, ministers were forgotten and the prince alone was punished. Thus it was with the royal house of Stuart. Charles and his son James had both wicked ministers, to whom, no doubt, the errors of their reigns ought to be chiefly ascribed; and yet they themselves were punished — the one by the loss of life, the other of his crown. This should be a lesson to sovereigns and teach them to check their ministers and not suffer themselves to be blindly led by them, as they themselves may, for their ministers, bear the whole weight of their people's indignation.
There was not, he observed, in the whole history of the country a period that resembled the present, except the reign of the unfortunate Henry VI. His family, like that of his present majesty, did not claim the crown as their hereditary right; it was by revolution that both obtained it. Henry was an amiable and pious prince; so was his present majesty. Henry was the son of the most renowned monarch that had ever sat upon our throne; George was the grandson of a hero. Henry lost all his father's conquests and all his hereditary provinces in France; George had already seen the conquests of his grandfather wrested from him in the West Indies, and his hereditary provinces of America erected into an empire that disclaimed all connection.... It was not a secret to that house that the present sovereign's claim to the throne of this country was founded only upon the delinquency of the Stuart family — a circumstance which should never be one moment out of his majesty's recollection....
The house divided: for the amendment 134; against it 233. The original address was then agreed to.
Ibid., XX, 1096-1150.
(F) Commons' Debate on Dunning's Resolutions (1780)
[6 April.] The house, according to order, resolved itself into a committee of the whole house to consider of the petition of the gentlemen, clergy, and freeholders of the county of York respecting an economical reform, and also the several other petitions referred to the consideration of the said committee.
The titles of the said petitions being read, in all about forty in number, Mr. Dunning rose and said it was unnecessary to observe that the subject matter to be taken into consideration was the subject matter contained in the petitions. Independent of the great objects which the petitions recommended to the care and attention of parliament, which had been, according to the particular ideas of the several classes of petitioners, of a various nature, there was one great fundamental point on which they hinged: that of setting limits or paring down the increased, dangerous, and alarming influence of the crown, and an economical expenditure of the public money. In one point of view, both these objects might be fairly consolidated into one great principle. For instance, if the public money was faithfully applied and frugally expended, that would reduce the influence of the crown; if, on the other hand, the influence of the crown was restrained within its natural and constitutional limits, it would once more restore that power which the constitution had vested in that house — the inquiring into and controlling the expenditure of public money....[7] Having endeavoured, as far as lay in my power, to describe what the petitioners mean, and what administration mean, on the other hand, give me leave to recur to the ground of my present proposed resolutions. I have already observed that the great objects of the petitioners have been resisted, both in argument and by public avowals, by the minister and his friends. They have told you that the influence of the crown is not too much and ought not, of course, to be lessened; the petitioners have asserted the direct contrary. Ministers have told you that it is not competent for this house to inquire into the expenditure of the civil list; the direct contrary are the sentiments of the petitioners. To talk of petitions or redress is vain, idle, nugatory, and ineffectual while these two points are maintained by those who have the majority of the house. To bring both these points fairly to issue, I mean to frame two propositions, abstracted from the petitions on your table, and take the sense of the committee upon them.... My first resolution will be, that it is the opinion of this committee that it is necessary to declare that the influence of the crown has increased, is increasing, and ought to be diminished; my second, that it is competent to this house to examine into and to correct abuses in the expenditure of the civil list revenues, as well as in every other branch of the public revenue, whenever it shall appear expedient to the wisdom of this house so to do....
Earl Nugent: ... The learned gentleman has produced a proposition that the influence of the crown has increased, is increasing, and ought to be diminished. Has he produced, or so much as promised, a tittle of evidence of the facts so alleged? Not a word of that; but he has said a great deal about the opinions of speculative men, of an eminent lawyer lately deceased, and of two ingenious political writers (Hume and Blackstone). The former says the influence of the crown began to show itself about the year 1742. I was in parliament before that period and remember that clamours and speculations of that kind prevailed long before the year 1742. But I protest that I thought then, as I think now, that they were totally unfounded; and I can fairly affirm that I never felt it myself nor gave a single vote under any influence whatever, but what was necessary for the support of government. But I will go one step further and take the two first assertions in the honourable gentleman's proposition as proved, that the influence of the crown has increased and is increasing. Will the learned gentleman's conclusion follow? May not this increased influence be necessary? Has he ventured to state that it is not? By no means; he declines the fair allegation that it is improper or unconstitutional, and takes a leap to his conclusion by inferring that it ought to be diminished....
