3/1 E.g. Ine, c. 74; Alfred, c. 42; Ethelred, IV. 4, Section 1.
3/2 Bract., fol. 144, 145; Fleta, I. c. 40, 41; Co. Lit. 126b; Hawkins, P.C., Bk. 2, ch. 23, Section 15.
3/3 Lib. I. c. 2, ad fin.
3 /4 Bract., fol. 144a, "assulto praemeditato."
4/1 Fol. 155; cf. 103b.
4/2 Y.B. 6 Ed. IV. 7, pl. 18.
4/3 Ibid., and 21 H. VII. 27, pl. 5.
4/4 D. 47. 9. 9.
7/1 xxi. 28.
7/2 [theta], ix. Jowett's Tr., Bk. IX. p. 437; Bohn's Tr., pp. 378, 379.
7/3 [theta], xv., Jowett, 449; Bohn, 397.
8/1 [iota alpha], xiv., Jowett, 509; Bohn, 495.
8/2 [theta], xii., Jowett, 443, 444; Bohn, 388.
8/3 [Greek words]. 244, 245.
8/4 l. 28 (11).
8/5 Solon.
8/6 "Si quadrupes pauperiem fecisse dicetur actio ex lege duodecim tabularum descendit; quae lex voluit, aut dari [id] quod nocuit, id ist, id animal, quod noxiam commisit; aut estimationem noxiae offerre." D. 9. 1. 1, pr.; Just. Inst. 4. 9; XII Tab., VIII. 6.
8/7 Gaii Inst. IV. Sections 75, 76; D. 9. 4. 2, Section 1. "Si servus furtum faxit noxiam ve noxit." XII Tab., XII.2. Cf. Just. Inst. 4.8, Section 7.
9/1 D. 39. 2. 7, Sections 1, 2; Gaii Inst. IV. Section 75.
9/2 "Noxa caput sequitur." D. 9. 1. 1, Section 12; Inst. 4.8, Section 5.
9/3 "Quia desinit dominus esse ubi fera evasit." D. 9. 1. 1, Section 10; Inst. 4. 9, pr. Compare May v. Burdett, 9 Q.B.101, 113.
10/1 D. 19. 5. 14, Section 3; Plin. Nat. Hist., XVIII. 3.
10/2 "In lege antiqua si servus sciente domino furtum fecit, vel aliam noxiam commisit, servi nomine actio est noxalis, nec dominus suo nomine tenetur." D. 9. 4. 2.
10/3 Gaius, Inst. IV. Section 77, says that a noxal action may change to a direct, and conversely, a direct action to a noxal. If a paterfamilias commits a tort, and then is adopted or becomes a slave, a noxal action now lies against his master in place of the direct one against himself as the wrong-doer. Just. Inst. 4. 8, Section 5.
11/1 LL. Alfred, c. 13; 1 Tylor, Primitive Culture, Am. ed., p. 285 et seq.; Bain, Mental and Moral Science, Bk. III. ch. 8, p. 261.
11/2 Florus, Epitome, II. 18. Cf. Livy, IX 1, 8, VIII. 39; Zonaras, VII. 26, ed. Niebuhr, vol. 43, pp. 98, 99.
12/1 Gaii Inst. IV. Section 81. I give the reading of Huschke: "Licere enim etiam, si fato is fuerit mortuus, mortuum dare; nam quamquam diximus, non etiam permissum reis esse, et mortuos homines dedere, tamen et si quis eum dederit, qui fato suo vita excesserit, aeque liberatur." Ulpian's statement, in D. 9. 1. 1, Section 13, that the action is gone if the animal dies ante litem contestatam, is directed only to the point that liability is founded on possession of the thing.
12/2 "Bello contra foedus suscepto."
12/3 Livy, VIII. 39: "Vir...haud dubie proximarum induciarum ruptor. De eo coacti referre praetores decretum fecerunt 'Ut Brutulus Papius Romanis dederetur."...Fetiales Romam, ut censuerunt, missi, et corpus Brutuli exanime: ipse morte voluntaria ignominiae se ac supplicio subtraxit. Placuit cum corpore bona quoque ejus dedi." Cf. Zonaras, VII. 26, ed. Niebuhr, vol. 43, p. 97: [Greek characters]. See further Livy, V. 36, "postulatumque ut pro jure gentium violato Fabii dederentur," and Ib. I. 32.
13/1 Livy, IX. 5, 8, 9, 10. "Nam quod deditione nostra negant exsolvi religione populum, id istos magis ne dedantur, quam quia ita se res habeat, dicere, quis adeo juris fetialium expers est, qui ignoret?" The formula of surrender was as follows: "Quandoque hisce homines injussu populi Romani Quiritium foedus ictum iri spoponderunt, atque ob eam rem noxam nocuerunt; ob eam rem, quo populus Romanus scelere impio sit solutus, hosce homines vobis dedo." Cf. Zonaras, VII. 26, ed. Niebuhr, vol. 43, pp. 98, 99.
13/2 De Orator. I. 40, and elsewhere. It is to be noticed that Florus, in his account, says deditione Mancini expiavit. Epitome, II. 18. It has already been observed that the cases mentioned by Livy seem to suggest that the object of the surrender was expiation, as much as they do that it was satisfaction of a contract. Zonaras says, Postumius and Calvinus [Greek characters]. (VII. 26, ed. Niebuhr, Vol. 43, pp. 98, 99.) Cf. ib. p. 97. Compare Serv. ad Virg. Eclog. IV. 43: "In legibus Numae cautum est, ut si quis imprudens occidisset hominem pro capite occisi et natis [agnatis? Huschke] ejus in concione offerret arietem." Id. Geor. III. 387, and Festus, Subici, Subigere. But cf. Wordsworth's Fragments and Specimens of Early Latin, note to XII Tab., XII. 2, p. 538.
14/1 D. 9. 4. 2
14/2 2 Tissot, Droit Penal, 615; 1 Ihering, Geist d. Roem. R., Section 14; 4 id. Section 63.
14/3 Aul. Gell. Noctes Attici, 20. 1; Quintil. Inst. Orat. 3. 6. 84; Tertull. Apol., c. 4.
14/4 Cf. Varro, De Lingua Latina, VI.: "Liber, qui suas operas in servitute pro pecunia, quam debeat, dum solveret Nexus vocatur."
15/1 D. 9. 1. 1, Section 9 But cf. 1 Hale, P.C. 420.
15/2 D. 9. 4. 2, Section 1.
15/3 D. 9. 1. 1, Sections 4, 5.
16/1 D. 4. 9. 1, Section 1; ib. 7, Section 4.
16/2 Gaius in D. 44. 7. 5, Section 6; Just. Inst. 4. 5, Section 3.
16/3 D. 4. 9. 7, pr.
17/1 See Austin, Jurisp. (3d ed.) 513; Doctor and Student, Dial. 2, ch. 42.
17/2 Cf. L. Burgund. XVIII.; L. Rip. XLVI. (al. 48).
17/3 See the word Lege, Merkel, Lex Salica, p. 103. Cf. Wilda, Strafrecht der Germanen, 660, n. 1. See further Lex Salica, XL.; Pactus pro tenore pacis Child. et Chloth., c. 5; Decretio Chlotharii, c. 5; Edictus Hilperichi, cc. 5, 7; and the observations of Sohm in his treatise on the Procedure of the Salic Law, Sections 20, 22, 27, French Tr. (Thevenin), pp. 83 n., 93, 94, 101-103, 130.
17/4 Wilda, Strafrecht, 590.
18/1 Cf. Wilda, Strafrecht, 660, n. 1; Merkel, Lex Salica, Gloss. Lege, p. 103. Lex Saxon. XI. Section 3: "Si servus perpetrato facinore fugerit, ita ut adomino ulterius inveniri non possit, nihil solvat." Cf. id. II. Section 5. Capp. Rip. c. 5: "Nemini liceat servum suum, propter damnum ab illo cuibet inlatum, dimittere; sed justa qualitatem damni dominus pro illo respondeat vel eum in compositione aut ad poenam petitori offeret. Si autem servus perpetrato scelere fugerit, ita ut a domino paenitus inveniri non possit, sacramento se dominus ejus excusare studeat, quod nec suae voluntatis nec conscientia fuisset, quod servus ejus tale facinus commisit."
18/2 L. Saxon. XI. Section1.
18/3 Lex Angl. et Wer. XVI.: "Omne damnum quod servus fecerit dominus emendet."
19/1 C. 3; 1 Thorpe, Anc. Laws, pp. 27, 29.
19/2 C. 74; 1 Thorpe, p. 149; cf. p. 118, n. a. See LL. Hen. I., LXX. Section 5.
19/3 C. 24; 1 Thorpe, p. 79. Cf. Ine, c. 42; 1 Thorpe, p. 129.
19/4 C. 13; 1 Thorpe, p. 71.
19/5 1 Tylor, Primitive Culture, Am. ed., p. 286.
20/1 Cf. Record in Molloy, Book 2, ch. 3, Section16, 24 Ed. III.: "Visum fuit curiae, quod unusquisque magister navis tenetur respondere de quacunque transgressione per servientes suos in navi sua facta." The Laws of Oleron were relied on in this case. Cf. Stat. of the Staple, Ed. III., Stat. 2, c. 19. Later, the influence of the Roman law is clear.
20/2 Quon. Attach., c. 48, pl. 10 et seq. Cf. The Forme and Maner of Baron Courts, c. 62 et seq.
21/1 Forme and Maner of Baron Courts, c. 63.
21/2 C. 64. This substantially follows the Quoniam Attachiamenta, c. 48, pl. 13, but is a little clearer. Contra, Fitzh. Abr. Corone, Pl. 389, 8 Ed. II.
22/1 Fitzh. Abr. Barre, pl. 290.
22/2 Mitchil v. Alestree, 1 Vent. 295; S.C. 2 Lev. 172; S.C. 3 Keb. 650. Cf. May b. Burdett, 9 Q.B.101, 113.
22/3 May v. Burdett, 9 Q.B.101.
22/4 Mason v. Keeling, 12 Mod. 332, 335; S.C. 1 Ld. Raym. 606, 608.
23/1 Williams, J. in Cox v. Burbidge, 13 C.B. N.S. 430, 438. Cf. Willes, J. in Read v. Edwards, 17 C.B. N.S. 245, 261.
23/2 Mason v. Keeling, 1 Ld. Raym. 606, 608.
23/3 In the laws of Ine, c. 42 (1 Thorpe, Anc. Laws, 129), personal liability seems to be imposed where there is a failure to fence. But if an animal breaks hedges the only remedy mentioned is to kill it, the owner to have the skin and flesh, and forfeit the rest. The defendant was held "because it was found that this was for default of guarding them,...for default of good guard," in 27 Ass., pl. 56, fol. 141, A.D. 1353 or 1354. It is much later that the reason is stated in the absolute form, "because I am bound by law to keep my beasts without doing wrong to any one." Mich. 12 Henry VII., Keilway, 3b, pl. 7. See, further, the distinctions as to a horse killing a man in Regiam Majestatem, IV, c. 24.
24/1 Fol. 128.
24/2 Cf. 1 Britton (Nich.), 6a, b, 16 (top paging 15, 39); Bract., fol. 136b; LL. Alfred, c. 13 (1 Thorpe, Anc. Laws, p. 71); Lex Saxon., Tit. XIII.; Leg Alamann., Tit. CIII. 24.
25/1 Fleta, I. 26, Section 10; Fitzh. Abr. Corone, pl. 416. See generally Staundforde, P.C., I. c. 2, fol. 20 et seq.; 1 Hale, P.C. 410 et seq.
25/2 Doctor and Student, Dial. 2, c. 51.
25/3 Plowd. 260.
25/4 Jacob, Law Dict. Deodand.
25/5 Y.B. 30 & 31 Ed. I., pp. 524, 525; cf. Bract., fol. 136b.
26/1 Fitzh. Abr. Corone, pl. 403.
26/2 Bract. 122; 1 Britton (Nich.), top p. 16; Fleta, Ic. 25, Section 9, fol. 37.
26/3 1 Hale, P.C. 423.
26/4 1 Rot. Parl. 372; 2 Rot. Parl. 345, 372a, b; 3 Rot. Parl. 94a, 120a, 121; 4 Rot. Parl. 12a, b, 492b, 493. But see 1 Hale, P.C. 423.
26/5 1 Black Book of the Admiralty, 242.
27/1 Cf. Ticonderoga, Swabey, 215, 217.
27/2 China, 7 Wall. 53.
28/1 Doctor and Student, Dial. 2, c. 51.
28/2 1 Roll. Abr. 530 (C) 1.
29/1 3 Black Book of Adm. 103.
29/2 Malek Adhel, 2 How. 210, 234.
30/1 3 Kent, 218; Customs of the Sea, cap. 27, 141, 182, in 3 Black Book of the Admiralty, 103, 243, 245.
31/1 3 Kent's Comm. 188.
31/2 Clay v. Snelgrave, 1 Ld. Raym. 576, 577; S.C. 1 Salk. 33. Cf. Molloy, p. 355, Book II. ch. 3, Section 8.
31/3 "Ans perdront lurs loers quant la nef est perdue." 2 Black Book, 213. This is from the Judgments of the Sea, which, according to the editor (II., pp. xliv., xlvii.), is the most ancient extant source of modern maritime law except the decisions of Trani. So Molloy, Book II. ch. 3, Section7, p. 354: "If the ship perishes at sea they lose their wages." So 1 Siderfin, 236, pl. 2.
32/1 3 Black Book, pp. lix., lxxiv.
32/2 3 Black Book, 263. It should be added, however, that it is laid down in the same book that, if the vessel is detained in port by the local authorities, the master is not bound to give the mariners wages, "for he has earned no freight."
32/3 Lipson v. Harrison, 2 Weekly Rep. 10. Cf. Louisa Jane, 2 Lowell, 295.
32/4 3 Kent's Comm. (12th ed.), 218; ib. 138, n. 1.
32/5 3 Kent, 218.
32/6 Justin v. Ballam, 1 Salk. 34; S.C. 2 Ld. Raym. 805.
33/1 D. 20. 4. 5 & 6; cf. Livy, XXX. 38.
33/2 Pardessus, Droit. Comm., n. 961.
33/3 3 Keb. 112, 114, citing 1 Roll. Abr. 530.
34/1 Godbolt, 260.
