11. No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment, or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia in the time of war, or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor be compelled in any criminal case, to be witness against himself; nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation. Amendments to C. U. S. Art. 7, and,
12. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state, and district, wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favour, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defence. Amendments to C. U. S. Art. 8.
13. Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel, and unusual punishments inflicted. Amendments to C. U. S. Art. 10.
The subjects of these three articles are so immediately connected with each other, that I have chosen not to separate them. The first may be considered as liberal exposition, and confirmation of the principles of that important chapter of Magna Charta, which declares, "Nullus liber Homo aliquo modo destruatur nisi per legale judicium parium suorum," which words, aliquo modo destruatur, according to Sir Edward Coke, include a prohibition not only of killing and maiming, but also of torturing, and of every oppression by colour of legal authority: and the words liber Homo, extend to every one of the king's subjects, "be he ecclesiastical or temporal, free or bond, man or woman, old or young, or be he outlawed, ex-communicated, or any other, without exception 249". ... for even a villein, as he tells us elsewhere, is comprehended under the term liber Homo, except against his lord 250.
The common law maxim, that no man is to be brought in jeopardy of his life more than once for the same offence, is here rendered a fundamental law of the government of the United States; as, is also, that other inestimable maxim of the common law, that no man shall be compelled in any criminal case to give evidence against himself; that he shall, moreover, be informed of the nature and cause of his accusation; that he shall be confronted with the witnesses against him; that be shall have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favour; .... a benefit long denied by the courts in England: and that he shall have the assistance of counsel for his defence; .... not as a matter of grace, but of right; ... not for his partial defence, upon a point of law; but for his full defence, both on the law, and the evidence: and, that he shall, in no case, be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. To all which, is added, the inestimable right of a trial by jury, of the state and district in which the crime shall have been committed. The importance of all which articles will more evidently appear, in the course of our examination of the various subjects to which they relate, in the first and fourth book of the Commentaries, on the Laws of England. That part of the seventh article which declares that private property shall not be taken for public use, without just compensation, was probably intended to restrain the arbitrary and oppressive mode of obtaining supplies for the army, and other public uses, by impressment, as was too frequently practised during the revolutionary war, without any compensation whatever. A law of the state of Virginia describes by whom, and in what cases, impresses may be made; and authorises the commitment of the offender in case of any illegal impressment 251.
We have already noticed the act concerning aliens 252, as violating the sixth article of the amendments to the constitution. It was said, moreover, to violate the seventh and eighth. To this the congress answered, "that the provisions in the constitution relative to presentment and trial of offences by juries, do not apply to the revocation of an asylum given to aliens. Those provisions solely respect crimes, and the alien may be removed without having committed any offence, merely from motives of policy, or security. The citizen, being a member of society, has a right to remain in the country, of which he cannot be disfranchised, except for offences first ascertained, on presentment and trial by jury. ... That the removal of aliens, though it may be inconvenient to them, cannot be considered as a punishment inflicted for an offence, but merely the removal, from motives of general safety, of an indulgence, which there is danger of their abusing, and which we are in no manner bound to grant or continue 253."
To these arguments the general assembly of Virginia replied; that it can never be admitted that the removal of aliens authorised by the act, is to be considered, not as a punishment for an offence, but as a measure of precaution and prevention. If the banishment of an alien from a country into which he has been invited, as the asylum most auspicious to his happiness; a country where he may have formed the most tender connections, where he may have vested his entire property, and acquired property of the real and permanent, as well as the moveable and temporary kind; where he enjoys under the laws, a greater share of the blessings of personal security, and personal liberty, than he can elsewhere hope for, and where he may have nearly completed his probationary title to citizenship; if, moreover, in the execution of the sentence against him, he is to be exposed, not only to the ordinary dangers of sea, but to the peculiar casualties incident to a crisis of war, and of unusual licentiousness on that element, and possibly to vindictive purposes which his emigration itself may have provoked; if a banishment of this sort be not a punishment, and among the severest of punishments, it will be difficult to imagine a doom, to which the name can be applied. And, if it be a punishment, it will remain to be shewn, whether, according to the express provisions of these articles, it can be constitutionally inflicted, on mere suspicion, by the single will of the executive magistrate, on persons convicted of no personal offence against the laws of the land, nor involved in any offence against the law of nations, charged on the foreign state of which they were members 254.
14. In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any court of the United States than according to the rules of the common law. C. U. S. Art. 9, Amendments.
This article provides for the trial by jury in civil cases, as well as criminal, and supplies some omission in the constitution.