Mr. Rous said that gentlemen on the other side of the house had rested their arguments for some time past chiefly on two points: that it was necessary the crown should have influence both within and without that house; and that gentlemen who composed opposition were instigated by motives of ambition. He thought it was necessary to grant both propositions in order to explain the true grounds on which they stood. For his part, he was one who thought that the crown ought to have an influence in that house; but what species of influence? Not surely a corrupt one. By no means; but a fair constitutional influence, an influence arising from a confidence in government, originating in a full conviction that the measures proposed by its subordinate ministers were founded in wisdom ... — in a thorough conviction that the persons entrusted with the exercise of the executive power were selected for their integrity, talents, and public virtue. This was the influence and the only influence that should ever be felt in that house. But, on the other hand, when the opposite qualities were those which encouraged persons to be candidates for places of the highest trust and confidence under government, who could, without a mixture of indignation and the most ineffable contempt, listen to such as maintained in argument that the friends and supporters of such an administration were not under the dominion of the most corrupt and unconstitutional influence? ...
At twelve o'clock the committee divided: for Mr. Dunning's [first] motion 233; against it 215.... Mr. Dunning made his next motion.... The question being called for, the motion was agreed to without a division....
Ibid., XXI, 340-67.
(G) Pitt's Proposals for Reform of Parliament (1783)
Mr. Pitt: An Englishman, who should compare the flourishing state of his country some twenty years ago with the state of humiliation in which he now beholds her, must be convinced that the ruin which he now deplores, having been brought on by slow degrees and almost imperceptibly, proceeded from something radically wrong in the constitution. Of the existence of a radical error no one seemed to doubt; nay, almost all were so clearly satisfied of it that various remedies had been devised by those who wished most heartily to remove it. The house itself had discovered that a secret influence of the crown was sapping the very foundation of liberty by corruption. The influence of the crown had been felt within these walls, and had often been found strong enough to stifle the sense of duty and to overrule the propositions made to satisfy the wishes and desires of the people. The house of commons, in former parliaments, had been base enough to feed the influence that enslaved its members; and thus was at one time the parent and the offspring of corruption. This influence, however, had risen to such a height that men were ashamed any longer to deny its existence, and the house had at length been driven to the necessity of voting that it ought to be diminished. Various were the expedients that had been thought of in order to effect so salutary a purpose as was that of guarding against this influence; of shutting against it the doors of that house, where, if it once got footing, after the resolution alluded to, liberty could no longer find an asylum. The house of commons which, according to the true spirit of the constitution, should be the guardian of the people's freedom, the constitutional check and control over the executive power, would through this influence degenerate into a mere engine of tyranny and oppression, to destroy the constitution in effect, though it should, in its outward form, still remain.
Among the various expedients that had been devised to bar the entrance of such influence into that house, he had heard principally of three. One was to extend the right of voting for members to serve in parliament, which was now so confined, to all the inhabitants of the kingdom indiscriminately; so that every man, without the distinction of freeholder, or freeman of a corporation, should have the franchise of a vote for a person to represent him in parliament — and this mode, he understood, was thought by those who patronized it to be the only one that was consistent with true liberty in a free constitution, where every one ought to be governed by those laws only to which all have actually given their consent, either in person, or by their representative. For himself, he utterly rejected and condemned this mode, which it was impossible for him to adopt without libelling those renowned forefathers who had framed the constitution in the fulness of their wisdom and fashioned it for the government of freemen, not of slaves. If this doctrine should obtain, nearly one-half of the people must in fact be slaves; for it was absolutely impossible that this idea of giving to every man a right of voting, however finely it might appear in theory, could ever be reduced to practice. But, though it were even practicable, still one-half of the nation would be slaves; for all those who vote for the unsuccessful candidates cannot, in the strictness of this doctrine, be said to be represented in parliament, and therefore they are governed by laws to which they give not their assent, either in person or by representatives. Consequently, according to the ideas of the friends to this expedient, all those who vote for unsuccessful candidates must be slaves. Nay, it was oftentimes still harder with those who are members of parliament, who are made slaves also and are governed by laws to which they not only have not given their consent, but against which they have actually voted.