34/2 3 Colquhoun, Roman Civil Law, Section 2196.
35/1 Lex Salica (Merkel), LXXVII.; Ed. Hilperich., Section 5.
36/1 See Lecture III., ad fin.
39/1 Cf. 2 Hawk. P.C. 303 et seq.; 27 Ass. 25.
40/1 2 Palgrave, Commonwealth, cxxx., cxxxi.
41/1 Butler, Sermons, VIII. Bentham, Theory of Legislation (Principles of Penal Code, Part 2, ch. 16), Hildreth's tr., p. 309.
41/2 General View of the Criminal Law of England, p. 99.
43/1 Wharton, Crim. Law, (8th ed.) Section8, n. 1.
43/2 Ibid., Section 7.
43/3 Even the law recognizes that this is a sacrifice. Commonwealth v. Sawin, 2 Pick. (Mass.) 547, 549.
47/1 Cf. 1 East, P.C. 294; United States v. Holmes, 1 Wall. Jr. 1; 1 Bishop, Crim. Law, Sections 347-349, 845 (6th ed.); 4 Bl. Comm. 31.
51/1 Art. 223.
51/2 General View of the Criminal Law of England, p. 116.
53/1 Harris, Criminal Law, p. 13.
53/2 Steph. Dig. Crim. Law, Art. 223, Illustration (6), and n. 1.
56/1 4 Bl. Comm. 192.
57/1 Cf. 4 Bl. Comm. 197.
58/1 Reg. v. Hibbert, L.R. 1 C.C. 184.
59/1 Reg. v. Prince, L.R. 2 C.C. 154.
59/2 Commonwealth v. Hallett, 103 Mass. 452.
60/1 Stephen, Dig. Cr. Law, Art. 223, Illustr. (5); Foster, 294, 295.
60/2 Cf. Gray's case, cited 2 Strange, 774.
60/3 Steph. Dig., Art. 223, Illustr. (1).
60/4 Steph. Dig., Art. 223, Illustr. (8).
60/5 Rex v. Mastin, 6 C.&P. 396. Cf. Reg. v. Swindall, 2 C. & K. 230.
60/6 4 Bl. Comm. 192.
62/1 Steph. Dig. Cr. Law, Art. 225.
62/2 Rex v. Shaw, 6 C.&P. 372.
62/3 Rex v. Oneby, 2 Strange, 766, 773.
62/4 Rex v. Hayward, 6 C.&P. 157.
63/1 Commonwealth v. Walden, 3 Cush. (Mass.) 558. Cf. Steph. Gen. View of the Crim. Law, 84.
64/1 2 Bishop Crim. Law, Section 14 (6th ed.).
64/2 Glanv., Lib. XIV. c. 4.
64/3 Bract., fol. 146b.
64/4 Ibid.
64/5 2 East, P.C., c. 21, Sections 7, 8, pp. 1027, 1031.
66/1 1 Bishop, Crim. Law, Section 735 (6th ed.).
66/2 Reg. v. Dilworth, 2 Moo. & Rob. 531; Reg. v. Jones, 9 C.&P. 258. The statement that a man is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his acts is a mere fiction disguising the true theory. See Lecture IV.
67/1 Reg. v. Taylor, 1 F. & F. 511.
67/2 Reg. v. Roberts, 25 L. J. M. C. 17; S.C. Dearsly, C., C. 539.
68/1 Lewis v. The State, 35 Ala. 380.
69/1 See M'Pherson's Case, Dearsly & Bell, 197, 201, Bramwell, B.
69/2 Cf. 1 Bishop, Crim. Law, Sections 741-745 (6th ed.).
71/1 2 Bishop, Crim. Law, Section758 (6th ed.).
73/1 Cf. Stephen, General View of Criminal Law of England, 49 et seq.
73/2 Cf. Stephen, General View, 49-52; 2 East, P.C. 553.
74/1 Rex v. Cabbage, Russ. & Ry. 292.
74/2 Cf. 4 Bl. Comm. 224; Steph. Dig. Crim. Law, Arts. 316, 319.
74/3 Cf. 4 Bl. Comm. 227, 228.
75/1 1 Starkie, Cr. Pl. 177. This doctrine goes further than my argument requires. For if burglary were dealt with only on the footing of an attempt, the whole crime would have to be complete at the moment of breaking into the house. Cf. Rex v. Furnival, Russ. & Ry. 445.
81/1 See Lecture VII.
82/1 Austin, Jurisprudence (3d ed.), 440 et seq., 474, 484, Lect. XX., XXIV., XXV.
84/1 Lib. I. c. 2, ad fin.
85/1 Hist. English Law, I. 113 (bis), n.a; Id., ed. Finlason, I. 178, n. 1. Fitzherbert (N.B. 85, F.) says that in the vicontiel writ of trespass, which is not returnable into the king's court, it shall not be said quare vi et armis. Cf. Ib. 86, H.
85/2 Milman v. Dolwell, 2 Camp. 378; Knapp v. Salsbury, 2 Camp. 500; Peafey v. Walter, 6 C.&P. 232; Hall v. Fearnley, 3 Q.B. 919.
85/3 Y.B. 6 Ed. IV. 7, pl. 18, A.D. 1466; cf. Ames, Cases in Tort, 69, for a translation, which has been followed for the most part.
87/1 Y.B. 21 Hen. VII. 27, pl. 5, A.D. 1506.
87/2 Cf. Bract., fol. 136 b. But cf. Stat. of Gloucester, 6 Ed. I. c. 9; Y.B. 2 Hen. IV. 18, pl. 8, by Thirning; Essays in Ang. Sax. Law, 276.
87/3 Hobart, 134, A.D. 1616.
87/4 Sir T. Jones, 205, A.D. 1682.
87/5 1 Strange, 596, A.D. 1723.
87/6 2 Keyes, 169, A.D. 1865.
88/1 Anonymous, Cro. Eliz. 10, A.D. 1582.
88/2 Sir T. Raym. 467, A.D. 1682.
88/3 Scott v. Shepherd, 2 Wm. B1. 892, A.D. 1773.
88/4 3 East, 593. See, further, Coleridge's note to 3 Bl. Comm. 123; Saunders, Negligence, ch. 1, Section I; argument in Fletcher v. Rylands, 3 H.&C. 774, 783; Lord Cranworth, in S.C., L.R. 3 H. L. 330, 341.
90/1 Ex. gr. Metropolitan Railway Co. v. Jackson, 3 App. Cas. 193. See M'Manus v. Crickett, 1 East, 106, 108.
91/1 1 Ld. Raym. 38; S.C. Salk. 637; 4 Mod. 404; A.D. 1695.
92/1 2 Wm. Bl. 892. Cf. Clark v. Chambers, 3 Q.B.D. 327, 330, 338.
92/2 7 Vt, 62.
93/1 Smith v. London & South-Western Railway Co., L.R. 6 C.P. 14, 21. Cf. S.C., 5 id. 98, 103, 106.
93/2 Sharp v. Powell, L.R. 7 C.P. 253. Cf. Clark v. Chambers, 3 Q.B.D. 327, 336- 338. Many American cases could be cited which carry the doctrine further. But it is desired to lay down no proposition which admits of controversy, and it is enough for the present purposes that Si home fait un loyal act, que apres devint illoyal, ceo est damnum sine injuria. Latch, 13. I purposely omit any discussion of the true rule of damages where it is once settled that a wrong has been done. The text regards only the tests by which it is decided whether a wrong has been done.
94/1 Mitchil v. Alestree, 1 Ventris, 295; S.C., 3 Keb. 650; 2 Lev. 172. Compare Hammack v. White, 11 C.B. N.S. 588; infra, p. 158.
95/1 Harvey v. Dunlop, Hill & Denio, (Lalor,) 193.
95/2 See Lecture II. pp. 54, 55.
97/1 cf. Hobart v. Hagget, 3 Fairf. (Me.) 67.
98/1 See Bonomi v. Backhouse, El. Bl. & El. 622, Coleridge, J., at p. 640.
99/1 3 Levirtz, 87, A.D. 1681.
99/2 Compare the rule as to cattle in Y.B. 22 Edw. IV. 8, pl. 24, stated below, p. 118.
100/1 Disc. 123, pr.; 124, Sections 2, 3. As to the historical origin of the latter rule, compare Lecture V.
101/1 Lecture I, pp. 3, 4.
101/2 Lib. I. c. 2, ad. fin.
101/3 Fol. 155.
101/4 Bro. Trespass, pl. 119; Finch, 198; 3 Bl. Comm. 118, 119.
101/5 See Brunner, Schwurgerichte, p. 171.
101/6 An example of the year 1195 will be found in Mr. Bigelow's very interesting and valuable Placita Anglo-Normanica, p. 285, citing Rot. Cur. Regis, 38; S.C. ? Abbr. Plac., fol. 2, Ebor. rot. 5. The suit was by way of appeal; the cause of action, a felonious trespass. Cf. Bract., fol. 144 a.
102/1 An example may be seen in the Year Book, 30 & 31 Edward I. (Horwood), p. 106.
103/1 6 Ed. IV. 7, pl. 18.
103/2 Popham, 151; Latch, 13, 119, A.D. 1605.
104/1 Hobart, 134, A.D. 1616.
104/2 3 East, 593.
105/1 1 Bing. 213, A.D. 1823.
105/2 6 Cush. 292.
106/1 Morris v. Platt, 32 Conn. 75, 84 et seq., A.D. 1864.
106/2 Nitro-glycerine Case (Parrot v. Wells), 15 Wall. 524, 538.
106/3 Hill & Denio, (Lalor,) 193; Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476, 489.
107/1 Vincent v. Stinehour, 7 Vt. 62. See, further, Clayton, 22, pl. 38; Holt, C.J., in Cole v. Turner, 6 Mod. 149; Lord Hardwicke, in Williams v. Jones, Cas. temp. Hardw. 298; Hall v. Fearnley, 8 Q.B. 919; Martin, B., in Coward v. Baddeley, 4 H.&N. 478; Holmes v. Mather, L.R. 10 Ex. 261; Bizzell v. Booker, 16 Ark. 308; Brown v. Collins, 53 N.H. 442.
107/2 Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co., 11 Exch. 781, 784; Smith v. London & South-Western Ry. Co., L.R. 5 C.P. 98, 102. Compare Campbell, Negligence, Section 1 (2d ed.), for Austin's point of view.
109/1 cf. Bro. Corone, pl. 6; Neal v. Gillett, 23 Conn. 437, 442; D. 9. 2. 5, Section 2; D. 48. 8. 12.
113/1 I Thorpe, p. 85; cf. LL. Hen. I., c. 88, Section 3.
113/2 Spofford v. Harlow, 3 Allen, 176.
114/1 See 27 Ass., pl. 56, fol. 141; Y.B. 43 Edw. III. 33, pl. 38. The plea in the latter case was that the defendant performed the cure as well as he knew how, without this that the horse died for default of his care. The inducement, at least, of this plea seems to deal with negligence as meaning the actual state of the party's mind.
115/1 Hobart, 134.
115/2 See Knight v. Jermin, Cro. Eliz. 134; Chambers v. Taylor, Cro. Eliz. 900.
115/3 32 Conn. 75, 89, 90.
116/1 Y.B. 12 Hen. VIII. 2 b, Pl. 2.
116/2 Keilway, 46 b.
116/3 L.R. 3 H.L. 330, 339; L.R. 1 Ex. 265, 279-282; 4 H.&C. 263; 3 id. 774.
117/1 See Card v. Case, 5 C.B. 622, 633, 634.
117/2 See Lecture I. p. 23 and n. 3.
117/3 Mitten v. Fandrye, Popham, 161; S.C., 1 Sir W. Jones, 136; S.C., nom. Millen v. Hawery, Latch, 13; id. 119. In the latter report, at p. 120, after reciting the opinion of the court in accordance with the text, it is said that judgment was given non obstant for the plaintiff; contrary to the earlier statement in the same book, and to Popham and Jones; but the principle was at all events admitted. For the limit, see Read v. Edwards, 17 C.B. N.S. 245.
118/1 Y.B. 22 Edw. IV. 8, pl. 24.
118/2 Popham, at p. 162; S.C., Latch, at p. 120; cf. Mason v. Keeling, 1 Ld. Raym. 606, 608. But cf. Y.B. 20 Edw. IV. 10, 11, pl. 10.
118/3 Latch, at p. 120. This is a further illustration of the very practical grounds on which the law of trespass was settled.
118/4 12 Mod. 332, 335; S.C., 1 Ld. Raym. 606, 608.
118/5 12 Mod. 335; Dyer, 25 b, pl. 162, and cas. in marg.; 4 Co. Rep. 18 b; Buxendin v. Sharp, 2 Salk. 662; S.C., 3 Salk. 169; S.C., nom. Bayntine v. Sharp, 1 Lutw. 90; Smith v. Pelah, 2 Strange, 264; May v. Burdett, 9 Q.B. 101; Card v. Case, 5 C.B. 622.
119/1 12 Mod. 335. See Andrew Baker's case, 1 Hale, P.C. 430.
119/2 Besozzi v. Harris, 1 F.&F. 92.
119/3 See Fletcher v. Rylands, L.R. I Ex. 265, 281, 282; Cox v. Burbridge, 13 C.B. N.S. 430, 441; Read v. Edwards, 17 C.B. N.S. 245, 260; Lee v. Riley, 18 C.B. N.S. 722; Ellis v. Loftus Iron Co., L.R. 10 C.P. 10; 27 Ass., pl. 56, fol. 141; Y.B. 20 Ed. IV. 11, pl. 10; 13 Hen. VII. 15, pl. 10; Keilway, 3 b, pl. 7. Cf. 4 Kent (12th ed.), 110, n. 1, ad fin.
120/1 2 Ld. Raym. 909; 13 Am. L.R. 609.
120/2 See Grill v. General Iron Screw Collier Co., L.R. 1 C.P. 600, 612, 614.
120/3 Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357, 383.
121/1 L.R. 1 C.P. 300.
121/2 See Gorham v. Gross, 125 Mass. 232, 239, bottom.
121/3 Minor v. Sharon, 112 Mass. 477, 487.
122/1 See Winsmore v. Greenbank, Willes, 577, 583; Rex v. Oneby, 2 Strange, 766, 773; Lampleigh v. Brathwait, Hobart, 105, 107; Wigram, Disc., pl. 249; Evans on Pleading, 49, 138, 139, 143 et seq.; Id., Miller's ed., pp. 147, 149.
