Tucker's Blackstone


Volume 1 — Appendix
Note D

[Section 15 - Executive Powers (cont.)]

But, to return to the treaty-making-power, it appears to be somewhat extraordinary, that that branch of the federal government, who are by the constitution required to concur, in a declaration of war, before any such declaration can be made, should be wholly precluded from voting at all, upon a question of peace.... They are judges of the causes of war; of the existence of those causes; of the resources, and ability of the states to prosecute and support a war; of the expediency of applying those resources to the obtaining redress, or satisfaction for the injury received; in short, of every possible circumstance that can induce the nation to incur the hazard, or expence of a war: and yet, if through timidity, venality, or corruption, the president, and two thirds of a majority of the senate can be prevailed upon to relinquish the prosecution of the war, and conclude a treaty, the house of representatives have not power to prevent, or retard the measure; although it should appear to them, that the object for which the war hath been undertaken, hath not been attained, and that it was neither relinquished from necessity, or inability to prosecute it, with effect.

These objections are not intended, to extend to the agency which the president and senate may have, in the formation of a treaty; nor to the principle that treaties with foreign nations should be regarded as a part of the supreme law of the land.... The honour and peace of the nation certainly require that it's compacts should be duly observed, and carried into effect with perfect good faith. And though it may be the result of sound discretion to confide the formation of a treaty, in the first instance, to the president and senate, only; yet the safety of the nation seems to require that the final ratification of any compact, which is to form a part of the supreme law of the land, should, as well as other laws of the federal government, depend upon the concurrent approbation of every branch of the congress, before they acquire such a sanction as to become irrevocable, without the consent of a foreign nation; or without hazarding an imputation against the honour and faith of the nation, in the performance of it's contracts.

It may not be improper here to add something on the subject of that part of the constitution, which declares that treaties made by the president and senate shall be a part of the supreme law of the land: acts of congress made pursuant to the powers delegated by the constitution are to be regarded in the same light. What then is the effect of a treaty made by the president and senate, some of the articles of which may contain stipulations on legislative objects, or such as are expressly vested in congress by the constitution, until congress shall make a law carrying them into effect? Is congress bound to carry such stipulations into effect, whether they approve or disapprove of them? Have they no negative, no discretion upon the subject? The answer seems to be, that it is in some respects, an inchoate act. It is the law of the land, and binding upon the nation in all it's parts, except so far as relates to those stipulations. It's final fate, in case of refusal on the part of congress, to carry those stipulations into effect, would depend on the will of the other nation. If they were satisfied that the treaty should subsist, although some of the original conditions should not be fulfilled on our part, the whole, except those stipulations embracing legislative objects, might remain a treaty. But if the other nation chose not to be bound, they would be at liberty to say so, and the treaty would be defeated 292. And this construction seems to be consonant with that resolution, of the house of representatives 293, wherein they declare, "That when a treaty stipulates regulations on any of the subjects submitted by the constitution to the power of congress, it must depend for it's execution, as to such stipulations, on a law or laws to be passed by congress; and it is the constitutional right and duty of the house of representatives, in all such cases, to deliberate on the expediency, or inexpediency, of carrying such treaty into effect, and to determine and act thereon, as in their judgment, may be most conducive to the public good.".... A contrary construction would render the power of the president and senate paramount to that of the whole congress, even upon those subjects upon which every branch of congress is, by the constitution, required to deliberate 294. Let it be supposed, for example, that the president and senate should stipulate by treaty with any foreign nation, that in case of war between that nation and any other, the United States should immediately declare war against that nation: Can it be supposed that such a treaty would be so far the law of the land, as to take from the house of representatives their constitutional right to deliberate on the expediency or inexpediency of such a declaration of war, and to determine and act thereon, according to their own judgment?

4. and 5. The president shall nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls: and he shall receive ambassadors, and other public ministers. C. U. S. Art. 2. §. 2, 3.