For his part, his idea of representation was this, that the members once chosen and returned to parliament were, in effect, the representatives of the people at large, as well of those who did not vote at all, or who, having voted, gave their votes against them, as of those by whose suffrages they were actually seated in the house. This being therefore his principle, he could not consent to an innovation founded on doctrines subversive of liberty, which in reality went so far as to say that this house of commons was not, and that no house of commons ever had been, a true and constitutional representation of the people; for no house of commons had yet been elected by all the men in the kingdom. The country had long prospered and had even attained the summit of glory, though this doctrine had never been embraced; and he hoped that no one would ever attempt to introduce it into the laws of England, or treat it in any other light than as a mere speculative proposition that may be good in theory but which it would be absurd and chimerical to endeavour to reduce to practice.
The second expedient he had heard of was to abolish the franchise which several boroughs now enjoy of returning members to serve in parliament. These places were known by the favourite, popular appellation of rotten boroughs. He confessed that there was something very plausible in this idea, but still he was not ready to adopt it; he held those boroughs in the light of deformities, which in some degree disfigured the fabric of the constitution, but which he feared could not be removed without endangering the whole pile. It was true that the representation of the people could not be perfect. Nay, it could not be good unless the interests of the representatives and the represented were the same. The moment they became different, from that moment the liberty of the people was in danger; because those who ought to be the guardians of it might find their account in circumscribing it within narrower limits than the constitution marked out, or in carrying through measures which might in the end effectually destroy it. It must be admitted from a variety of circumstances, which it was unnecessary for him at present to explain, that, though the members returned by boroughs might be for the present the brightest patterns of patriotism and liberty, still there was no doubt but that borough members, considered in the abstract, were more liable to the operation of that influence, which every good man wished to see destroyed in that house, than those members who were returned by the counties. And therefore, though he was afraid to cut up the roots of this influence by disfranchising the boroughs — because he was afraid of doing more harm than good by using a remedy that might be thought worse than the disease — still he thought it his duty to counteract, if possible, that influence, the instruments of which he was afraid to remove. The boroughs ought to be considered, not only as places of franchise, but also as places where the franchise was in some measure connected with property by burgage tenure. And therefore, as he was unwilling to dissolve the boroughs, he would endeavour to defeat the effect of undue influence in them by introducing and establishing a counterbalance that should keep it down and prevent it from ruining the country.
This brought him naturally to the third expedient that he had often heard mentioned, which was to add a certain number of members to the house who should be returned by the counties and the metropolis. It was unnecessary for him to say that the county members, in general, were almost necessarily taken from that class and description of gentlemen the least liable to the seduction of corrupt influence, the most deeply interested in the liberty and prosperity of the country, and consequently the most likely to pursue such measures as appeared to them the most salutary to their country. In the hands of such men the liberties of their constituents would be safe, because the interests of such representatives and the represented must necessarily be the same. This expedient appeared to him the most fit to be adopted, because it was the least objectionable. It had the merit of promising an effectual counterbalance to the weight of the boroughs without being an innovation in the form of the constitution. He would not then say what number of members ought to be added to the counties; he would leave that to be inserted in a bill, which, if the resolutions he meant to propose should pass, he intended to move for leave to bring in. He, however, would say that, in his opinion, the number ought not be under one hundred. It was true he thought the house would then be more numerous than he could wish; but still it were better it should be so than that the liberty of the country should be exposed to destruction from the baleful influence of the crown in the boroughs. He was not, however, without an expedient by degrees to reduce the number of members, even after the addition, down to nearly the present number. His expedient was this: that whenever it should be proved before the tribunal, which happily was now established by law to try the merits of contested elections, that the majority of any borough had been bribed and corrupted, the borough should then lose the privilege of sending members of parliament; the corrupt majority should be disfranchised, and the honest minority be permitted to vote at elections for knights of the shire. By this expedient he was sure the boroughs would be preserved free from corruption; or else they must be abolished gradually, and the number of members of that house be reduced to its present standard. This disfranchising of boroughs would be the work of time. The necessity of disfranchising any one, whenever that necessity should appear, would sanctify the measure. It would appear to be what in fact it would then be — an act of justice, not of whim, party, or caprice; as it would be founded, not on surmise, but on the actual proof of guilt.