123/1 See Detroit & Milwaukee R. R. Co. v. Van Steinburg, 17 Mich. 99, 120.
123/2 In the small-pox case, Minor v. Sharon, 112 Mass. 477, while the court ruled with regard to the defendant's conduct as has been mentioned, it held that whether the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence in not having vaccinated his children was "a question of fact, and was properly left to the jury." p. 488.
124/1 Metropolitan Railway Co. v. Jackson, 3 App. Cas. 193, 197.
125/1 See Kearney v. London, Brighton & S. Coast Ry. Co., L.R. 5 Q.B. 411, 414, 417; S.C., 6 id. 759.
125/2 Byrne v. Boadle, 2 H. & C. 722.
125/3 See Skinnier v. Lodon, Brighton, & S. Coast Ry. Co., 5 Exch. 787. But cf. Hammack v. White, 11 C.B. N.S. 588, 594.
127/1 7 American Law Review, 654 et seq., July, 1873.
128/1 Callahan v. Bean, 9 Allen, 401.
128/2 Carter v. Towne, 98 Mass. 567.
128/3 Lovett v. Salem & South Danvers R. R. Co., 9 Allen, 557.
128/4 Back v. Stacey, 2 C.&P. 465.
128/5 Cf. Beadel v. Perry, L.R. 3 Eq. 465; City of London Brewery Co. v. Termant, L.R. 9 Ch. 212, 220; Hackett v. Baiss, L.R. 20 Eq. 494; Theed v. Debenham, 2 Ch. D. 165.
135/1 Williamson v. Allison, 2 East, 446.
136/1 Leather v. Simpson, L.R. 11 Eq. 398, 406. On the other hand, the extreme moral view is stated in Weir v. Bell, 3 Ex. D. 238, 243.
138/1 As to actual knowledge and intent, see Lecture II. p. 57.
141/1 Cf. Knight v. German, Cro. Eliz. 70; S.C., ib. 134.
141/2 Mitchell v. Jenkins, 5 B.&Ad. 588, 594; Turner v. Ambler, 10 Q.B. 252, 257, 261.
142/1 Redfield, C. J. in Barron v. Mason, 31 Vt. 189, 197.
142/2 Mitchell v. Jenkins, 5 B.&Ad. 588, 595.
143/1 See Burton v. Fulton, 49 Penn. St. 151.
144/1 Rolfe, B. in Fouldes v. Willoughby, 8 Meeson & Welsby, 540.
145/1 Supra, pp. 115 et seq.
147/1 See, e.g., Cooley, Torts, 164.
147/2 Rex v. Dixon, 3 Maule & Selwyn, 11, 15; Reg. v. Hicklin, L.R. 3 Q.B. 360; 5 C.&P. 266, n.
148/1 Aleyn, 35; Style, 72; A.D. 1648.
149/1 1 Kent (12th ed.), 467, n. 1; 6 Am. Law Rev. 723-725; 7 id. 652.
149/2 2 Wm. Bl. 892, A.D. 1773; supra, p. 92; Addison on Torts (4th ed.), 264, citing Y.B. 37 Hen. VI. 37, pl. 26, which hardly sustains the broad language of the text.
151/1 Compare Crouch v. London & N. W. R. Co., 14 C.B. 255, 283; Calye's Case, 8 Co. Rep. 32; Co. Lit. 89 a, n. 7; 1 Ch. Pl. (lst ed,), 219, (6th ed.), 216, 217; 7 Am. Law Rev. 656 et seq.
151/2 But cf. The Pawashick, 2 Lowell, 142.
151/3 Gibson v. Stevens, 8 How. 384, 398, 399; Barnett v. Brandao, 6 Man. & Gr. 630, 665; Hawkins v. Cardy, 1 Ld. Raym. 360.
151/4 Pickering v. Barkley, Style, 132; Wegerstoffe v. Keene, 1 Strange, 214, 216, 223; Smith v. Kendall, 6 T. R. 123, 124.
155/1 Card v. Case, 5 C.B. 622, 634. Cf. Austin (3d ed.), 513.
156/1 Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330; supra, p. 116.
156/2 See Marshall v. Welwood, 38 N.J. (9 Vroom), 339; 2 Thompson, Negligence, 1234, n. 3.
157/1 Gorham v. Gross, 125 Mass. 232; supra, p. 117.
158/1 Mitchil v. Alestree, 1 Vent. 295; S.C., 3 Keb. 650; 2 Lev. 172; supra, p. 94.
158/2 Hammack v. White, 11 C.B. N.S. 588.
166/1 Laband, Vermogensrechtlichen Klagen, Section16, pp. 108 et seq.; Heusler, Gewere, 487, 492. These authors correct the earlier opinion of Bruns, R. d. Besitzes, Section37, pp. 313 et seq., adopted by Sohm in his Proc. d. Lex Salica, Section 9. Cf. the discussion of sua in writs of trespass, &c. in the English law, at the end of Lecture VI. Those who wish short accounts in English may consult North Amer. Rev., CX. 210, and see Id., CXVIII. 416; Essays in Anglo-Saxon Law, pp. 212 et seq. Our knowledge as to the primitive form of action is somewhat meagre and dependent on inference. Some of the earliest texts are Ed. Liutpr. 131; Lex Baiw., XV. 4; L. Frision. Add. X.; L. Visig., V.5. I; L. Burg., XLIX. I, 2. The edict of Liutprand, dealing with housebreaking followed by theft of property left in charge of the householder, lays down that the owner shall look to the bailee alone, and the bailee shall hold the thief both for the housebreaking and for the stolen goods. Because, as it says, we cannot raise two claims out of one causa; somewhat as our law was unable to divide the severing a thing from the realty, and the conversion of it, into two different wrongs. Compare, further, Jones, Bailm. 112; Exodus xxii. 10-12; LL. Alfred, 28; I Thorpe, Anc. L., p. 51; Gaii Inst., III. Sections 202-207.
167/1 XXXI. 16.
168/1 "Peterit enim rem suam petere [civiliter] ut adiratam per testimonium proborum hominum, et sic consequi rem suam quamvia furatam. . . Et non refert utrum res que ita subtracta fuit extiterit illius appellantis propria vel alterius, dum tamen de custodia sua." Bract., fol. 150 b, 151; Britton (Nich. ed.), I. 59, 60 [23 b], De Larcyns; cf. ib. 67 [26 b]; Fleta, fol. 5i, L. I. c. 38, Section 1.
169/1 Y.B. 21 & 22 Ed. I. 466-468, noticed in North Amer. Rev., CXVIII. 421, n. (So Britton [26 b], "Si il puse averreer la perte.") This is not trover. The declaration in detinue per inventionem was called "un newfound Haliday" in Y.B. 33 Hen. VI. 26, 27; cf. 7 Hen. VI. 22, pl. 3; Isack v. Clarke, I Rolle, R. 126, 128.
169/2 Y.B. 2 Ed. IV. 4, 5, pl. 9; 21 Hen. VII. 39, pl. 49; Bro. Trespass, pl. 216, 295.
169/3 2 Wms. Saund. 47, n. 1. See above, p. 167.
170/1 Notes to Saunders, Wilbraham v. Snow, note (h).
170/2 Y.B. 11 Hen. IV. 23, 24. See, further, Y.B. 8 Ed. IV. 6, pl. 5; 9 Ed. IV. 34, pl. 9; 3 Hen. VII. 4, pl. 16; 20 Hen. VII. 1, pl. 1; 21 Hen. VII. 14 b, pl. 23; 13 Co. Rep. 69; 1 Roll. Abr. 4(I), pl. I; F. N. B. 86, n. a; supra, p. 167.
170/3 Fitz. Abr. Barre, pl. 130; Y.B. 9 Ed. IV. 34, pl. 9; 12 Am. Law Rev. 694.
171/1 2 Steph. Comm. (6th ed.), 83, cited Dicey, Parties, 353; 2 Bl. Comm. 453; 2 Kent, 585. As the bailee recovered the whole value of the goods, the old reason, that he was answerable over, has in some cases become a new rule, (seemingly based on a misunderstanding,) that the bailee is a trustee for the bailor as to the excess over his own damage. Cf. Lyle v. Barker, 5 Binn. 457, 460; 7 Cowen, 68l, n.; White v. Webb, 15 Conn. 302, 305; in the order cited. (Thence the new rule has been extended to insurance recovered by a bailee. 1 Hall, N. Y. 84, 91; 3 Kent's Comm. (12th ed.), 371, 376, n. 1 (a).) In this form it ceases to be a reason for allowing the action.
171/2 Y.B. 48 Ed. III. 20, pl. 8; Bro. Trespass, pl. 67. Cf. 1 Britton (Nich. ed.), 67 [26 b]; Y.B. 6 Hen. VI1. 12, pl. 9; 12 Ed. IV. 13, pl. 9; 12 Am. Law Rev. 694.
172/1 Y.B. 22 Ed. IV. 5, pl. 16.
172/2 2 Rolle, Abr. 569, Trespass, 5. Cf. Y.B. 20 Hen. VII. 5, pl. 15; 21 Hen. VII. 39, pl. 49; Clayton, 135, pl. 243; 2 Wms. Saund. 47 e (3d ed.).
172/3 Bro. Trespass, pl, 67 in marg.; cf. Ed. Liutpr. 131, cited supra, p. 166, n.
172/4 In one instance, where, against the opinion of Brian, the bailor was allowed to sue for damage to the chattel by a stranger, the action seems to have been case. Y.B. 12 Ed. IV. 13, pl. 9; cf. the margin of the report.
173/1 Gordon v. Harper, 7 T. R. 9; Lord v. Price, L. IL 9 Ex. 54; Muggridge v. Eveleth, 9 Met. 233. Cf. Clayton, 135, pl. 243.
173/2 Nicolls v. Bastard, 2 C. M. & R. 659, 660; Manders v. Williams, 4 Exch. 339, 343, 344; Morgan v. Ide, 8 Cush. 420; Strong v. Adams, 30 Vt. 221, 223; Little v. Fosseft, 34 Me. 545.
173/3 2 Camp. 464; cf. Mears v. London & South-Western Railway Co., 11 C.B. N.S. 849, 854.
173/4 Addison, Torts (4th ed.), 364.
174/1 Wms. Pers. Prop., 26 (5th ed.), 27 (7th ed.).
174/2 Booth v. Wilson, I B. & Ald. 59; Y.B. 48 Ed. III. 20, pl. 8; 11 Hen. IV. 17, pl. 39; 11 Hen. IV. 23, 24, pl. 46 (Tre. "ou d'apprompter"); 21 Hen. VII. 14b, pl. 23; Godbolt, 173, pl. 239; Sutton v. Buck, 2 Taunt. 302, 309; Burton v. Hughes, 2 Bing. 173; Nicolls v. Bastard, 2 C. M. & R. 659, 660; Manders v. Williams, 4 Exch. 339, 343, 344; 2 Wms. Saund., note to Wilbraham v. Snow; 2 Kent, 585, 568, 574; Moran v. Portland S. P. Co., 35 Me. 55. See, further, Lecture VI. ad fin.
175/1 Cf. Lord v. Price, L.R. 9 Ex. 54, 56, supra, p. 172.
175/2 Supra, p. 167.
175/3 Lib. X. c. 13; cf. I., c. 8.
175/4 "Is qui rem commodatam accepit, ad ipsam restituendam tenetur, vel ejus precium, si forte incendio, ruins, naufragio, ant latronum, vel hostium incursu, consumpta fuerit vel deperdita, substracts, vel ablata." Fol. 99 a, b. This has been thought a corrupt text (Guterbock, Bracton, by Coxe, p. 175; 2 Twiss, Bract. Int. xxviii.), but agrees with Glanvill, supra, and with Fleta, L. II. c. 56, Section 5.
175/5 Bract., fol. 62 b, c. 28, Section 2; Fleta, L. II. e. 59, Section 4, fol. 128. Cf. Just. Inst. 3. 24, Section 5; ib. 15, Section 2.
176/1 Y.B. 8 Ed. II. 275; Fitz. Detinue, pl. 59.
176/2 2 Ld. Raym. 909.
176/3 Y.B. 13 Ed. IV. 9, pl. 5. See Lecture VI.
176/4 29 Ass. 163, pl. 28.
176/5 Cf. Ratcliff v. Davis, Yelv. 178; Cro. Jac. 244; Noy, 137; 1 Bulstr. 29.
176/6 Y.B. 33 Hen. VI. 1, pl. 3. This case is cited and largely relied on in Woodlife's Case, infra; Southcote v. Bennett, infra; Pickering v. Barkley, Style, 132 (24 Car. I., covenant on a charter-party); and Morse v. Slue, infra; in short, in all the leading cases on bailment.
177/1 Cf. Abbreviatio Plaeitorum, p. 343, col. 2, rot. 87, 17 Ed. II.
178/1 Y.B. 9 Ed. IV. 34, pl. 9; 2 Ed. IV. 15, pl. 7. It is proper to add, that in the latter case Littleton does not seem to distinguish between servants and bailees.
178/2 Y.B. 9 Ed. IV, 40, pl. 22. So Brian, in 20 Ed. IV. 11, pl. 10, ad fin.
178/3 Y.B. 10 Hen. VII. 25, 26, pl. 3.
178/4 Cf. L. Baiw., XV. 5; Y.B. 33 Hen. VI. 1, pl. 3.
178/5 Y.B. 6 Hen. VII. 12, pl. 9; Bro. Detinue, pl. 37; 10 Hen. VI. 21, pl. 69.
178/6 Y.B. 3 Hen. VII. 4, pl. 16. Cf. 10 Hen. VI. 21, pl. 69.
178/7 Y.B. 11 Hen. IV. 23, 24; 6 Hen. VII. 12, pl. 9.
178/8 Cro. Eliz. 815; 4 Co. Rep. 83 b; Co. Lit. 89; 2 BI. Comm. 452.
180/1 Savile, 133, 134. Cf. Bro. Accion sur le Case, pl. 103; Dyer, 161 a, b.
180/2 Nugent v. Smith, 1 C.P. D. 19, Brett, J., at p. 28.
180/3 Nugent v. Smith, 1 C.P. D. 423, Cockburn, C. J., at p. 428.
181/1 Moore, 462; Owen, 57.