15. The enumeration in the constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny, or disparage others retained by the people. Amendments to C. U. S. Art. 11, and,
16. The powers not delegated, to the United States by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people. C. U. S. Art. 12, Amendments.
All the powers of the federal government being either expressly enumerated, or necessary and proper to the execution of some enumerated power; and it being one of the rules of construction which sound reason has adopted; that, as exception strengthens the force of a law in cases not excepted, so enumeration weakens it, in cases not enumerated; it follows, as a regular consequence, that every power which concerns the right of the citizen, must be construed strictly, where it may operate to infringe or impair his liberty; and liberally, and for his benefit, where it may operate to his security and happiness, the avowed object of the constitution: and, in like manner, every power which has been carved out of the states, who, at the time of entering into the confederacy, were in full possession of all the rights of sovereignty, is, in like manner to be construed strictly, wherever a different construction might derogate from the rights and powers, which by the latter of these articles; are expressly acknowledged to be reserved to them respectively.
The want of a bill of rights was among the objections most strongly urged against the constitution in its original form. The author of the Federalist undertakes to shew, that a bill of rights was not only unnecessary, but would be dangerous 255. A bill of rights may be considered, not only as intended to give law, and assign limits to a government about to be established, but as giving information to the people. By reducing speculative truths to fundamental laws, every man of the meanest capacity and understanding may learn his own rights, and know when they are violated; a circumstance, of itself, sufficient, I conceive, to counterbalance every argument against one.
To comprehend the full scope and effect of the twelfth article, by which certain rights are said to be reserved to the states respectively, or to the people, it is to be recollected, that there are powers, exercised by most other governments, which in the United States are withheld by the people, both from the federal government and from the state governments: for instance, a tax on exports can be laid by no constitutional authority whatever, whether of the United States, or of any state; no bill of attainder; or ex post facto law can be passed by either; no title of nobility can be granted by either. Many other powers of government are neither delegated to the federal government, nor prohibited to the states, either by the federal or state constitutions. These belong to that indefinite class of powers which are supposed necessarily to devolve upon every government, in consequence of the very act of its establishment, where no restrictions are imposed on the exercise of them; such as the power of regulating the course in which property may be transmitted by deed, will, or inheritance; the manner in which debts may be recovered, or injuries redressed; the right of defining and punishing offences against the society, other than such as fall under the express jurisdiction of the federal government; all which, and all others of a similar nature are reserved to, and may be exercised by the state governments. From those powers, which are in express terms granted to the United States, and though not prohibited to the states respectively, are not susceptible of a concurrent exercise of authority by them, the states, notwithstanding this article, will continue to be excluded; such is the power to regulate commerce, and to define and punish piracies and felonies committed upon the high seas; from which the states, respectively, are by necessary and unavoidable construction excluded from any share or participation. On the other hand, such of the powers granted by the constitution to the federal government, as will admit of a concurrent exercise of authority, both in the federal and the state governments; such for example, as the right of imposing taxes, duties; and excises (except duties upon imports or exports, or upon tonnage, which the states cannot do without consent of congress) may be exercised by the states respectively, concurrently with the federal government. And here it may not be improper to take a short review of the powers which are expressly prohibited to the individual states by the constitution; or can be exercised by them only with the consent of congress; they have been enumerated elsewhere, but seem to require a more particular notice in this place.
1. First, then; no state shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation. C. U. S. Art. 1. §. 10.
A similar provision was contained in the articles of confederation, the terms of which are in reality more strong and definite than those of the constitution. The federal government being the organ through which the individual states communicate with foreign nations, and the interest of the whole confederacy being paramount to that of any member thereof; the power of making treaties and alliances with foreign nations, is with propriety vested exclusively in the federal government. Moreover, as congress is vested with the power of admitting new states into the union, it was necessary to prohibit any alliance or confederacy with such state, antecedent to its admission into the union; for such an alliance might contravene the principles of the constitution, and prevent or retard the proposed admission. And lastly, to preserve the union entire, and unbroken, no partial confederacy between any two or more states, can be entered into: for that would in fact dissolve the government of the United States, as now established.
2. Secondly; no state shall, without the consent of congress, enter into any agreement or compact with another state, or with any foreign power. C. U. S. Art. 1 §. 10.