After amplifying upon this for some time and showing that it was equally founded in policy and in justice, he urgently pressed the necessity of something being done in compliance with the petitions that had been presented, complaining of the present state of the representation; and took abundant pains to caution the house against adopting any extravagant plans of reform that might be suggested by enthusiastic speculatists on the one hand, or obstinately refusing to take any step whatever in compliance with the petitions, under a childish dislike and dread of innovation on the other. After urging very elaborately an infinite variety of arguments, Mr. Pitt said his first resolution was what he conceived every individual member would feel the force [of], and be ready to come into, without a moment's hesitation. Of his second he entertained hopes pretty nearly as sanguine, convinced as he was of its propriety and justice. And with regard to his third, though it might possibly meet with considerable opposition, he was extremely anxious to obtain it the sanction of the house. He then read his three resolutions, which, in substance, were as follows: (1) That it was the opinion of the house that the most effectual and practicable measures ought to be taken for the better prevention both of bribery and expense in the election of members to serve in parliament; (2) That for the future, when the majority of voters for any borough should be convicted of gross and notorious corruption before a select committee of that house appointed to try the merits of any election, such borough should be disfranchised, and the minority of voters, not so convicted, should be entitled to vote for the county in which such borough should be situated; (3) That an addition of knights of the shire, and of representatives of the metropolis, should be added to the state of the representation.... Lord North: ... They but little know mankind who imagine that a small indulgence will not induce a pressure for greater. A gentleman behind me says, "Give the people fifty knights, and then make your stand." I oppose this idea. Begin with innovation, and there is no knowing where you will stop; like the gravity of a weight in sinking, its velocity increases in proportion to its weight. The addition of one hundred or even fifty county members would give a decided superiority to the landed interest over the commercial; and it is the beauty of the constitution of the house of commons that, like the general fabric of the British legislature, it provides for and preserves the due balance between the several great interests of the empire — the landed, the commercial, and the moneyed. But do not let us begin. Principiis obsta. Let us act like men. We are not the deputies, but the representatives of the people. We are not to refer to them before we determine. We stand here as they would stand, to use our own discretion without seeking any other guidance under heaven. In a word, as no defect in the constitution has been proved, as we have heard nothing but declamation and surmise to warrant so awful and so very important a measure as an innovation on the form of the venerable palladium which ages have sanctified down to us, let us again — let me conjure you — act like men and like Britons, and reject what to adopt must inevitably lead to ruin....[8]
Ibid., XXIII, 829-75.
(H) Commons' Debate on the Influence of the Crown (1783)
Mr. Baker rose again. He observed that ... an adjournment of a couple of days ... had given gentlemen time to reflect seriously on the very alarming report that had been for some days in circulation relative to a conference which a noble lord had with a great personage, and the opinion that was said to have been expressed by the latter of the bill which that house had sent up to the lords for vesting the affairs of the East India Company in certain directors.... With respect to this rumour he would go so far as to say that, true or false, it had produced very dangerous effects; for he understood that some noble lords, in consequence of it, had taken their proxies from those to whom they had before entrusted them, and given them to noble lords who were known to be hostile to India. He concluded by reading the two following resolutions: (1) That it is now necessary to declare that to report any opinion or pretended opinion of his majesty upon any bill or other proceeding depending in either house of parliament, with a view to influence the votes of its members, is a high crime and misdemeanour derogatory to the honour of the crown, a breach of the fundamental privileges of parliament, and subversive of the constitution of this country; (2) That this house will on Monday next resolve itself into a committee of the whole house to consider the state of the nation. Having read the resolutions, Mr. Baker moved the former....
Earl Nugent was never more astonished in his life than with the resolution now moved and seconded. It went, in his opinion, to an utter annihilation of all sovereignty in the country....
Mr. W. Pitt, who had risen at the same time with Lord Nugent, hoped the noble lord would attribute his then getting up to no other motive than that common one which actuated them both — a due attachment to the constitutional independence of parliament and the inalienable right of peers, either individually or collectively, to advise his majesty whenever they thought the situation of public affairs made such a step an essential part of their duty.... [The resolution] appeared to him the most unnecessary, the most frivolous and ill-timed, that ever insulted the attention of the national senate.... He concluded by moving the order of the day.