181/2 Dial. 2, ch. 38, A.D. 1530.
182/1 Keilway, 160, pl. 2 (2 Hen. VIII.); cf. ib. 77b (21 Hen. VII.).
182/2 Y.B. 33 Hen. VI. 1, pl. 3.
182/3 4 Co. Rep. 83 b; Cro. Eliz. 815.
183/1 Keilway, 160, pl. 2.
183/2 Y.B. 19 Hen. VI. 49, ad fin. Cf. Mulgrave v. Ogden, Cro. Eliz. 219; S.C., Owen, 141, 1 Leon. 224; with Isaack v. Clark, 2 Bulstr. 306, at p. 312, Coke, J.
183/3 See Lecture VII.
184/1 Paston, J., in Y.B. 19 Hen. VI. 49. See, also, Rogers v. Head, Cro. Jac. 262; Rich v. Kneeland, Cro. Jac. 330, which will be mentioned again. An innkeeper must be a common innkeeper, Y.B. 11 Hen. IV. 45. See further, 3 Bl. Comm. 165, where "the transition from status to contract" will be found to have taken place.
184/2 F. N. B. 94 D; infra, p. 203.
184/3 Y.B. 7 Hen. IV. 14; 12 Ed. IV. 13, pl. 9, 10; Dyer, 22 b.
184/4 The process may be traced by reading, in the following order, Y.B. 2 Hen. VII. 11; Keilway, 77 b, ad fin. (21 Hen. VII.); ib. 160, pl. 2 (2 Hen. VIII.); Drake v. Royman, Savile, 133, 134 (36 Eliz.); Mosley v. Fosset, Moore, 543 (40 Eliz.); 1 Roll. Abr. 4, F, pl. 5; Rich v. Kneeland, Cro. Jac. 330 (11 Jac. I.).
185/1 Cro. Jac. 262 (8 Jac. I.). Compare Maynard's argument in Williams v. Hide, Palmer, 548; Symons v. Darknoll, ib. 523, and other cases below; 1 Roll. Abr. 4, F, pl. 3. Mosley v, Fosset, Moore, 543 (40 Eliz.); an obscurely reported case, seems to have been assumpsit against an agistor, for a horse stolen while in his charge, and asserts obiter that "without such special assumpsit the action does not lie." This must have reference to the form of the action, as the judges who decided Southcote's Case took part in the decision. See, further, Evans v. Yeoman, Clayton, 33.
186/1 See Symons v. Darknoll, and the second count in Morse v. Slue infra. (The latter case shows the averment of negligence to have been mere form.) Cf. I Salk. 18, top.
187/1 Supra, p. 179.
187/2 Boson v. Sandford, Shower, 101; Coggs v. Bernard, infra.
187/3 Symons v. Darknoll, infra.
188/1 Reg. Brev. 92b, 95a, 98a, 100b, 104a; cf. Y.B. 19 Ed. II. 624; 30 Ed. III. 25, 26; 2 Hen. IV. 18, pl. 6; 22 Hen. VI. 21, pl. 38; 32 & 33 Ed. I., Int., xxxiii.; Brunner, Schwurgerichte, 177; id. Franzosische, Inhaberpapier, 9, n. 1.
188/2 12 Co. Rep. 64.
188/3 See, besides the following cases, the declaration in Chamberlain v. Cooke, 2 Ventris, 75 (1 W. & M.), and note especially the variations of statement in Morse v. Slue, set forth below, in the text.
189/1 Hobart, 17; Cro. Jac. 330. See also George v. Wiburn, 1 Roll. Abr. 6, pl. 4 (A.D. 1638).
190/1 The use which has been made of this case in later times shows the extreme difficulty in distinguishing between principles of substantive law and rules relating only to procedure, in the older books.
190/2 Y.B. 22 Hen. VI. 21, pl. 38; supra, p. 188, n. 1.
191/1 Palmer, 523.
191/2 Palmer, 548.
191/3 Aleyn, 93.
191/4 1 Sid. 36.
192/1 1 Sid. 244. Cf. Dalston v. Janson, 1 Ld. Raym. 58.
192/2 2 Keb. 866; 3 id. 72, 112, 135; 2 Lev. 69; I Vent. 190, 238; 1 Mod. 85; Sir T. Raym. 220.
193/1 2 Keb. 866. See 3 Keb. 74; 1 Mod. 85; Sir T. Raym. 220.
193/2 2 Keb. 72.
193/3 Y.B. 33 Hen. VI. 1; supra, p. 177.
193/4 3 Keble, 73. This is the main point mentioned by Sir T. Raymond and Levinz.
193/5 Cf. 1 Mod. 85.
194/1 1 Ventris, 238, citing Southcote's Case in the margin. Cf. 3 Keble, 135.
194/2 Aleyn, 93; supra, p. 191.
194/3 See also 1 Hale, P.C. 512, 513.
195/1 King v. Viscount Hertford, 2 Shower, 172, pl. 164; cf. Woodlife's Case, supra.
195/2 Boson v. Sandford, 1 Shower, 101 (2 W. & M.). See above, pp. 183,185; below, p. 197. Modern illustrations of the doctrine will be found in "Fleming v. Manchester, Sheffield, & Lincolnshire Railway Co., 4 Q.B.D. 81, and cases cited. In Boorman v. Brown, 3 Q.B.511, 526, the reader the primitive assumpsit, which was the inducement to a declaration in tort, interpreted as meaning contract in the modern sense. It will seen directly that Lord Holt took a different view. Note the mode of dealing with the Marshal's case, 33 Hen; VI. 1, in Aleyn, 27.
196/1 See Lovett v. Hobbs, 2 Shower, 127 (32 Car. II.); Chamberlain v. Cooke, 2 Ventris, 75 (1 W. & M.); Boson v. Sandford, 1 Shower, 101, citing Southcote's Case (2 W. & M.); Upshare v. Aidee, 1 Comyns, 25 (8 W. III.); Middleton v. Fowler, I Salk. 288 (10 W. III.).
196/2 12 Mod. 472.
196/3 2 Ld. Raym. 909.
197/1 Powtuary v. Walton, 1 Roll. Abr. 10, pl. 5 (39 Eliz.). Cf. Keilway, 160.
197/2 2 Ld. Raym. 919. See Lecture VII. How little Lord Holt meant to adopt the modern view, that delivery, being a detriment to the owner, was a consideration, may be further seen by examining the cases put and agreed to by him from the Year Books.
199/1 2 Kent, 598; 1 C.P. D. 429.
199/2 Palmer, 523. See too Keilway, 77 b, and 160, pl. 2, where the encroachment of case on detinue, and the corresponding confusion in principle, may be pretty clearly seen taking place. But see p. 175, supra.
200/1 2 Kent, 597; Forward v. _Pittard, 1 T. R. 27.
200/2 Cf. Y.B. 7 Hen. IV. 14; 2 Hen. VII. 11; Keilway, 77 b, 160, pl. 2, and other cases already cited.
200/3 Y.B. 41 Ed. III. 3, pl. 8.
200/4 Y.B. 33 Hen. YI. 1, pl. 3.
200/5 Reg. Brev. 107 a, 108 a, 110 a, b; entries cited 1 T. R. 29.
200/6 See above, pp. 167, 175 et seq.; 12 Am. Law Rev. 692, 693; Y.B. 42 Ed. III. 11, pl. 13; 42 Ass., pl. 17.
201/1 1 Wilson, 282; cf. 2 Kent (12th ed.), 596, n. 1, b.
201/2 Y.B. 33 Hen. VI. 1, pl. 3.
202/1 Mouse's Case, 12 Co. Rep. 63.
202/2 Bird v. Astcock, 2 Bulstr. 280; cf. Dyer, 33 a, pl. 10; Keighley's Case, 10 Co. Rep. 139 b, 140.
202/3 Y.B. 40 Ed. III. 5, 6, pl. 11; see also Willams v. Hide, Palmer, 548; Shep. Touchst. 173.
203/1 See Safe Delcosit Company of Pittsburgh v. Pollock, 85 Penn. 391.
203/2 Paston, J., in Y.B. 21 Hen. VI. 55; Keilway, 50 a, pl. 4; Hardres, 163.
203/3 Lane v. Cotton, 1 Ld. Raym. 646, 654; 1 Salk. 18; 12 Mod. 484.
204/1 Forward v. Pittard, 1 T. R. 27, 83.
205/1 Printing and Numerical Registering Co. v. Sampson, L.R. 19 Eq. 462, 465.
207/1 Possession, Section 6, Eng. tr., pp. 27, 28.
207/2 R. d. Besitzes, 487.
208/1 R. d. Besitzes, 490, 491.
208/2 Bruns, R. d. Besitzes, 415; Windscheid, Pand. Section 148, n. 6. Further Hegelian discourse may be found in Dr. J. Hutchison Sterling's Lectures on the Philosophy of Law.
208/3 Institutionen, Sections 224, 226; Windscheid, Pand. Section 148, n. 6.
208/4 Windscheid, Pand. Section 148, n. 6.
208/5 Besitzklagen, 276, 279.
209/1 Bruns, R. d. Besitzes, 499.
209/2 Bruns, R. d. Besitzes, Section 2, pp. 5 et seq.; Puchta, Besitz, in Weiske, Rechtslex.; Windscheid, Pand. Section 154, pp. 461 et seq. (4th ed.).
209/3 D. 41.2.3, Section 20; 13.6.8 & 9. Cf. D. 41.1.9, Section 5.
210/1 But see Ihering, Geist d. Rom. R., Section 62, French tr., IV. p. 51.
210/2 Heusler thinks this merely a result of the English formalism and narrowness in their interpretation of the word suo in the writ (disseisivit de teuemento suo). Gewere, 429-432. But there was no such narrowness in dealing with catalla sua in trespass. See below, p. 242.
210/3 See, further, Bracton, fol. 413; Y.B. 6 Hen. VII. 9, pl. 4.
211/1 Infra, p. 243.
211/2 R. d. Besitzes, 494.
212/1 Rogers v. Spence, 13 M. & W. 579, 581.
212/2 Webb v. Fox, 7 T. R. 391, 397.
212/3 Fennings v. Lord Grenville, 1 Taunt. 241; Littledale v. Scaith, ib. 243, n. (a); cf. Hogarth v. Jackson, M. & M. 58; Skinner v. Chapman, ib. 59, n.
212/4 Swift v. Gifford, 2 Lowell, 110.
212/5 1 Taunt. 248.
213/1 Cf. Wake, Evolution of Morality, Part I. ch. 4, pp. 296 et seq.
215/1 Asher v. Whitlock, L.R. 1 Q.B.1.
215/2 People v. Shearer, 30 Cal. 645.
217/1 2 Kent's Comm. 349, citing Pierson v. Post, 3 Caines, (N. Y.) 175; Buster v. Newkirk, 20 Johnson, (N. Y.) 75.
217/2 Young v. Hichens, 6 Q.B.606.
217/3 2 Kent's Comm. 349, n. (d).
218/1 Inst. 2. 1, Section 13.
218/2 Swift v. Gifford, 2 Lowell, 110.
218/3 Savigny, R. d. Besitzes, Section 21.
218/4 II. 9, Section 4; III. 29, Section 2. Animus domini will be used here as shortly indicating the general nature of the intent required even by those who deny the fitness of the expression, and especially because Savigny's opinion is that which has been adopted by English writers.
219/1 Cf. Bruns, R. d. Besitzes, 413, and ib. 469, 474, 493, 494, 505; Windscheid, Pand. Section 149, n. 5 (p. 447, 4th ed.); Puchta, Inst. Section 226.
219/2 Supra, p. 207; 2 Puchta, Inst. Section 226 (5th ed.), pp. 545, 546.
221/1 15 Jur. 1079; 21 L. J. Q.B.75; 7 Eng. L. & Eq. 424.
222/1 11 Allen, 548.
223/1 Kincaid v. Eaton, 98 Mass. 139.
223/2 Barker v. Bates, 13 Pick. 255, 257, 261; Proctor v. Adams, 113 Mass. 376, 377; 1 Bl. Comm. 297, Sharsw. ed., n. 14. Cf. Blades v. Hiqgs, 13 C.B. N.S. 844, 847, 848, 850, 851; 11 H. L. C. 621; Smith v. Smith, Strange, 955.
223/3 Reg. v. Rowe, Bell, C.C. 93.
224/1 See, as to treasure hidden in another's land, D. 41. 2. 44, pr.; D. 10. 4. 15. Note the different opinions in D. 41.2. 3, Section 3.
224/2 3 Inst. 107; 1 Hale, P.C. 504, 505; 2 Bishop, Crim. Law, Sections 834, 860 (6th ed.).
224/3 Reg. v. Middleton, L.R. 2 C.C. 38, 55. Cf. Halliday v. Holgate, L.R. 3 Ex. 299, 302.
224/4 Cf. Y.B. 8 Ed. II. 275; Fitzh. Abr. Detinue, ph 59; Y.B. 13 Ed. IV. 9, pl. 5; Keilway, 160, pl. 2; Merry v. Green, 7 M. & W. 623, 630. It may not be necessary to go quite so far, however, and these cases are not relied on as establishing the theory. For wrong explanations, see 2 East, P.C. 696.
225/1 Durfee v. Jones, 11 R. I. 588.
225/2 Reg. v. Rowe, Bell, C.C. 93, stated above.
225/3 8 Ves. 405; 7 M. & W. 623; Stephen, Crim. Law, Art. 281, Ill. (4), p. 197. He says, "because [the owner of the safe] cannot be presumed to intend to act as the owner of it when he discovers it,"--a reason drawn from Savigny, but not fitted to the English law, as has been shown.
226/1 Y.B. 13 Ed. IV. 9, 10, pl. 5; 21 Hen. VII. 14, pl. 21. Cf. 3 Hen. VII. 12, pl. 9; Steph. Crim. Law, Art. 297, and App., note xvii.
226/2 Steph. Crtre. Law, Art. 297, and App., note xvii. p. 882. It may be doubted whether the old law would have sanctioned the rule in this form. F. N. B. 91 E; Y.B. 2 Ed. IV. 15, pl. 7.
226/3 Y.B. 21 Hen. VII. 14, pl. 21; 13 Co. Rep. 69.
227/1 They have been said to be a part of the family pro hac vice. Southcote v. Stanley, 1 H. & N. 247, 250. Cf. Y.B. 2 Hen. IV. 18, pl. 6.