The intercourse with foreign nations requiring that ambassadors should be sent from one to another, the appointment of such ministers, is by our constitution vested in the same departments of government as the treaty making power; the exclusive right of nomination being vested in the president; the senate in this case, as in other cases of appointment in which they have any concurrence, having simply the right of approving, or of rejecting, if they think proper; but they cannot propose any other person in the room of him whom they may reject; they may prevent the appointment of an agent in whom they have not a proper degree of confidence, but they cannot substitute a more fit one in his stead.

The president, alone, has authority to receive foreign ministers; a power of some importance, as it may sometimes involve in the exercise of it, questions of delicacy; especially in the recognition of authorities of a doubtful nature. A scruple is said to have been entertained by the president of the United States, as to the reception of the first ambassador from the French republic. But it did not prevent, or retard his reception, in that character.... These powers are respectively branches of the royal prerogative in England.

6. The president shall, moreover, nominate, and by and with the advice and consent of the senate, shall appoint judges of the supreme court, and all other officers of the United States, whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by the constitution, and which shall be established by law. But congress may, by law, vest the appointment of such inferior officers as they think proper, in the president alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments. C. U. S. Art. 2. §. 2. And the president shall commission all the officers of the United States.... Ibid. §. 3.

Although the authority of the president of the United States, does not extend, as has been already remarked, to the creation of offices, by his own authority, it is nevertheless astonishing to view the number to which he has been authorised in his discretion, to give existence. In the army, navy, and volunteer corps, only, this discretionary power, with which congress have from time to time most liberally vested him, must have amounted to the appointment of several thousand officers 295. If to these we add the civil officers whose appointments depend either upon the president, alone; or upon his nomination or influence in the senate; we shall find that the influence and patronage of that department are already as great, and probably greater than any friend to his country could wish to see them 296. It is however, still more encreased by the next clause.

7. The president shall have power to fill up all vacancies that may happen during the recess of the senate, by granting commissions, which, shall expire at the end of their next session.

The act of 5 Cong. c. 153, authorised the president to make appointments to fill any vacancies in the army and navy which may have happened during that session of the senate. And this without any reservation of the right of the senate to approve, or reject, at a succeeding session. This was among the manifold acts of that period for encreasing the power of the president, far beyond the limits assigned by the constitution; limits already sufficiently large for every beneficial purpose. The right of nomination to office in all cases where the senate are to be consulted upon the appointment, being the undoubted privilege of the president under the constitution, should he persist in the nomination of a person to office after the senate have rejected him, there is no constitutional control over him, by which he may be compelled to nominate any other person. The office then may be kept vacant through this disagreement between them. But if it should have happened that the office became vacant during the recess of the senate, and the vacancy were filled by a commission which should expire, not at the meeting of the senate, but at the end of their session, then, in case such a disagreement between the president and the senate, if the president should persist in his opinion, and make no other nomination, the person appointed by him during the recess of the senate would continue to hold his commission, until the end of their session so that the vacancy would happen a second time during the recess of the senate, and the president consequently, would have the sole right of appointing a second time; and the person whom the senate have rejected, may be instantly replaced by a new commission. And thus it is evidently in the power of the president to continue any person in office, whom he shall once have appointed in the recess of the senate, as long as he may think proper. A circumstance which renders the power of nomination, and of filling up vacancies during the recess of the senate, too great, to require any further extention. Even the control of elections loses it's force, in great measure, in such cases: the influence of a president, and the activity and zeal of his partizans encreasing in proportion to the number of offices which he has power to fill, and to the measure of obligation which the persons preferred by his favour, may suppose they owe to him, for the distinction.

Perhaps these inconveniencies might have been avoided, if the constitution had required more than one person to have been put in nomination by the president for those offices, where the concurrence of the senate is required to complete the appointment, or, that in case of disagreement between the president and senate, two thirds of the latter might appoint, without a previous nomination by the president, in case be should decline any further nomination, after the first had been rejected.