Lord Mahon seconded the motion. He began by charging Mr. Secretary Fox with an utter desertion of all principle. He reprobated his East India Bill[9] as the worst and most obnoxious that ever challenged the attention of parliament or roused the indignation of Englishmen....
Lord North ... contended for the propriety and necessity of the motion; and this he did the more especially as he had been charged, on former occasions, with indifference to the constitution. Had he been silent when such a gross violation of it had met with countenance, he should have thought himself culpable indeed. For what was the influence of the crown — against which on former occasions all these gentlemen had divided against him, and for which he had then deemed it his duty to contend — in comparison of a principle which, once established, would bury in one grave all the privileges of parliament and the rights of the people? He should therefore give the resolution now proposed his most sincere and hearty support....
Mr. Fox spoke to the following effect. I did not intend, sir, to have said anything in addition to what has been already urged so ably in favour of the resolution now agitated. In my own opinion, its importance, propriety, and necessity are completely and substantially established.... This rumour has been treated with a levity which amounts to a sarcasm or lampoon on the dignity of the house. But I will tell gentlemen it is not a newspaper; it is not a verbal surmise, but something much stronger and more serious; there is a written record to be produced. This letter (pulling it out of his pocket) is not to be put in the balance with the lie of the day. It states that his majesty allowed Earl Temple to say that whoever voted for the India Bill were not only not his friends, but he should consider them as his enemies. And if these words were not strong enough, Earl Temple might use whatever words he might deem stronger or more to the purpose. Is this parliamentary, or is it a truth? Where is the man who dares to affirm the one or deny the other, or to say that he believes in his conscience such a rumour was not calculated to produce an immediate effect? ... I trust Englishmen will be as jealous of secret influence as superior to open violence. I trust they are not more ready to defend their interests against foreign depredation and insult than to encounter and defeat this midnight conspiracy against the constitution....
Whoever knows the mode of digesting business in the cabinet must be sensible that the least interference with anything pending in parliament must be dangerous to the constitution. The question is not whether his majesty shall avail himself of such advice as no one readily avows, but who is answerable for such advice. Is the honourable gentleman aware that the responsibility of ministers is the only pledge and security the people of England possess against the infinite abuses so natural to the exercise of this power? Once remove this great bulwark of the constitution, and we are in every respect the slaves and property of despotism. And is not this the necessary consequence of secret influence? ...
Much and gloriously did this house fight and overcome the influence of the crown by purging itself of ministerial dependents. But what was the Contractors Bill, the board of trade, or a vote of the revenue officers compared to a power equal to one-third of the legislature, unanswerable for and unlimited in its acting? Against these we had always to contend. But we knew their strength; we saw their disposition; they fought under no covert; they were a powerful, not a sudden enemy. To compromise the matter therefore, sir, it would become this house to say — rather than yield to a stretch of prerogative thus unprecedented and alarming — "Withdraw your secret influence.... Take back those numerous and tried dependents who so often secured you a majority in parliament. We submit to all the mischief which even this accession of strength is likely to produce; but for God's sake strangle us not, in the very moment we look for success and triumph, by an infamous string of bedchamber janissaries! ..."
I never was the tool of any junto. I accepted of office at the obvious inclination of this house. I shall not hold it a moment after the least hint from them to resume a private station. The honourable gentleman is, however, grasping at place on very different grounds. He is not called to it by a majority of this house; but, in defiance of that majority, stands forth the advocate and candidate for secret influence....
The house divided on the question, that the order of the day be now read: yeas ... 80; noes ... 153. Mr. Baker's motion was consequently carried. He then moved his second resolution, which was likewise carried.
Ibid., XXIV, 197-225.
(I) Debates on the Continuance of Pitt's ministry (1784)[10]
[16 January.] Lord Charles Spencer [moved] that, it having been declared to be the opinion of this house that in the present situation of his majesty's dominions it is peculiarly necessary there should be an administration that has the confidence of this house and of the public, and that the appointments of his majesty's present ministers were accompanied by circumstances new and extraordinary and such as do not conciliate or engage the confidence of this house, the continuance of the present ministers in trusts of the highest importance and responsibility is contrary to constitutional principles and injurious to the interests of his majesty and his people....