227/2 Moore, 248, pl. 392; S.C., Owen, 52; F. N. B. 91 E; 2 B1. Comm. 396; 1 H. Bl. 81, 84; 1 Chitty, Pl. 170 (1st ed.); Dicey, Parties, 358; 9 Mass. 104; 7 Cowen, 294; 3 S. & R. 20; 13 Iredell, 18; 6 Barb. 362, and cases cited. Some of the American cases have been denied, on the ground that the custodian was not a servant. Cf. Holiday v. Hicks, Cro. Eliz. 638, 661, 746; Drope v. Theyar, Popham, 178, 179.
228/1 Bracton, fol. 6 a, Section 3, 12 a, 17 a, Cap. V. ad fin., 25 a, b, etc.; Pucbra, Inst. Section 228.
228/2 See also 7 Am. Law Rev. 62 et seq.; 10 Am. Law Rev. 431; 2 Kent, Comm. (12th ed.), 260, n. 1.
228/3 1 Comm. 427. Cf. Preface to Paley on Agency. Factors are always called servants in the old books, see, e. g., Woodlife's Case, Owen, 57; Holiday v. Hicks, Cro. Eliz. 638; Southcote's Case, 4 Co. Rep. 83 b, 84 a; Southern v. How, Cro. Jac. 468; St. 21 Jac. I., c. 16, Section 3; Morse v. Slue, 3 Keble, 72. As to bailiffs, see Bract. 26 b, "Reestituat domino, vel servienti," etc.; Y.B. 7 Hen. IV. 14, pl. 18.
229/1 Paley, Agency, c. 4, Section 1, citing Godbolt, 360. See, further, F. N. B. 120, G; Fitzh. Abr. Dette, pl. 3; Y.B. 8 Ed. IV. 11, pl. 9. These rules seem to be somewhat modern even as to servants. The liability of a master for debts contracted by his servant is very narrowly limited in the earlier Year Books.
230/1 I am inclined to think that this extension has been largely due to the influence of the Roman law. See Lecture I. p. 20, n. 1, and observe the part which the precedents as to fire (e. g., Y.B. 2 Hen. IV. 18, pl. 6) have played in shaping the modern doctrine of master and servant. Tuberville v. Stampe, I Ld. Raym. 264 (where Lord Holt's examples are from the Roman law); Brucker v. Fromont, 6 T. R. 659; M'Manus v. Crickett, 1 East, 106; Patten v. Rea, 2 C.B. N.S. 606. In Southern v. How, Popham, 143, Doctor and Student is referred to for the general principles of liability. Doctor and Student states Roman law. See, further, Boson v. Sandford, 1 Shower, 101, 102.
230/2 Bac. Ahr. Master and Servant, K; Smith, Master and Servant (3d ed.), 260, n. (t).
230/3 Clapp v. Kemp, 122 Mass. 481; Murray v. Currie, L.R. 6 C.P. 24, 28; Hill v. Morey, 26 Vt. 178.
230/4 See, e.g., Patten v. Rea, 2 C.B. N.S. 606; Bolingbroke v. Swindon Local Board, L.R. 9 C.P. 575.
230/5 Freeman v. Rosher, 13 Q.B.780, 785; Gauntlett v. King, 3 C. B. N.S. 59; Haseler v. Lemoyne, 28 L. J. C.P. 103; Collett v. Foster, 2 H. & N. 356; Barwick v. English Joint Stock Bank, L.R. 2 Ex. 259, 265, 266; Lucas v. Mason, L.R. 10 Ex. 251, 253, last paragraph; Mackay v. Commercial Bank of New Brunswick, L.R. 5 P.C. 394, 411, 412. So as to partners, 3 Kent's Comm. (12th ed.), 46, notes (d) & 1.
231/1 Bush v. Steinman, 1 B. & P. 404, 409.
231/2 6 M. & W. 358. Cf. Udell v. Atherton, 7 H. & N. 172, 184, for a comment like that in the text. Other grounds for the decision are immaterial here.
231/3 Mackay v. Commercial Bank of New Brunswick, L.R. 5 P.C. 394; Barwick v. English Joint Stock Bank, L.R. 2 Ex. 259; Western Bank of Scotland v. Addie, L.R. 1 H. L. Sc. 145; 2 Kent (12th ed.), 616, n. 1; Swift v. Jewsbury, L.R. 9 Q.B.301, overruling S.C. sub nom. Swift v. Winterbotham, L.R. 8 Q.B.244; Weir v. Bell, 3 Ex. D. 238, 244. The objections which Baron Bramwell mentions (L.R. 9 Q.B.815) to holding one man liable for the frauds of another, are objections to the peculiar consequences attaching to the relation of master and servant in general, and have been urged in that more general form by the same learned judge. 12 Am. Law Rev. 197, 200; 2 H. & N. 856, 361. See 7 Am. Law Rev. 61, 62.
231/3 7 Am. Law Rev. 63 (Oct. 1872).
232/1 D. 44. 2. 4, note 17, Elzevir ed.
232/2 Hunter's Roman Law, 431.
232/3 Ancient Hist. of Inst. 235.
232/4 Cf. Gillett v. Ball, 9 Penn. St. 13; Craig v. Gilbreth, 47 Me. 416; Nickolson v. Knowles, 5 Maddock, 47; Williams v. Port, L.R. 12 Eq. 149; Adams v. Jones, 12 Ad. & El. 455; Bracton, fol. 28 b, 42 b, 43. And compare with the passage cited above from Blackstone: "Possider, cujus riomine possidetur, procurator alienae possessioni praestat ministerium." D. 41. 2. 18, pr.
233/1 Ward v. Macaulay, 4 T. R. 489, 490. Cf. as to factors supra, p. 228.
233/2 Berndtson v. Strang, L.R. 3 Ch. 588, 590.
233/3 Blackburn, Sale, 33; Marvin v. Wallis, 6 El. & Bl. 726.
233/4 D. 41. 2. 18, pr. "Quod meo nomine possideo, possum alieno nomine possidere: nec enim muto mihi causam possessionis, sed desino possidere et alium possessorem ministerio meo facio. Nec idem est possidere et alieno nomine possidere: nam possidet, cujus nomine possidetur, procurator alienae possessioni praestat ministerium." Thus showing that the vendor changed possession by holding in the name of the purchaser, as his agent to possess. Cf. Bracton, fol. 28 b.
233/4 Windscheid, Pand. Section 155, n. 8 a; 2 Kent (12th ed.), 492, n. 1 (a). It should be kept in mind also that the Roman law denied possession to bailees.
234/1 See, e. g., Farina v. Home, 16 M. & W. 119, 123.
235/1 McGahey v. Moore, 3 Ired. (N. C.) 35.
235/2 Reader v. Moody, 3 Jones, (N. C.) 372. Cf. Basset v. Maynard, Cro. Eliz. 819, 820.
235/3 Browne v. Dawson, 12 A. & E. 624. Cf. D. 43. 16. 17; ib. 3, Section 9; D. 41. 2. 18, Section 3; Clayton, 147, pl. 268.
236/1 Cf. Bruns, R. d. Besitzes, 503.
237/1 Clark v. Maloney, 3 Harrington (Del.), 68. Bruns (R. d. Besitzes, 503, 507) comes to the same conclusion on practical grounds of convenience, although he utterly repudiates it on theory. I must refer to what I said above touching these conflicts between theory and convenience.
238/1 Bruns, R. d. Besitzes, Section 57, p. 486. A learned writer of more ancient date asks why a doctor has not a possessory action if you cease to employ him, and answers: "Sentio actionem non tenere, sed sentio tantum, nec si vel morte mineris, possum dicere quare. Tu lector, si sapis, rationes decidendi suggere." Hommel, Rhaps., qu. 489, cited, Bruns, 407.
239/1 Gardiner v. Thibodeau, 14 La. An. 732.
239/2 Bruns, 483.
240/1 2 Kent (12th ed.), 205, n. 1. Cf. Y.B. 21 Hen. VI. 8, 9, pl. 19; American note to Scott v. Shepherd, in 1 Sm. L. C. (Am. ed.).
240/2 Britton (Nich. ed.), I. 277 (cf. Bract., fol. 164 b; Fleta, fol. 214; Glanv., Lib. XIII. c. 37); Littleton, Sections 237-240, 588, 589; 3 Bl. Comm. 170; 3 Cruise, Dig., tit. xxviii., Rents, ch. 2, Section 34.
241/1 See Lecture XI.
241/2 Cf. Stockport Water Works v. Potter, 3 H. & C. 300, 318. The language in the seventh English edition of 1 Sm. L. C., 300, is rather too broad. If the law should protect a possessor of land in the enjoyment of water coming to it, it would do so because the use of the water was regarded as a part of the enjoyment of that land, and would by no means imply that it would do the same in the case just put of a way over land of another.
242/1 Jefferies v. Great Western Railway Co., 5 El. & B1. 802. Cf. Armory v. Delamirie, 1 Strange, 505, 1 Sm. L. C.
242/2 Co. Lit. 145 b.
242/3 2 Wms. Saund. 47 b, note 1, to Wilbraham v. Snow.
242/4 Bract., fol. 150 b, 151; supra, p. 168; Y.B. 22 Ed. I. 466-468.
242/5 Y.B. 48 Ed. III. 20; 11 Hen. IV. 17; 11 Hen. IV. 23, 24; 21 Hen. VII. 14. The meaning of sua is discussed in Y.B. 10 Ed. IV. 1, B, by Catesby. Compare Laband, Vermogensrechtlichen Klagen, 111; Heusler, Gewere, 492 et seq., correcting Bruns, R. d. Besitzes, 300 et seq.; Sohm, Proc. d. L. Sal., Section 6.
243/1 Y.B. 11 Hen. IV. 17, pl. 39.
243/2 Y.B. 21 Hen. VII. 14 b, pl. 23.
243/3 Godbolt, 173, pl. 239. Cf. 11 Hen. IV. 17, pl. 39.
243/4 Bro. Abr. Trespass, pl. 433, cit. Y.B. 13 Hen. VII. 10.
243/5 Kelyng, 89. See, further, Buller, N. P. 33.
243/6 Lecture V.; Y.B. 20 Hen. VII. 1, pl. 11.
243/7 Y.B. 21 lien. VII. 14 b, pl. 23.
243/8 1 Roll. Abr. 4, 5 (I), pl. 1. Cf. Arnold v. Jefferson, 1 Ld. Raym. 275.
244/1 29 Ass., fol. 163, pl. 28.
244/2 Southcote's Case, 4 Co. Rep. 83 b.
244/3 Mores v. Conham, Owen, 123. Cf. Ratcliff v. Davis, I Bulstr. 29.
244/4 Doe v. Dyball, Mood. & M. 346 and note; 2 Wms. Saund. 111, and later notes; I Ad. & El. 119; Asher v. Whitlock, L.R. 1 Q.B.1.
244/5 Graham v. Peat, 1 East, 244.
245/1 As to this period see Heusler, Gewere. Cf. Laveleye, Propriete, 166.
248/1 2 Hist. du Droit Franc., pp. 146 et seq, 152.
248/2 Anciens Poetes de la France, (Guessard,) p. 71.
248/3 Page 283; cf. 284, cxviii, et seq., 44, lxix.
249/1 Sohm, Proc. d. Lex. Sal., Sections 15, 23-25, tr. Thevenin, pp. 80, 105, 122.
249/2 Essays in A. S. Law, p. 292.
249/3 Cap. VIII., Merkel, p. 48.
249/4 Cap. LXXXIX. Section 3, Essays in A. S. Law, p. 291.
249/5 Chap. IV. Section 16.
250/1 Fitzh. Abr. Mainprise, pl. 12 (H. 33 Ed. III.); Staundforde, P.C. 65.
250/2 Abbr. Plac., p. 343, col 2, rot. 37, 17 Ed. II.
250/3 Jacob, L. D., "Bail." Cf. I Bulstr. 45; .Hawkins, P.C., II. ch. 15, Section 83; Abbr. Plac., p. 343, col. 2, rot. 37, 17 Ed. II.
250/4 Highmore, Bail, p. 199; Jacob, L. D., "Bail." Cf. 2 Laferriere, Hist. du Droit Franc., p. 148.
250/5 Highmore, p. 195.
250/6 Ibid., p. 200.
252/1 Vermoegensrechtlichen Klagen.
253/1 II. c. 60, Section 25. Glanvill's "justa debendi causa" (Lib. X. c. 4) seems remote from consideration.
254/1 Y.B. 3 Hen. VI. 36.
254/2 Y.B. 37 Hen. VI. 13, pl. 3.
254/3 Y.B. 37 Hen. VI. 8, pl. 33.
254/4 Glanv., Lib. X. c. 12; Bract, fol. 400b, Section 10; 22 Ass., pl. 70, fol. 101.
255/1 Essays in A. S. Law, 187.
256/1 I. 45; III. 10.
256/2 Lib. X. e. 17. Suit, secta, was the term applied to the persons whose oath the party tendered.
257/1 Lib. X. c. 12 (Beames, p. 262); c. 8 & c. 5 (Beames, pp. 256, 251); cf. IV. c. 6, where witnesses are tendered de visu et auditu. Cf. Bract., 315 b, Section6 Fleta, II. c. 63, Section10, p. 137. It was no doubt true, as Glanvill says, Lib. X. c. 17, that the usual mode of proof was by a writing or by duel, and that the King's Court did not generally give protection to private agreements made anywhere except in the Court of the King (Lib. X. c. 8). But it can hardly be that debts were never established by witness in his time, in view of the continuous evidence from Bracton onwards.
257/2 But cf. Brunner, Schwurgerichte, 399. I do not go so far as to say that they were still a living institution. However that may be, tradition must at least have modelled itself on what had been the function of the former official body.
257/3 Bract., fol. 315 b, Section 6; Britt. (Nich.) I. p. 162; Magna Charta, c. 38; Y.B. 21 Ed. I. 456; 7 Ed. II. 242; 18 Ed. II. 582; 3 Bl. Comm. 295, 344. Cf. 17 Ed. III. 48 b.
257/4 Cf. Glanv., Lib. IV. c. 6.