8. The president shall, from time to time, give to congress information of the state of the union, and recommend to their consideration such measures, as he may judge necessary and expedient. He may also on extraordinary occasions convene both houses, or either of them; and in case of disagreement between them with respect to the time of adjournment, he may adjourn them to such time as he shall think proper. C. U. S. Art. 2. Sec. 3.

As from the nature of the executive office it possesses more immediately the sources, and means of information than the other departments of government; and as it is indispensably necessary to wise deliberations and mature decisions, that they should be founded upon the correct knowledge of facts, and not upon presumptions, which are often false, and always unsatisfactory; the constitution has made it the duty of the supreme executive functionary, to lay before the federal legislature, a state of such facts as may be necessary to assist their deliberations on the several subjects confided to them by the constitution. And as any inconveniencies resulting from new laws, or for the want of adequate laws upon any subject, more immediately occur to those who are entrusted with the administration of the government, than to others, less immediately concerned therein; it is likewise provided, that the first magistrate of the union should recommend to the consideration of congress such measures as he shall judge necessary, and proper. But this power of recommending any subject to the consideration of congress, carries no obligation with it. It stands precisely on the same footing, as a message from the king of England to parliament; proposing a subject for deliberation, not pointing out the mode of doing the thing which it recommends. This is considered by De Lolme 297, as one of the favourable peculiarities of the English constitution, uniting the advantages of originating laws in select assemblies, with the freedom of the legislature, as vested in the representatives of the people. In France, under the present constitution, all laws originate with the executive department: than which, there can not exist a stronger characteristic of a despotic government.

The power of the president to convene either or both houses of congress, was a provision indispensably necessary in a government organized as the federal government is by the constitution. Occasions may occur during the recess of congress, for taking the most vigorous and decisive measures to repel injury, or provide for defence: congress, only, is competent to these objects: the president may therefore convene them for that purpose. Or it may happen that an important treaty hath been negotiated during the recess of the senate, and their advice thereupon be required, without delay, either, that the ratification may be exchanged in due time, or for some other important reason. On such extraordinary occasions as these, if there were not a power lodged in the president to convene the senate, or the congress, as the case might require, the affairs of the nation might be thrown into confusion and perplexity, or worse. The power of adjourning congress, in case of a disagreement between the two houses, as to the time of adjournment, was likewise necessary to prevent any inconvenience from that source, as, is too obvious to require any further remarks upon it.

9. Ninthly; the president, as was observed, elsewhere is sub modo a branch of the legislative department; since every bill, order, resolution, or vote, to which the concurrence of both houses of congress is necessary, must be presented to him for his approbation, before it can take effect 298. If he approve it, the measure is immediately final: if he disapprove, it must be sent back to congress for further consideration, as has been already shewn. The importance which the executive department derives from this share in the legislative, hath been sufficiently discussed in its proper place, being here brought into view again, merely for the sake of method.

10. Lastly; it is the duty of the president to take care that the laws be faithfully executed; and, in the words of his oath, "to preserve, protect, and defend the constitution of the United States 299."

The obligation of oaths upon the consciences of ambitious men has always been very slight, as the general history of mankind but too clearly evinces. Among the Romans, indeed, they were held in great sanctity during the purer ages of the republic, but began to be disregarded as the nation approached to a state of debasement, that fitted them for slavery 300. Among christian princes, they seem only to have been calculated for the worst, instead of the best purposes 301: monarchs having long exercised, and seeming to claim, not less than the successors of St. Peter, a kind of dispensing power on this subject, in all cases affecting themselves. A due sense of religion must not only be wanting in such cases, but the moral character of the man must be wholly debased, and corrupted. Whilst these remain unsullied, in the United States, oaths may operate in support of the constitution they have adopted, but no longer. After that period an oath of office will serve merely to designate its duties, and not to secure the faithful performance of them; or, to restrain those who are disposed to violate them.