Mr. Fox observed that political distinctions were by no means involved in the present question. The principles of Whig and Tory, said he, which have given rise to so much difference of sentiment and to so much disputation in the world, have no connection with it. In my conversations with the rankest Whigs, and in the whole course of my reading, I have never found the hardiest of them deny a right inherent in the prerogative to elect its own ministers. On this point all are agreed. But though this be the admitted and established right of the executive branch of the constitution, is it not also the privilege of the house and of parliament to decide on the conduct of administration, on the peculiarity of their introduction into office, and on those circumstances which either entitle them to the confidence or the reprobation of the house? It was on this principle allowed on all hands — and the exercise of which, in various instances, has saved the country from ruin — that the resolutions of last Monday were submitted to the committee, and afterwards received the sanction of this branch of the legislature. But although it is undoubtedly the prerogative of his majesty to appoint his ministers, it may still be a point worthy of consideration how far it may be prudent, wise, and politic in a monarch to continue them in power and support them in office, when they are declared by that house to have been elevated to their station by means unconstitutional and such as have rendered them unworthy of confidence. On this question, as I cannot allow myself even to imagine that a monarch would appoint ministers whom he did not think possessed of the confidence of parliament, so I cannot even form an idea that a wise and prudent sovereign would be hardy enough to continue in office those who have been reprobated as undeserving their regard....[11]
[26 January.] Mr. Pitt: He had the profoundest respect for the house, the utmost reverence for their resolutions, being perfectly aware that the house had it in its power at all times to follow up their resolutions with measures that could not fail to render them effectual. That he stood in a situation perfectly new he was ready to admit; but that he stood in that situation in contempt of that house, or as holding himself superior to its authority, he must beg leave to deny. New and extraordinary circumstances might justify new and extraordinary conduct. For any minister who had been declared unworthy the approbation and confidence of that house to remain in office was, he confessed, far from common; but he hoped he should not give offence when he declared that a minister might nevertheless act constitutionally by remaining in office after that house had declared their disapprobation of him. He begged pardon for what he was going to say, but he conceived that, according to the constitution, the immediate appointment or removal of ministers rested not with that house. There was therefore nothing illegal in a minister's remaining in office after that house had declared against him, particularly where immediate resignation would have injured the country; and he hoped a public man might be supposed to act honourably, when, upon public motives, he thought he best served his country by continuing in office after he had been so unfortunate as to lose the confidence of that house. He explained this by declaring that there were acts of duty not the less indispensable because they were disagreeable; that in critical situations it was incumbent on a minister who found he was not approved by that house to look to the probable consequences of his immediate resigning. It behooved him to consider who were likely to be his successors, and whether the country might not receive more detriment than they could possibly derive advantage by his leaving it without any executive government, and thus making room for an administration in whom the crown, the parliament, and the people could not equally repose confidence.... To have resigned immediately after the house had come to their resolution on Friday se'nnight would have been to have let in the ministers who, however they might enjoy the confidence of that house, he believed had not the confidence of the nation. Such a change therefore could have done no good to the country. It was true the majority of that house had decided against him; but the sense of the house upon that point did not appear to be grown more and more in the progress of the time that had elapsed since his coming into office. On the contrary, the majority had gradually decreased....
[2 February.] Mr. Coke [moved] that it is the opinion of this house that the continuance of the present ministers in their offices is an obstacle to the formation of such an administration as may enjoy the confidence of this house, and tend to put an end to the unfortunate divisions and distractions of the country.