Here we find a distinction between treaties, alliances, and confederations; and agreements or compacts. The former relate ordinarily to subjects of great national magnitude and importance, and are often perpetual, or made for a considerable period of time 256; the power of making these is altogether prohibited to the individual states: but agreements, or compacts, concerning transitory or local affairs, or such as cannot possibly affect any other interest but that of the parties, may still be entered into by the respective states, with the consent of congress. The compact between this state and Maryland, entered into in the year 1786, may serve as an example of this last class of public agreements 257.
3. No state shall grant letters of marque and reprisal 258.
As these measures ordinarily precede a declaration of war, the reasons for the total prohibition of the exercise of this power, by the states respectively, have been already mentioned: for otherwise the petulance and precipitation of any one state, whose citizens may have been injured by the subjects of a foreign nation, might plunge the union into a war.
4. No state shall, without consent of congress, keep troops, or ships of war, in time of peace; or engage in war, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay 259.
The prohibitions contained in this clause are not absolute, but are subject to the consent of congress, or imperious circumstances. The setting on foot an army or navy, in the time of profound peace, is often a just cause of jealousy between neighbouring, and even remote nations. But there is not unfrequently a period between the commencement of a quarrel between two nations, and a declaration of war, or commencement of actual hostility, when prudence makes it necessary to prepare for the issue of the dispute. During such a period, it might be necessary to call for the exertions of the several states, in aid of the federal strength. At this epoch, it might be the summit of indiscretion to check the ardour of the respective states, if disposed to raise an army or navy from its own resources. Congress therefore may permit it: and if the danger of an attack upon any particular state be so imminent, as not to admit of delay, or if it be actually invaded, it may adopt measures for its own defence, without waiting for the consent of congress. And when a war is actually begun, under the authority of the federal union, any state may, according to its resources and discretion, keep any number of troops or ships: for the prohibition ceases as soon as war begins.
5. No state shall coin money: emit bills of credit, make any thing but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts: or pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts 260.
The right of coining, and regulating the value of coin, being vested in the federal government, a participation in those rights could not be permitted to the respective states with any propriety. For the government must be responsible for the purity and weight of all coin issued under its authority: this could not be if the states were permitted to coin money according to the standard prescribed by the United States, as the officers of the mint would be under the directions of the state government. And if the several states were to issue coin of different standards, or denominations, the inconveniencies to commerce would be infinite. They are therefore prohibited altogether from coining money. ... The evils of paper money, the injury produced by it to public credit; the utter destruction of the fortunes of numberless individuals, by a rapid and unparalleled depreciation during the revolutionary war; the grievous hardships introduced, at the same period, by the tender laws, (an unhappy, but perhaps unavoidable expedient, to which both the federal, and state governments were constrained to have recourse, at the same time) by which a creditor was in some instances obliged to accept paper in a most depredated state, for a just debt of an hundred times it's real value, or incur the general odium of his fellow-citizens, probably gave rise to the prohibition against any state's emitting paper money, or making any thing but gold or silver a tender in payment of debts, or passing any law impairing the obligation of contracts. ... But why was not the prohibition extended to the federal, as well as to the state governments? The federal government, during the revolutionary war, was not more exempt from just cause of censure upon these grounds, than the States respectively. Many of the laws passed by the states to support the credit of the continental money, by making it a tender in payment of debts, were passed on the recommendation of congress. The forty for one scheme originated there; why not prohibit some future congress from renewing the same breach of faith?
6. No state shall pass any bill of attainder, or ex post facto law; or grant any title of nobility. ... Ibid.
These prohibitions being extended equally to the federal government, as to the states, have been already sufficiently noticed.
7. No state shall, without the consent of congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing it's inspection laws; and the nett produce of all duties and imposts, laid by any state on imports, or exports, shall be for the use of the treasury of the United States: and all such laws shall be subject to the revision and control of congress. Nor shall any state, without the consent of congress lay any duty of tonnage.
On the subject of these prohibitions, respectively, sufficient hath already been said, under the article which authorises congress to regulate commerce.
Having thus taken a survey of the powers delegated to the congress of the United States, and of those prohibited thereto, by the constitution; as also, of those, which are either altogether prohibited to the states, individually, or can be exercised by them only, with the consent, and under the control of congress; and in the course of that survey, having pointed out according to the best of my abilities, those powers which are exclusively vested in the federal government; secondly, those powers, in which the federal, and state governments, may be presumed to possess concurrent jurisdiction, and authority: thirdly, those powers which are equally prohibited to both; and fourthly, those which are absolutely prohibited to the states, respectively, or can be exercised by them only, with the approbation and consent of the federal government; it follows that all other powers of government compatible with the nature and principle of democratic governments, and not prohibited by the bill of rights, or constitution of the respective states, remain with them, and may be exercised by them, respectively, in such manner as their several constitutions, and laws, may permit, or direct. And this right, is expressly recognized, as before-mentioned, by the twelfth article of the amendments to the federal constitution; declaring, that the powers not delegated to the United States by the constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people. This numerous class of powers relates altogether to the civil institutions, or laws of the states; and the subject of them forms their several municipal codes, according to the constitutions and laws of each state, respectively.