The right of issuing proclamations is one of the prerogatives of the crown of England. No such power being expressly given by the federal constitution, it was doubted, upon a particular occasion, whether the president possessed any such authority under it: Both houses of congress appear to have recognized the power as one that may be constitutionally exercised by him 302. Independent of such authority, we might perhaps be justified, in concluding that the obligation upon the president to take care that the laws be faithfully executed, drew after it this power, as a necessary incident thereto. The commencement or determination of laws is frequently made to depend upon events, of which the executive may be presumed to receive and communicate the first authentic information: the notification of such facts seems therefore to be the peculiar province and duty of that department. If the nation be in a state of war with another nation, acts of hostility are justifiable, on the part of our citizens towards theirs; if a truce he concluded; such acts are no longer to be permitted. The fact that such a truce has been made, must be announced by the competent authority; and the law arising from the promulgation of this fact, according to the rules of war and peace, among civilized nations, is such, as to give to the proclamation the apparent effect of a new law to the people. But this is not really the case; it is the established law of nations which operates upon the fact disclosed by the proclamation, viz. That a truce has been concluded between the two nations, who were before at war. But if a proclamation should enjoin any thing to be done, which neither the law of nations, nor any previous act of the legislature, nor any treaty or compact should have made a duty, such injunction would not only be merely void, but an infringement of the constitution 303. Proclamations are then only binding, when they reinforce the observance of a duty, enjoined by law, but connected with some particular fact, which it may be the duty of the executive to make known.

The president of the United States may be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors: and the chief justice of the United States shall preside at his trial. C. U. S. Art. 2, Sec. 4. Art. 1, Sec. 3.

The exclusion of the vice-president in such cases, from his ordinary constitutional seat, as president of the senate, seems to have been both necessary and proper, not only in order to remove all suspicion of undue bias upon the mind of any member of the court; (since in case of conviction, the duties of the office of the president would devolve immediately upon the vice-president) but because it is presumable, that whenever a president may he actually impeached, he would be instantly incapacitated thereby from discharging the duties of his office, until a decision should take place; in which case also, the duties of the office of president, must devolve upon the vice-president. Machiavel ascribes the ruin of the republic of Florence, to the want of this mode of proceeding by impeachment against those who offend against the state. If the want of a proper tribunal for the trial of impeachments can endanger the liberties of the United States, some future Machiavel may, perhaps, trace their destruction to the same source.

In England, as we have more than once had occasion to remark, the law will not suppose the king capable of doing wrong. His person is sacred; he is above the reach of the laws, none having power to accuse, or to judge him. The people must be driven to a total violation, and subversion of the constitution, before he can be made responsible for the most flagrant act of tyranny, or abuse of authority. Our constitution, on the contrary, considers the president as a man, and fallible; it contemplates the possibility of his being not only corrupt, but, in the highest degree criminal; even to the commission of treason, against the government which he is appointed to administer. How such a case may happen, will be the subject of future inquiry. Suffice it to say, the constitution supposes it, and has provided, however inadequately, for his punishment.

The administration of the federal government, from it's first institution, has repeatedly given rise to doubts in my own breast, whether some important amendments are not necessary for the preservation of the liberty of the people of the United States, the necessary and proper independence of the several states, and the union of the confederacy. The limitations which the constitution has provided to the powers of the president, seem not to be sufficient to restrain this department within it's proper bounds, or, to preserve it from acquiring and exerting more than a due share of influence. To this cause it may be attributed, that in addition to the very extensive powers, influence, and patronage which the constitution gives to the president of the United States, congress have, from time to time, with a liberal hand, conferred others still more extensive; many of them altogether discretionary, and not unfrequently questionable, as to their constitutionality. These circumstances but too well justify the remark, that if a single executive do not exhibit all the features of monarchy at first, like the infant Hercules, it requires only time to mature it's strength, to evince the extent of it's powers. Crescit occulto velut arbor avo.