Mr. Pitt: With regard ... to the resignation of ministers, he saw no reason for it. If that house insisted upon their going out, there were two constitutional means open to them: either by impeachment to proceed against them for their crimes, if they had committed any, or by an immediate address to the crown to desire their removal. The removal of ministers lay with the crown and not with that house. In remaining in office, therefore, with a view to keep the country from anarchy and confusion and to prevent the government from falling a prey to that administration which had been removed, and suffering them to force themselves upon the sovereign against his will, was neither illegal nor unconstitutional....[12]
[11 February.] Mr. Fox: ... He would say the only suspicion he entertained, and which had originated in the mode by which the right honourable gentleman obtained and kept possession of power, was that he entertained an opinion that the crown might appoint a ministry, and persist in supporting them, who had not the confidence of the house. He wished he might find the suspicion ill-founded, but he dreaded to find it true; for then a union[13] on such a principle was impossible. It went to deprive this country of an executive government in which the people had any concern, over which they could exercise any control. All the instances of voting money was on a principle of confidence. The minister's influence in the house depended on what confidence they had in him; he was their trustee; to them he was responsible for every article of public expenditure. The very estimates to be considered that night were instances of the same principle in the constitution; and every sum of money voted for the ordnance was voted by gentlemen incapable of judging for themselves whether those sums were properly applied or not; but in confidence that Lord Townshend, the duke of Richmond, or any other whose province it was to direct the business of that very important department, were competent to pronounce on the fitness of the objects for which the money would be applied....
Mr. Pitt: ... A union might take place in which one minister might look to the right for support and confidence and another to the left, but he thought a minister ought to look to both; he ought to look for the confidence of his sovereign and for the confidence of that house. He would go farther — he ought to look for the confidence of the house of lords and of the people. He had said to the house before, and he would repeat it again, that there was no law in this kingdom which made it criminal in him to remain in office, notwithstanding a resolution of the house of commons. He would, however, admit that the confidence of that house was absolutely necessary, and that an administration could not last that did not possess it. He did not, however, agree with the right honourable gentleman that there was any similitude between the resolution of the 16th January and that principle of confidence on which money was voted in that house. It was certainly necessary that the commons, in matters which, being entirely professional, they were not able to judge of, should confide for the propriety of them in the minister from whose department the estimates came — as, for instance, in the case of the ordnance estimates, which were to be voted that evening, the house must of course repose a confidence in the master-general of the ordnance, whose duty it was to see that the estimates were proper. But surely the right honourable gentleman would not declare that this was the kind of confidence the house had in view when the resolution of the 16th of January passed....
[18 February.] Mr. Pitt ... declared that his majesty had not yet, in compliance with the resolutions of the house, thought proper to dismiss his present ministers; and that his majesty's ministers had not resigned. This much he thought necessary to say, prior to any discussion on the subject of supplies....
Mr. Fox: He had often stated his conceptions of the prerogatives of the throne. The present question involved them very materially. That his majesty had a legal right to appoint whom he pleased, and even to continue those whom he had appointed to be his ministers, in opposition to the sentiments. of this house, he pretended not to dispute; but he was certain, on the other hand, the public money was trusted with the house of commons, whose right to distribute that money was at least not less legal. When, therefore, either the one or the other of these rights were asserted in the extreme, he could consider it in no other light than as a challenge; and the party thus defied was bound in duty to its own honour calmly and deliberately to consider with itself whether it should take up the challenge or not. He did not know that any defiance more explicit and direct could be given to that house than the one which had just come from the right honourable gentleman. He hoped the house was not by any means prepared to accept of it without farther and more sedate consideration....[14]
[1 March.] Mr. Fox: ... Since the unfortunate reigns of the Stuarts prerogative had never been so much the topic of discussion as it had become of late in parliament. His ideas of whatever the constitution had vested in the crown were no secret; he ever had and ever would avow them. No prerogative of the crown was, in his opinion, distinct or unconnected with the whole of that free and liberal system in which our government chiefly consisted. The people were the great source of all power, and their welfare the sole object for which it was to be exerted; but who in this case were to be the judges? The house of commons undoubtedly were competent to protect the rights of the people, to pronounce on whatever they deemed an encroachment on their privileges; and the moment they could not prevent everything which struck them as such, they were not equal to the design of such an institution. This he called a due seasoning or modification of that enormous power devolved by the constitution on the executive government of the country. The house of commons consequently were possessed of the power of putting a negative on the choice of ministers. They were stationed as sentinels by the people, to watch over whatever could more or less remotely or nearly affect their interest; so that, whenever they discovered in those nominated by his majesty to the several great offices of state want of ability, want of weight to render their situations respectable, or want of such principles as were necessary to give effect to the wishes of the house, in any or all of such cases they were entitled to advise his majesty against employing such persons as his faithful commons could not trust....