Here, let us again pause, and reflect, how admirably this division, and distribution of legislative power is adapted to preserve the liberty, and to promote the happiness of the people of the United States; by assigning to the federal government, objects which relate only to the common interests of the states, as composing one general confederacy, or nation; and reserving to each member of that confederacy, a power over whatever may affect, or promote its domestic peace, happiness, or prosperity: at the same time limiting, and restraining both from the exercises, or assumption of powers, which experience has demonstrated, either in this, or in other countries, to be too dangerous to be entrusted with any man or body of men whatsoever. ... Restraint upon the power of the legislature, says De Lolme 261, are more necessary than upon the executive; the former does in a moment, what the latter accomplishes only by successive steps. In England, all legislative power, without limitation, and without control, is concentrated in the two houses of parliament, with the king at their head; and their united power according to the maxims of that government, is omnipotent. In the United States, the great and essential rights of the people are secured against legislative as well as executive ambition.... They are secured, not by laws, only, which the legislature who makes them may repeal, and annul at it's pleasure; but by constitutions, paramount to all laws: defining and limiting the powers of the legislature itself, and opposing barriers against encroachments, which it can not pass, without warning the people of their danger. Secondly, by that division, and distribution of power between the federal, and the state governments, by which each is in some degree made a check upon the excesses of the other. For although the states possess no constitutional negative upon the proceedings of the congress of the United States, yet it seems to he a just inference and conclusion, that as the powers of the federal government result from the compact to which the states are parties; and are limited by the plain sense of the instrument constituting that compact; they are no further valid, than as they are authorised by the grants enumerated therein: and, that in case of a deliberate, palpable, and dangerous exercise of other powers, not granted by that compact, the states, who are parties thereto, have the right, and are in duty bound, to interpose, for arresting the progress of the evil, and for maintaining within their respective limits, the authorities, rights, and liberties appertaining to them 262. Thirdly, by the constitution of the legislative department itself, and the separation and division of powers, between the different branches, both of the congress, and of the state legislatures: in all which, an immediate dependence, either from the people, or the states, is happily, in a very great degree preserved. Fourthly, by the qualified negative which the constitution of the United States, gives to the president, upon all the proceedings of congress, except a question of adjournment. Fifthly, and lastly; by the separation of the judiciary from the legislative department; and the independence of the former, of the control, or influence of the latter, in any case where any individual may be aggrieved or oppressed, under colour of an unconstitutional act of the legislature, or executive. In England, on the contrary, the greatest political object may be attained, by laws, apparently of little importance, or amounting only to a slight domestic regulation: the game-laws, as was before observed, have been converted into the means of disarming the body of the people: the statute de donis conditionalibus has been the rock, on which the existence and influence of a most powerful aristocracy, has been founded, and erected: the acts directing the mode of petitioning parliament, &c. and those for prohibiting riots: and for suppressing assemblies of free-masons, &c. are so many ways for preventing public meetings of the people to deliberate upon their public, or national concerns. The congress of the United States possesses no power to regulate, or interfere with the domestic concerns, or police of any state: it belongs not to them to establish any rules respecting the rights of property; nor will the constitution permit any prohibition of arms to the people; or of peaceable assemblies by them, for any purposes whatsoever, and in any number, whenever they may see occasion.
249. 2. Inst. 55.
250. Ibid. c. 45.
251. L. V. Edi. 1794, c. 121.
252. L. U. S. 5 Cong. c. 75.
253. Report of the committee of congress, February 25, 1799.
254. Report of the committee of the general assembly or Virginia, on the alien and sedition laws. ... January 20, 1800.
255. Vol. II. 349.
256. See Vattel, 296, 297.
257. L. V. Edi. 1794, c. 18.
258. C. U. S. Art. 1. §. 10.
259. C. U. S. Act. 1. Sec. 10.
260. Ibidem.
261. On the British Constitution, p. 164.
262. Resolutions of the general assembly of Virginia, December 21, 1798. Also the resolution of the general convention of Virginia, ratifying the constitution of the U. States.... for which see ante.
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