258/1 Lib. X. c. 18. It is possible that this means no more than Glanvill's often repeated statement, that the King's Court did not, generally speaking, take cognizance of private agreements. The substantive law was, perhaps, still limited by traditions from the infancy of contract. See pp. 248, 251, 259, 260. The proposition in its broadest form may have been based on the inability to try such agreements in any way but those which have been specified. Cf. the requirement of aliam diracionationem and aliis probationibus, in Lib. X. c. 12. But cf. Ibid. with Essays in A. S. Law, pp. 189, 190.
259/1 Sharington v. Strotton, Plowden, 298, at p. 302, M. 7 & 8 Eliz.
259/2 Pillans v. Van Mierop, 3 Burrow, 1663, 1669.
260/1 1 Thorpe, Anc. Laws, 181, Oaths, 7, 8.
260/2 Glanv., Lib. X. c. 5 (Beames, p. 251); Y.B. 7 Ed. II. 242; Novae Narr. Dette-Vers plege, Rastell's Law Tracts, p. 253, D, 2 Finl. Reeves, 376.
261/1 Glanv., Lib. X. c. 22 (Beames, p. 263); Bract., fol. 398 b, Section 1. The favorite proof by duel was also allowed, but this disappeared. When the inquest became general, the execution of the deed was tried, like any other fact, by that means.
261/2 Bract., fol. 315 b, Section 6, 400 b; Coke, 2d Inst., 44, 45.
262/1 Glanv., Lib. X. c. 12 (Beames, p. 263); Bract., fol. 100 b, Section 9.
262/2 Glanv., Lib. X. c. 17 (Beames, p. 272).
262/3 Bract., fol. 400 b, Section 9.
262/4 Cf. Y.B. 20 Ed. I. 304, and 34 Ed. II., 150, 152; ib. 330, 332; 35 Ed. I. 546.
263/1 Bract., fol. 400 b, Section 8.
263/2 Cf. Y.B. 20 Ed. I. 304.
263/3 Cap. 28; 32 & 33 Ed. I. 516; 18 Ed. II. 582; Fleta, II. c, 63, Section 9; Coke, 2d Inst., 44; 3 Bl. Comm. 344.
263/4 Y.B. 18 Ed. II. 582; 17 Ed. III. 48 b, pl. 14.
264/1 Y.B. 29 Ed. III. 25, 26; cf. 48 Ed. III. 6, pl. 11; Fleta, II. c. 60, Section 25; Glanvill, Lib. X. c. 12.
264/2 Cf. Bro..Acc. sur le Case, pl. 5; S.C., 27 Hen. VIII. 24, 25, pl. 3.
264/3 Y.B. 18 Ed. III. 13, pl. 7.
264/4 Y.B. 44 Ed. III. 21, pl. 23.
264/5 F. N. B. 122, I, in margin. Cf. F. N. B. 122 K; Y.B. 43 Ed. III. 11, pl. 1; S.C., Bro. Pledges, pl. 3; 9 Hen. V. 14, pl. 23.
265/1 Y.B. 17 Ed. III. 48 b, pl. 14. Cf. Fortescue (Amos), 67, n.; 3 Bl. Comm. 295.
265/2 For limit, see Constit. of Clarendon, c. 15; Glanv., Lib. X. c. 8, 12; Y.B. 22 Ass., pl. 70, fol. 101; 45 Ed. III. 24, pl. 30; 19 R. II., Fitzh. Abr. Dett, pl. 166; 37 Hen. VI. 8, pl. 18; 14 Ed. IV. 6, pl. 3; 15 Ed. IV. 32, pl. 14; 19 Ed. IV. 10, pl. 18; 20 Ed. IV. 3, pl. 17.
266/1 See for an illustration 2 Kent's Comm. (12th ed.), 451, n. 1 (b).
266/2 Repromittatur, but cf. pro servitio tuo vel pro homagio, Fleta, II. c. 60, Section 25.
267/1 Y.B. 29 Ed. III. 25, 26. But cf. 48 Ed. III. 3, pl. 6.
267/2 19 R. II., Fitzh. Abr. Dett, pl. 166.
267/3 Y.B. 12 Hen. IV. 17, pl. 13, ad fin.
267/4 Y.B. 9 Hen. V. 14, pl. 23.
267/5 (Cf. 13 Ed. II. 403; 17 Ed. IIL 48, pl. 14; 29 Ed. III. 25, 26.) 41 Ed. III. 7, pl. 15; 46 Ed. III. 6, pl. 16; Fitzh. Abr. Dett, pl. 166.
267/6 Y.B. 3 Hen, VI. 36, pl. 33.
268/1 Y.B. 37 Hen. VI. 8, pl. 18.
268/2 E. g., Rolfe in Y.B. 3 Hen. VI. 36, pl. 23.
269/1 Y.B. 37 Hen. VI. 8, pl. 18. Cf. Bro. Feoffements al Uses, pl. 54; Plowden, 301.
269/2 Y.B. 15 Ed. IV. 32, pl. 14; (S.C., 14 Ed. IV. 6, pl. 3;) 17 Ed. 4, pl. 4.
269/3 Cf. Y.B. 37 Hen. VI. 8, pl. 18; 17 Ed. IV. 4, 5; Plowden, 305, 306.
269/4 Y.B. 3 Hen. VI. 36, pl. 33.
269/5 Y.B. 37 Hen. VI. 13.
269/6 As to requirement of certain sum, cf. Y.B. 12 Ed. II. 375; Fleta, II. c. 60, Section 24.
270/1 Y.B. 29 Ed. III. 25, 26; 40 Ed. III. 24, pl. 27; 43 Ed. II1. 2, pl. 5.
270/2 Y.B. 43 Ed. III. 2, pl. 5; 46 Ed. III. 25, pl. 10; 50 Ed. III. 5, pl. 11.
270/3 Cf. Glanv., Lib. X. c. 8; Fleta, II. c. 60, Section 25.
270/4 Y.B. 35 Ed. I. 454; 12 Ed. II. 375.
272/1 Ducange, "Sigilium"; Ingulph. 901.
272/2 Big. Pl. Ang. Norm. 177.
272/3 Big. Pl. Ant. Norm. 177; Bract., fol. 100 b, Section 9, "scriptura." But cf. Y.B. 30 Ed. I. 158; Fleta, II. c. 60, Section 25.
272/4 Y.B. 33 Ed. I. 354, 356; 35 Ed. I. 455, top; 41 Ed. III. 7, pl. 15; 44 Ed. III. 21, pl. 23. Cf. 39 Hen. VI. 34, pl. 46.
272/5 Y.B. 7 Ed. I. 242. Cf. 35 Ed. I. 452.
272/6 Cf. Bract., fol. 100 b, Section 9.
272/7 Cf. Glanv., Lib. X. c. 12; Dugdale, Antiq. Warwic. 673, cited Ducange, "Sigillum"; Bract., fol. 396 b, Section 3; I Britt. (Nich.)163, Section 17; Abbrev. Plac. 8 Joh., Berk. rot. 4, pp. 55, 56; ib. 19 Ed. I., Norf. & Surf. rot. 7, p. 284; ib. Index "Sigillum."
272/8 Y.B. 30 Ed. I. 158; Fleta, II. c. 60, Section 25, p. 130.
273/1 45 Ed. III. 24, pl. 30.
273/2 Bract., fol. 100 b, Section 9.
275/l Cf. 5 Co. Rep. 13 b, 14 a, with 1 Roll. Rep. 126, 128; Y.B. 43 Ed. III 30, pl. 15.
275/2 Y.B. 46 Ed. III. 19, pl. 19; S.C. Bro. Acc. sur le Case, pl. 22.
275/3 Y.B. 22 Ass., pl. 4i, fol. 94.
276/1 Y.B. 43 Ed. III. 33, pl. 38.
277/1 Y.B. 11 Hen. IV. 33, pl. 60.
277/2 Y.B. 3 Hen. VI. 36, pl. 33.
277/3 Y.B. 2 Hen. IV. 3, pl. 9; 11 Hen. IV. 33, pl. 60. Cf. 3 Hen. VI. 36, 83.
279/1 Cf. 19 Hen. VI. 49, pl. 5 ad fin., Newton, C. J.
280/1 Cf. Y.B. 48 Ed. III. 6, pl. 11.
280/2 Cases supra; Y.B. 2 Hen. IV. 3, pl. 9; 11 Hen. IV. 33. Cf. 3 Hen. VI. 36, pl. 33; 20 Hen. VI. 34, pl. 4; 2 Hen. VII. 11, pl. 9.
281/1 Y.B. 48 Ed. III. 6, pl. 11. Cf. Fitzh. Abr. Acc. sur le case, pl. 37, 11 R. II; 14 Hen. VI. 18. But cf. 43 Ed. III. 33, pl. 38.
282/1 Cf. Candish's reasons for allowing wager of law with Y.B. 32 & 33 Ed. I., Preface, p. xxxvi., citing the old rules of pleading printed at the end of the tract entitled, Modus tenendi unum Hundredum sire Curiam de Recordo, in Rastell's Law Tracts, p. 410, E, F, G.
282/2 Y.B. 3 Hen. VI. 36, pl. 33.
282/3 Y.B. 2 Hen. IV. 3, pl. 9; 11 Hen. IV. 33, pl. 60; 3 Hen. VI. 36, pl. 33.
282/4 3 Hen. VI. 36, pl. 33.
283/1 Y.B. 14 Hen. VI. 18, pl. 58.
283/2 Ibid. Cf. 48 Ed. III 6, pl. 11.
283/3 Y.B. 19 Hen. VI. 49, pl. 5. See, further, Y.B. 20 Hen. VI. 25, pl. 11.
284/1 Cf. Y.B. 3 Hen. VI. 36, pl. 33.
284/2 Y.B. 2 Hen. VII. 11, pl. 9. Cf. 20 Hen. VI. 34, pl. 4.
284/3 Cf. Y.B. 14 Hen. VI. 18, pl. 58; 21 Hen. VII. 41, pl. 66, Fineux, C. J.
284/4 Keilway, 160, pl. 2 (2 Hen. VIII.); Powtuary v. Walton, 1 Roll. Abr. 10, pl. 5 (39 Eliz.); Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Raym. 909 (2 Anne, A.D. 1703). Supra, p. 195.
285/1 Sands v. Trevilian, Cro. Car. 193, 194 (Mich. 4 Car. I., A.D. 1629).
285/2 Bro. Acc. sur le Case, pl. 5; S.C., Y.B. 27 Hen. VIII. 24, 25, pl. 3; Sidenham v. Worlington, 2 Leon. 224, A.D. 1585.
285/3 Y.B. 21 Hen. VII. 30, pl. 5; ib. 41, pl. 66.
285/4 Y.B. 3 Hen. VI. 36, pl. 33.
286/1 Sharington v. Strotton, Plowden, 298 (Mich. 7 & 8 Eliz.); ib. 309, note on "the civil law."
286/2 Hunt v. Bate, 3 Dyer, 272 a (10 Eliz., A.D. 1568).
286/3 See Lecture VIII. Mr. Langdell, Contracts, Sections 92, 94, suggests the ingenious explanation for this doctrine, that it was then held that no promise could be implied in fact from the request. There may be evidence which I do not know, but the case cited (Bosden v. Thinne, Yelv. 40) for this statement was not decided until A.D. 1603, while the implication of Hunt v. Bate, supra, which was the authority followed by the cases to be explained, is all the other way.
286/4 Sidenham v. Worlington, 2 Leon. 224, A.D. 1585.
287/1 Read v. Baxter, 3 Dyer, 272 b, n. (26 & 27 Eliz.). Cf. Richards and Bartlet's Case, 1 Leon. 19 (26 Eliz.).
287/2 Bro. Acc. sur le Case, pl. 5; S.C., Y.B. 27 Hen. VIII. 24, 25, pl. 3; 3 Dyer, 272, n.
287/3 Marsh v. Rainsford, 3 Dyer, 272 b, n.; S.C., 2 Leon. 111, and Cro. Eliz. 59, sub. nom. Marsh v. Kavenford.
287/4 Smith and Smith's Case, 3 Leon. 88, A.D. 1583; Riches and Briggs, Yelv. 4, A.D. 1601; Pickas v. Guile, Yelv. 128, A.D. 1608.
288/1 Supra, p. 195. Lord Coke's caution not to rely on the abridgments is very necessary to the proper study of the history of consideration. The abridgments apply the doctrine to cases which make no mention of it, and which were decided before it was ever heard of.
290/1 Y.B. 46 Ed. III. 19, pl. 19; 19 Hen. VI. 49, pl. 5; Keilway, 160, pl. 2; Powtuary v. Walton, 1 Roll. Abr. 10, pl. 5; Coggs v. Bernaard, 2 Ld. Raym. 909.
290/2 Riches and Briggs, Yelv. 4, A.D. 1601; Pickas v. Guile, Yelv. 128.
291/1 Bainbridge v. Firmstone, 8 Ad. & El. 743, A.D. 1838.
291/2 Wilkinson v. Oliveira, 1 Bing. N. C. 490, A.D. 1835; Haigh v. Brooks, 10 Ad. & El. 309; lb. 323; Hart v. Miles, 4 C.B. N.S. 371, A.D. 1858.
291/3 Wheatley v. Low, Cro. Jac. 668, A.D. 1623. Cf. Byne and Playne's Case, 1 Leon. 220, 221 (32 & 33 Eliz.).
291/4 Wilkinson v. Oliveira, 1 Bing. N. C. 490; Haigh v. Brooks, 10 Ad. & El. 309; Hart v. Miles, 4 C.B. N.S. 371; 6 Am. Law Rev. 47, Oct. 1871.
292/1 Supra, pp. 196, 197. See also Lecture VII.
292/2 Byles, J., in Shadwell v. Shadwell, 30 L. J. C.P. 145, 149.
292/3 Shadwell v. Shadwell, ubi supra; Burr v. Wilcox, 13 Allen, 269, 272, 273.
292/4 Thomas v. Thomas, 2 Q.B.851.
293/1 Price v. Jenkins, 5 Ch. D. 619. Cf. Grabbe v. Moxey, 1 W. R. 226; Thomas v. Thomas, 2 Q.B.851; Monahan, Method of Law, 141 et seq.
294/1 Ellis v. Clark, 110 Mass. 389.
294/2 Fitch v. Snedaker, 38 N. Y. 248, criticising Williaws v. Carwardine, 4 Barn. & Ad. 621, where, however, it does not appear that the plaintiff did not know of the offer of a reward, but merely that the jury found that she was in fact actuated by other motives, a finding wholly beside the mark.