Mr. Fox then moved that an humble address be presented to his majesty: ... That this house with all humility claims it as its right, and on every proper occasion feels it to be their bounden duty, to advise his majesty touching the exercise of any branch of his royal prerogative; that we submit it to his majesty's royal consideration that the continuance of an administration which does not possess the confidence of the representatives of the people must be injurious to the public service; ... that ... his majesty's faithful commons ... find themselves obliged again to beseech his majesty that he would be graciously pleased to lay the foundation of a strong and stable government by the previous removal of his present ministers....
Mr. Pitt: ... No man was more zealous or more unreserved in admitting and asserting the right of the house to advise the sovereign in the exercise of all his prerogatives than he was. This had always been a sentiment which he had avowed; but that a declaration on the part of the house of their disapprobation of his majesty's ministers should ipso facto, in any given instance, bind and compel the sovereign to dismiss those ministers, or oblige them to resign, was a point which he never had admitted and would never allow.... Attempts have been made, said Mr. Pitt, to fix imputations of criminality on the present administration. Their sins have been stated; and one of the most glaring of them is that the late ministry were dismissed against the sense of the house. But what is the meaning of this charge? To what conclusion does the argument, when followed up, lead? Does it not fairly admit of this comment, that it is improper for his majesty to dismiss his ministers, provided they are approved of by the house of commons; and that, so long as they act agreeably to its sentiment, so long and no longer are they to enjoy the patronage of the crown and retain the offices of administration? Is this a decent treatment of the prerogative? Is this constitutional doctrine? Is it not degrading the dignity of the sovereign? It is not a transference of the prerogatives of the crown to the house of commons and a placing the royal sceptre under the mace that lies upon the table? The constitution of this country is its glory; but in what a nice adjustment does its excellence consist! Equally free from the distractions of democracy and the tyranny of monarchy, its happiness is to be found in its mixture of parts. It was this mixed government which the prudence of our ancestors devised, and which it will be our wisdom inviolably to support. They experienced all the vicissitudes and distractions of a republic. They felt all the vassalage and despotism of a simple monarchy. They abandoned both and, by blending each together, extracted a system which has been the envy and admiration of the world. It is this scheme of government which constitutes the pride of Englishmen, and which they can never relinquish but with their lives....[15]
Ibid., XXIV, 361-711.
[1] The following documents are (1) resolutions of the commons occasioned by Wilkes' famous no. 45 of the North Briton; (2) a minority protest made by certain lords after the upper house had agreed to the foregoing resolution of the commons.
[2] Cf. No. 126B.
[3] Having been expelled from the house of commons as unfit to serve, Wilkes offered himself for re-election as a member for Middlesex. He was twice returned unopposed and on each occasion the house annulled the election. On standing for re-election the third time, he was opposed by Colonel Luttrell, who received 296 votes to 1143 for Wilkes. The following documents are (1) the resolutions of the commons barring Wilkes and seating Luttrell; (2) a minority protest signed by forty-two peers when the house of lords refused to condemn the action of the commons.
[4] In January, 1712 (new style), Walpole had been expelled from the house of commons for "a high breach of trust and notorious corruption." In the following March he had been declared "incapable to serve in this present parliament" and a writ had been issued for a new election.
[5] See no. 124C.
[6] A vote of thanks to his majesty for his speech at the opening of parliament.
[7] Here Dunning warmly praised the Place Bill recently introduced by Burke; see no. 126F.
[8] Pitt's motion was lost, 149 to 293.
[9] A bill to extend control over the East India Company, which had passed the house of commons but had been rejected by the lords.
[10] This debate took place in the weeks preceding the dissolution of parliament on 25 March. Pitt had taken office in December, 1783, being assured by the king's parliamentary agent, John Robinson, that a favourable majority would be obtained in the next election. Until the voters could be bribed, Pitt had to face the hostile coalition of Fox and North in the commons. But Robinson kept his word and the dissolution brought the promised victory. For full details see W. T. Laprade, Parliamentary Papers of John Robinson; also his articles in the English Historical Review, XXXI, 224 f., and the American Historical Review, XVIII, 155 f.
[11] The motion was carried, 205 to 184.
[12] The motion was carried, 223 to 204.
[13] He had been advocating a coalition ministry.
[14] Grant of supply was postponed by a vote of 208 to 196.
[15] The motion was carried, 201 to 189.