Under the former confederation, the United States in congress assembled, had authority to appoint a committee to sit in the recess of congress, to be denominated "a committee of the states," and to consist of one delegate from each state: and to appoint one of their number to preside, provided that no person should be allowed to serve in the office of president more than one year, in any term of three years. This committee, or any nine of them, were authorised to execute, in the recess of congress, such of the powers of congress, as the United States in congress assembled, by the consent of nine states, might from time to time think expedient to vest them with; provided that no power be delegated to the said committee, for the exercise of which, by the articles of confederation, the voice of nine states, in the congress of the United States assembled, was requisite 304. An executive constituted somewhat upon this plan, composed of a member from each state, would, I conceive, have been more consistent with the principles of a federal union: it might have been so modified, as that a smaller number (consisting of one member from each quarter of the union,) might execute ah the powers which are now vested in the president alone, whilst the whole should be consulted upon all points to which the advice and consent of the senate is now required by the constitution. The senate might then have been divested entirely of it's executive powers, and confined to such as might properly be vested in a second branch of the legislature Such an arrangement would have removed many of those objections which now apply to the union of legislative, executive, and judiciary powers, in that body, I well know that there are many objections to a numerous executive: but I conceive them to be fewer in a federal, than in a national government. One of the principal objections to the former congress, as an executive body, seems to have arisen from the plurality of members from the states, whose united voice was often necessary to give the state a vote. If the delegates from the same state were equally divided upon any question, the state had no vote. And as this not unfrequently happened in the delegations from several states, upon the same question, the result was, that no determination could be had thereupon, for want of a sufficient number of states, voting either in the affirmative or negative. But where the representation from a state is confined to an individual, the former of these inconveniencies could never happen, and the latter very rarely. How far experience, under the former articles of confederation, might have prompted or justified the preference given by the convention to a single executive, I cannot pretend to judge.


292. Debates on the treaty making power, p. 345.

293. Resolution of the house of representatives, April 6, 1796.

294. Such a doctrine appears to have been strenuously advocated in congress, some years ago. See debates on the treaty making power: March and April 1796. Philadelphia, printed 1796.

295. The commission-officers for an army of 85,000 men (including the volunteer corps which were authorised to be raised by the president) would amount to more than than 4,500. See the acts of 5 Cong. c. 7 and 48. Sec 3. c. 56. Sec. 2. c. 64. Sec. 2. 7. c. 74. Sec. 2. 4. c. 81. c. 93. Sec. 7. 8. c. 128. Sec. 99. c. 137. Sec 2. 6. c. 153, with many others.

296. See the speech of Mr. Gallatin on the foreign intercourse bill; by which it appears that the patronage of the executive (even before the passage of the law mentioned in the last note,) amounted in March, 1798, to the enormous sum of two millions of dollars, annually. It probably is not less at this day, notwithstanding the immense changes that have been made.

297. On the English Constitution, B. 2. c. 4.

298. C. U. S. Art. 1. Sect, 7.

299. C. U. S. Art. 2. Sect. 1, 3.

300. Montesquieu's Spirit of Laws, Vol. 1. p.173. Grotius, p.313.

301. Vattel, p. 348. &c. Grotius, 330.

302. The occasion here alluded to, was the president's proclamation of neutrality in June, 1793. This was merely an admonition, to the people of the U. States, of the duty imposed on them by the law of nations, and an annunciation of the fact that we were at peace with all nations. Both houses of congress in their addresses to the president approved of the proclamation, 3 Cong. 1 Session.

303. The proclamation of the two former presidents recommending fasting and prayer, were of this nature; they were an assumptton of power not warranted by the constitution, or rather prohibited, by the true spirit of the third article of amendments. Some persons excused the act as amounting only to the advice of the president as an individual. Why then was it clothed with all the forms of authority, the seal of the United States, and the attestation of the secretary of state?

304. Articles of confederation and perpetual union, Art. 9, and 10.


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