296/1 Y.B. 29 Ed. III. 25, 26.
296/2 19 R. II., Fitzh. Abr. Dett, pl. 166.
296/3 Hunt v. Bate, Dyer, 272, A.D. 1568.
297/1 See Barker v. Halifax, Cro. Eliz. 741; S.C. 3 Dyer, 272 a, n. 32.
297/2 Sidenham v. Worlington, 2 Leonard, 224; Bosden v. Thinne, Yelv. 40; Lampleigh v. Brathwait, Hobart, 105; Langdell, Cas. on Contr. (2d ed.), ch. 2, Section 11, Summary, Sections 90 et seq. See above, Lecture VII. p. 286.
297/3 Pollock, Contr. (lst ed.), p. 6.
298/1 Canham v. Barry, 15 C.B. 597, 619; Jones v. How, 9 C.B. 1, 9; Com. Dig. Condition, D. 2; I Roll. Abr. 420 (D), pl. 1; Y.B. 22 Ed. IV. 26, pl. 6.
301/1 Gee v. Lancashire & Yorkshire Railway Co., 6 H. & N. 211, 218, Bramwell, B. Cf. Hydraulic Engineering Co. v. McHaffie, 4 Q.B.D. 670, 674, 676.
301/2 British Columbia Saw-Mill Co. v. Nettleship, L.R. 3 C.P. 499, 509, Willes, J.; Horne v. Midland Railway Co., L.R. 7 C.P. 583, 591; S.C., L.R. 8 C.P. 131.
302/1 British Columbia Saw-Mill Co. v. Nettleship, L.R. 3 C.P. 499, 509.
304/1 Cheale v. Kenward, 3 DeG. & J. 27.
304/2 Langdell, Contr., Sections 89, 28.
305/1 Langdell, Contr., Section 57.
305/2 Ibid., Sections 14, 15.
306/1 But see Langdell, Contr., Sections 14, 15.
FOOTNOTES
309/1 Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 2 H. & C. 906. Cf. Kyle v. Kavanagh, 103 Mass. 356, 357.
309/2 Cf. Cocker v. Crompton, 1 B. & C. 489.
310/1 Smith v. Hughes, L.R. 6 Q.B.597.
310/2 See Gardner v. Lane, 12 Allen, 39; S.C. 9 Allen, 492, 98 Mass. 517.
311/1 Goddard v. Monitor Ins. Co., 108 Mass. 56.
313/1 See Cundy v. Lindsay, 3 App. Cas. 459, 469. Cf. Reg. v. Middleton, L.R. 2 C.C. 38, 55 et seq., 62 et seq.; Reg. v. Davies, Dearsly, C.C. 640; Rex v. Mucklow, 1 Moody, O.C. 160; Reg. v. Jacobs, 12 Cox, 151.
313/2 "Praesentia corporis tollit errorem nominis." Cf. Byles, J., in Way v. Hearne, 32 L. J. N.S.C.P. 34, 40. But cf. the conflicting opinions in Reg. v. Middleton, L.R. 2 C.C. 38, 45, 57. It would seem that a proper name or other identification of an object or person as specific may have the same effect as an actual identification by the senses, because it refers to such an identification, although in a less direct way.
316/1 Brown v. Foster, 113 Mass. 136.
316/2 Leake, Dig. Contr. 13, 14, 637; Hunt v. Livermore, 5 Pick. 395, 397; Langd. Contr. (2d ed.), Section 36.
316/3 Leake, Dig. Contr. 638; Braunstein v. Accidental Death Ins. Co., 1 B. & S. 782.
316/4 But cf. Langd. Contr. (2d ed.), Section 29.
318/1 Langd. Contr. (2d ed.), Section 29.
318/2 Bullen & Leake, Prec. of Plead. (3d ed.), 147, "Conditions Precedent."
319/1 Cf. Cort v. Ambergate, Nottingham & Boston & Eastern Junction Railway Co., 17 Q.B.127.
320/1 Goodman v. Pocock, 15 Q.B.576 (1850).
325/1 Fisher v. Mellen, 103 Mass. 503.
325/2 Supra, p. 136.
327/1 Langd. Contr. (2d ed.), Section 33.
328/1 See the explanation of Dimech v. Corlett, 12 Moo. P.C. 199, in Behn v. Burness, 3 B. & S. 751, 760.
329/1 Behn v. Burness, 3 B. & S. 751.
329/2 Langd. Contr. (2d ed.), Section 28, p. 1000.
329/3 See Lecture VIII.
330/1 Kennedy v. Panama, &c. Mail Co., L.R. 2 Q.B.580, 588; Lyon v. Bertram, 20 How. 149, 153. Cf. Windscheid, Pand., Section 76, nn. 6, 9.
330/2 Windscheid, Pand., Section 76(4). See, generally, Ibid., nn. 6, 7; Section 78, pp. 206, 207; Section 82, pp. 216 et seq.
331/1 Cr. Ihering, Geist d. Roem. Rechts, Section 48, III. p. 116 (Fr. transl.).
331/2 See, however, the language of Crompton, J. in S.C., I B. & S. 877. Cf. Kent, Comm. (12th ed.), 479, n. 1, A (c).
331/3 Behn v. Burness, 3 B. & S. 751, 755, 756.
334/1 Cf. Anglo-Egyptian Navigation Co. v. Rennie, L.R. 10 C.P. 271.
334/2 Ellen v. Topp, 6 Exch. 424.
335/1 Contracts (2d Ed.), Section 106, and passim.
336/1 Chanter v. Hopkins, 4 M. & W. 399, 404. Possibly Behn v. Burness, stated above, might have been dealt with in this way. The ship tendered was not a ship which had been in the port of Amsterdam at the date of the contract. It was therefore not such a ship as the contract called for.
336/2 Heyworth v. Hutchinson, L.R. 2 Q.B.447, criticised in Benj. Sales (2d ed.), pp. 742 et seq.
336/3 See Thomas v. Cadwallader, Willes, 496; Langd. Contr. (2d ed.), Sections 116, 140. This is put as a case of equivalence by Mr. Langdell (Contr., Section 116); but the above explanation is believed to be the true one. It will be noticed that this is hardly a true case of condition, but merely a limitation of the scope of the tenant's promise. So a covenant to serve as apprentice in a trade, which the other party covenants to teach, can only be performed if the other will teach, and must therefore be limited to that event. Cf. Ellen v. Topp, 6 Exch. 424.
337/1 Langdell, Contracts (2d ed.), Section 127. Cf. Roberts v. Brett, 11 H. L. C. 337.
339/1 Graves v. Legg, 9 Exch. 709. Cf. Lang. Contr. (2d ed.), Section 33, p. 1004. Mr. Langdell says that a bought note, though part of a bilateral contract, is to be treated as unilateral, and that it may be presumed that the language of the contract relied on was that of a bought note, and thus a condition in favor of the defendant, who made it. I do not quite understand how this can be assumed when the declaration states a bilateral contract, and the question arose on demurrer to a plea, which also states that the plaintiff "was by the agreement bound to declare" the names. How remote the explanation is from the actual ground of decision will be seen.
341/1 Recht des Besitzes, Section 11, p. 184, n. 1 (7th ed.), Eng. tr. 124, n. t.
342/1 Inst. II. Section 157.
342/2 "In suis heredibus evidentius apparet continuationem dominii eo rem perdueere, ut nulla videatur hereditas fuisse, quasi olim hi domini essent, qui etiam vivo patre quodammodo domini existimantur, unde etiam filius familias appellatur sicut pater familias, sola nota hae adiecta, per quam distinguitur genitor ab eo qui genitus sit. itaque post mortem patris non hereditatem percipere videntur, sed magis liberam bonorum administrationem consequuntur hac ex causa licet non sint heredes instituti, domini sunt: nec obstat, quod licet eos exheredare, quod et occidere licebat." D. 28.2. 11. Cf. Plato, Laws, [Greek characters]
343/1 Laveleye, Propriety, 24, 202, 205, 211, n. 1, 232; Norton, L.C. Hindu Law of Inheritance, p. 193.
343/2 D. 50. 16. 208.
343/3 D. 41. 1. 34. Cf. D. 41. 3. 40; Bract., fol. 8 a, 44 a.
343/4 D. 43. 24. 13, Section 5.
344/1 Germania, c. 20.
345/1 Littleton, Section 337; Co. Lit. 209, a, b; Y.B. 8 Ed. IV. 5, 6, pl. 1; Keilway, 44 a (17 Hen. VII.); Lord North v. Butts, Dyer, 139 b, 140 a, top; Overton v. Sydall, Popham, 120, 121; Boyer v. Rivet, 3 Bulstr. 317, 321; Bain v. Cooper, 1 Dowl. Pr. Cas. N. s. 11, 14.
345/2 Y.B. 48 Ed. III. 2, pl. 4.
346/1 Vermoegensrechtlichen Klagen, 88, 89.
346/2 Proc. de la Lex Salica, tr. Thevenin, p. 72 and n. 1.
347/1 Ethelred, II. 9; Cnut, II. 73; Essays in Ang. Sax. Law, pp. 221 et seq.
347/2 1 Spence, Eq. 189, note, citing Hickes, Dissert. Epist., p. 57.
347/3 Glanv., Lib. VII. c. 2 (Beames, p. 150).
347/4 Ibid., c. 8 (Beames, p. 168).
347/5 Reg. Maj., Lib. II. c. 39.
348/1 Fol. 61 a.
348/2 Sachsensp., II. 60, Section 2, cited in Essays in Ang. Sax. Law, p. 221; Grand Cust. de Norm., c. 88.
348/3 Britt., fol. 64 b (Nich. ed. 163); Fleta, Lib. II. c. 62, Section 10. Cf. Bract., fol. 37 b, Section 10.
348/4 Bracton, fol. 61 a, b. "Item quaero an testator legare possit actiones suas? Et verum est quod non, de debitis quae in vita testatoris convicta non fuerunt nec recognita, sed hujusmodi actiones competunt haeredibus. Cum antera convicta sint et recognita, tune sunt quasi in bonis testatoris, et competunt executoribus in foro ecclesiastico. Si autem competant haeredibus, ut praedictum est, in foro seculari debent terminari, quia antequam communicantur et in foro debito, non pertinet ad executores, ut in foro ecclesiastico convincantur."
349/1 Bracton, fol. 62a.
349/2 Y.B. 20 & 21 Ed. I. 232; cf. ib. 312.
349/3 Oates v. Frith, Hob. 130. Cf. Y.B. 5 Hen. VII. 18, pl. 12; Popham, J., in Overton v. Sydall, Poph. 120, 121 (E. 39 El.); Boyer v. Rivet, 3 Bulstr. 317, 319-322; Brooker's Case, Godb. 376, 380 (P. 3 Car. I.).
349/4 Bain v. Cooper, 1 Dowl. Pract. Cas. N. s. 11, 14. Cf. Y.B. 14 Hen. VIII. pl. 5, at fol. 10.
350/1 Bract., fol. 66 b, 76 b, and passim; Y.B. 20 Ed. I. 226, 200; Littleton, Section 241. The same thing was said where there were several executors: "They are only in the place of one person." Y.B. 8 Ed. IV. 5,pl. 1.
350/2 Comm. 385.
350/3 Cf. Glanv., Lib. VII. c. 3; F. N. B. 21 L; Dyer, 4 b, 5 a.
351/1 Cf. Bract., fol. 80 b.
351/2 Charta Divis. Reg. Franc., Art. IX. & VIII. Cf. 3 Laferriere, Hist. du Droit Francais, 408, 409.
351/3 Glanv., Lib. IX. c. 1 (Beames, pp. 218, 220); Bract., fol. 79 b.
352/1 Brooker's Case, Godbolt, 376, 377, pl. 465.
352/2 Dyer, 1 b. Cf. Bain v. Cooper, 1 Dowl. Pr. C. N. s. 11, 12.
354/1 In the American Law Review for October, 1872, VII. 49, 50, I mentioned one or two indications of this fact. But I have since had the satisfaction of finding it worked out with such detail and learning in Ihering's Geist des Roemischen Rechts, Sections 10, 48, that I cannot do better than refer to that work, only adding that for my purposes it is not necessary to go so far as Ihering, and that he does not seem to have been led to the conclusions which it is my object to establish. See, further, Clark, Early Roman Law, 109, 110; Laferriere, Hist. du Droit Frang., I. 114 et seq.; D. 1.5. 4, Section 3; Gaii Inst. IV. Section 16; ib. II. Section 69.
356/1 Erbvertraege, I. 15 et seq.
356/2 Hist. du Droit Franc., IV. 500.
357/3 "Quantum dare voluerit aut totam furtunam eui voluerit dare . . . nec minus nec majus nisi quantum ei creditum est." Lex Sal. (Merkel), XLVI.
357/4 Lex Sal. (Merkel), Cap. XLVI., De adfathamire; Sohm, Frank. Reichs- u. Gerichtsverfassung, 69.
357/6 Beseler, Erbvertraege, I. 101, 102, 105.
358/1 "Omnem facultatem suam. . . seu cuicunque libet de proximis vel extraneis, adoptare in hereditatem vel in adfatimi vel per scripturarum seriem seu per traditionem." L. Rib. Cap. L. (al. XLVIII.); cf. L. Thuring. XIII. So Capp. Rib. Section7: "Qui filios non habuerit et aliurn quemlibet heredem facere sibi voluerit coram rege . . . traditionem faclat."
357/2 Ed. Roth., cap. 174, 157; cf. lb. 369, 388; Liutpr. III. 16 (al. 2), VI. 155 (al. 102). Cf. Beseler, Erbvertraege, I. 108 et seq., esp. 116-118. Compare the charter of A.D. 713, "Offero . . . S. P. ecclesia quam mihi heredem constitui." (Mem. di Lucca V. b. No. 4.) Troya III. No. 394, cited Heusler, Gewere, 45, 46. Cf. ib. 484. This, no doubt, was due to Roman influence, but it recalls what Sir Henry Maine quotes from Elphinstone's History of India (I. 126), as to sale by a member of one of the village communities: "The purchaser steps exactly into his place, and takes up all his obligations." Ancient Law, ch. 8, pp. 263, 264.
357/3 (Merkel) Cap. LVIII., De chrenecruda. Sohm, Frank. R. u. G. Verf., 117.
358/1 A.D. 679: "Sicuti tibi donata est ira tene et posteri tui." Kemble, Cod. Dip., I. 21, No. xvi. Uhtred, A.D. 767: "Quam is semper possideat et post se cui voluerit heredum relinquat." Ib. I. 144, cxvxi. ("Cuilibet heredi voluerit relinquat" is very common in the later charters; ib. V. 155, MLXXXIL; lb. VI. 1, MCCXVIIL; it). 31, MCCXXX.; lb. 38, MCCXXXIV.; and passim. This may be broader than cui voluerit herealum.) Offa, A.D. 779: "Ut se viverite habe . . . deat. et post se suoe propinquitatis homini cui ipse vo . . . possidendum libera utens potestate relinquat." Ib. I. 164, 165, CXXXVII. Aethilbald, A.D. 736: "Ita ut quamdiu vixerit potestatem habeat tenendi ac possidendi cuicumque voluerit vel eo vivo vel certe post obitum suum relinquendi." Ib. I. 96, LXXX.; cf. ib. V. 53, MXIV. Cuthred of Kent, A.D. 805: "Cuicumque hominum voluerit in aeternam libertatem derelinquat." Ib. I. 232, CXC. "Ut habeat libertatem commutandi vel donandi in vita sua et post ejus obiturn teneat facultatem relinquendi cuicumque volueris." Ib. I. 233, 234, CXCI.; cf. ib. V. 70, MXXXI. Wiglaf of Mercia, Aug. 28, A.D. 831: "Seu vendendum ant commutandum i cuicumque ei herede placuerit dereliaquendum." Ib. I. 294, CCXXVII.
359/1 "W. et heredibus suis, videlicet quos heredes constituerit." Memorials of Hexham, Surtees Soc. Pub., 1864, II. 88.
359/2 Cf. Y.B. 27 Ass., fol. 135, pl. 25. Under the Welsh laws the champion in a cause decided by combat acquired the rights of the next of kin, the next of kin being the proper champion. Lea, Superstition and Force (3d Ed.), 165. Cf. ib. 161, n. 1; ib. 17.
361/1 D. 38. 8. 1, pr.
361/2 "Cum is, qui ex edicto bonorum possessionem petiit, ficto se herede agit." Gaii Inst. IV. Section 34. Cf. Ulp. Fragm. XXVIII. Section 12; D. 37. 1. 2. So the fidei commissarius, who was a praetorian successor (D. 41. 4. 2, Section 19; 10. 2. 24), "in similitudinem heredis consistit." Nov. 1. 1, Section 1. Cf. Just. Inst. 2. 24, pr., and then Gaius, II. Sections 251, 252.
361/3 Gaii Inst. II. Sections 102 et seq. Cf. ib. Sections 252, 35.
361/4 Gaii Inst. IV Section 35: "Similiter et bonorum emptor ficto se herede agit." Cf. ib. Sections 144, 145. Keller, Roemische Civilprocess, Section 85, III. But cf. Scheurl, Lehrb. der Inst., Section 218, p. 407 (6th ed.).
361/5 Paulus in D. 50. 17. 128.
362/1 "In re legata in accessione temporis quo testator possedit, legatarius quodammodo quasi heres est." D. 41. 3. 14, Section 1.
362/2 D. 41.1.62; 43. 3. 1, Section 6; Gaii Inst. II. Section 97; Just. Inst. 2. 10, Section 11.
363/1 "[Accessiones possessionum] plane tribuuntur his qui in locum aliorum succedunt sive ex contractu sive voluntate: heredibus enum et his, qui successorum loco habentur, datur accessio testatoris. Itaque si mihi vendideris servum utar accesssione tua." D. 44.3.14, Sections 1, 2.
363/2 "Ab eo . . . in cujus locum hereditate vel emptione aliove quo iure successi." D. 43. 19. 3, Section 2.
363/3 D. 50. 4. 1, Section 4. Cf. Cic. de Off. 3. 19. 76; Gaii Inst. IV. Section 34.
363/4 C. 2. 3. 21; C. 6. 16. 2; cf. D. 38. 8. 1, pr.
364/1 "In locum successisse accipimus sive per universitatem sive in rem sit successum." D. 43. 3. 1, Section13. Cf.D. 21.3.3,Section1;D. 12.2.7&8;D. 39. 2. 24, Section 1.
364/2 D. 41.2. 13, Sections 1, 11. Other cases put by Ulpian may stand on a different fiction. After the termination of a precarium, for instance, fingitur fundus nunquam fuisse possessus ab ipso detentore. Gothofred, note 14 (Elz. ed.). But cf. Puchta, in Weiske, R. L., art. Besitz, p. 50, and D. 41.2.13, Section7.
364/3 Inst. 2. 6, Sections 12, 13. Cf. D. 44. 3. 9. See, for a fuller statement, 11 Am. Law Rev. 644, 645.
365/1 Recht des Besitzes, Section11 (7th ed.), p. 184, n. 1, Eng. tr. 124, n. t.
365/2 Paulus, D. 8. 6. 18, Section 1. This seems to be written of a rural servitude (aqua) which was lost by mere disuse, without adverse user by the servient owner.
365/3 Hermogenianus, D. 21. 3. 3; Exe. rei jud., D. 44. 2. 9, Section 2; ib. 28; ib. 11, Sections 3, 9; D. 10. 2. 25, Section 8; D. 46. 8. 16, Section I; Keller, Roem. Civilproc., Section 73. Cf. Bracton, fol. 24 b, Section 1 ad fin.
365/4 "Recte a me via uti prohibetur et interdictum ei inutile est, quia a me videtur vi vel clam vel precario possidere, qui ab auctore meo vitiose possidet. nam et Pedius scribit, si vi aut clam aut precario ab co sit usus, in cuius locum hereditate vel emptione aliove quo lure suceessi, idem esse dicendum: cum enim successerit quis in locum eorum, aequum non est nos noceri hoc, quod adversus eum non nocuit, in cuius locum successimus." D. 43. 19. 3, Section 2. The variation actore, argued for by Savigny, is condemned by Mommsen, in his edition of the Digest, -- it seems rightly.
365/5 D. 12. 2. 7 & 8.
366/1 Ulpian, D. 39. 2. 24, Section1. Cf. D. 8. 5.7; D. 39. 2. 17, Section 3, n. 79 (Elzevir ed.); Paulus, D. 2. 14. 17, Section 5.
366/2 "Cum quis in alii locum successerit non est aequum ei nocere hoc, quod adversus eum non nocuit, in cujus locum successit. Plerumque emptoris eadem causa esse debet circa petendum ac defendendum, quae fuit auctoris." Ulp. D. 50. 17. 156, Sections 2, 3. "Qui in ius dominiumve alterius succedit, iure ejus uti debet." Paulus, D. 50. 17. 177. "Non debeo melioris condieionis esse, quam auctor meus, a quo ius in me transit." Paulus, D. 50. 17. 175, Section 1. "Quod ipsis qui contraxerunt obstat, et successoribus eoturn obstabit." Ulp. D. 50. 17. 143. "Nemo plus iuris ad alium transferre potest, quam ipse haberet." Ulp. D. 50. 17. 54; Bract., fol. 31 b. Cf. Decret. Greg. Lib. II. Tit. XIII. c. 18, De rest. spoliat.: "Cum spoliatori quasi succedat in vitium." Bruns, R. d. Besitzes, p. 179. Windscheid, Pand., Section 162 a, n. 10.
366/3 "Ne vitiosae quidam possessioni ulla potest accedere: sed nec vitiosa ei, quse vitiosa non est." D. 41. 2. 13, Section 13.
367/1 Hill v. Ellard, 3 Salk. 279. Cf. Withers v. Iseham, Dyer, 70 a, 70 b, 71 a; Gateward's Case, 6 Co. Rep. 59b, 60b; Y.B. 20 & 21 Ed. I 426; 205; 12 Hen. IV. 7.
368/1 Doe v. Barnard, 13 Q.B.945, 952, 953, per Cur., Patteson, J. Cf. Asher v. Whitlock, L.R. 1 Q.B.1, 3, 6, 7.
368/2 See, further, Sawyer v. Kendall, 10 Cush. 241; 2 Bl. Comm. 263 et seq.; 3 Ch. Pl. 1119 (6th Am. ed.); 3 Kent, 444, 445; Angell, Limitations, ch. 31, Section 413. Of course if a right had already been acquired before the disseisin different considerations would apply. If the right claimed is one of those which are regarded as incident to land, as explained in the following Lecture, the disseisor will have it. Jenk. Cent. 12, First Cent. Case 21.
370/1 Ared v. Watkin, Cro. Eliz. 637; S.C., ib. 651. Cf. Y.B. 5 Hen. VII. 18, pl. 12; Dyer, 4 b, n. (4).
370/2 Roe v. Hayley, 12 East, 464, 470 (1810).
371/1 Boyer v. Rivet, 3 Bulstr. 317, 321.
372/1 Essays in A. S. Law, 219.
372/2 "Per medium," Bracton, fol. 37b, Section10 ad fin.
374/1 Bract., fol. 17 b. Cf. Fleta, III. c. 14, Section 6.
374/2 See, further, Middlemore v. Goodale, Cro. Car. 503, stated infra, p. 379.
374/3 See also Bract., fol. 380 b, 381. "Et quod de haeredibus dicitur, idem dici poterit de assignatis .... Et quod assignatis fieri debet warrantia per modum donationis: probatur in itinere W. de Ralegh in Com. Warr. circa finem rotuli, et hoc maxime, si primus dominus capitalis, et primus feoffator, ceperit homagium et servitium assignati." Cf. Fleta, VI. Section 6; Moore, 93, pl. 230; Sheph. Touchst. 199, 200. As to the reason which led to the mention of assigns, cf. Bract., fol. 20 b, Section 1; 1 Britt. (Nich.), 223, 312.
375/1 I do not stop to inquire whether this was due to the statute of Quia Emptores, by which the assign was made to hold directly of the first grantor, or whether some other explanation must be found. Cf. Bract., fol. 37 b; c. 14, Sections 6, 11; VI. c. 28, Section 4; 1 Britton (Nich.), 256, [100 b].
375/2 Fleta, III. c. 14, Section 6, fol. 197; 1 Britton (Nich.), 223, 233, 244, 255, 312; Co. Lit. 384 b; Y.B. 20 Ed. I. 232; Abbr. Placit., fol. 308, 2d col., Dunelm, rot. 43; Y.B. 14 Hen. IV. 5, 6.
377/1 Fol. 67 a; cf. 54 a.
377/2 Fol. 381; supra, p. 874, n. 3.
378/1 Cf. Pincombe v. Rudge, Hobart, 3; Bro. Warrantia Carte, pl. 8; S.C., Y.B. 2 Hen. IV. 14, pl. 5.
378/2 Y.B. 50 Ed. III. 12b & 13.
378/3 Y.B. 42 Ed. III. 3, pl. 14, per Belknap, arguendo.
378/4 Noke v. Awder, Cro. Eliz. 373; S.C., ib. 436. Cf. Lewis v. Campbell, 8 Taunt. 715; S.C., 3 J. B. Moore, 35.
379/1 Middlemore v. Goodale, Cro. Car. 503; S.C., ib. 505, Sir William Jones, 406.
379/2 Harper v. Bird, T. Jones, 102 (Pasch. 30 Car. II.). These cases show an order of development parallel to the history of the assignment of other contracts not negotiable.
380/1 Andrew v. Pearce, 4 Bos. & Pul. 158 (1805).
383/1 Austin, Jurisprudence, II. p. 842 (3d ed.).
383/2 "Quoniam non personae, sed praedia deberent, neque adquiri libertas neque remitti servitus per partem poterit." D. 8. 3. 34, pr.
383/3 "Qui fundum alienum bona fide emit, itinere quod ei fundo debetur usus est: retinetur id ius itineris: atque etiam, si precario aut vi deiecto domino possidet: fundus enim qualiter se habens ita, cum in suo habitu possessus est, ius non deperit, neque refert, iuste nec ne possideat qui talem eum possidet." D. 8. 6. 12.
383/4 Elzevir ed., n. 51, ad loc. cit.; Cicero de L. Agr. 3. 2. 9.
383/5 D. 50. 16, 86. Cf. Ulpian, D. 41. 1. 20, Section 1; D. 8. 3. 23, Section 2.
383/6 Inst. 2. 3, Section 1.
384/1 D. 8. 1. 14, pr. Cf. Elzevir ed., n. 58, "Et sic jura . . . accessiones ease possunt corporum."
384/2 "Cum fundus fundo servit." D. 8. 4. 12. Cf. D. 8. 5. 20, Section 1; D. 41. 1. 2O, Section 1.
384/3 Jurisprudence, II. p. 847 (3d ed.).
384/4 Cf. Windscheid, Pand., Section 57, n. 10 (4th ed.), p. 150.
385/1 Fol. 10b, Section 3.
385/2 Fol. 220b, Section 1.
386/1 Fol. 221.
386/2 Fol. 219a, b.
386/3 Fol. 102a, b.
386/4 Fol. 226 b, Section 13. All these passages assume that a right has been acquired and inheres in the land.
387/1 Fol. 53 a; cf. 59 b, ad fin., 242 b.
387/2 "Nihil praescribitur nisi quod possidetur," cited from Hale de Jur. Maris, p. 32, in Blundell v. Catterall, 5 B. & Ald. 268, 277.
388/1 Bract., fol. 46b; cf. 17b, 18, 47 b, 48.
388/2 Fol. 81, 81 b, 79 b, 80 b.
388/3 Fol. 24 b, 26, 35 b, 86, 208 b, &c. Cf. F. N. B. 123, E; Laveleye, Propriete, 67, 68, 116.
388/4 Abbr. Plac. 110; rot. 22, Devon. (Hen. III.}.
388/5 Stockwell v. Hunter, 11 Met. (Mass.) 448.
389/1 Keilway, 130 b, pl. 104.
389/2 Keilway, 113 a, pl. 45; Dyer, 2b.
389/3 Keilway, 113a, pl. 45. Cf. Y.B. 33-35 Ed. I. 70; 45 Ed. III. 11, 12.
389/4 Litt. Section 589.
389/5 Keilway, 2 a, pl. 2 ad fin. (12 Hen. VII.). But cf. Y.B. 6 Hen. VII. 14, pl. 2 ad fin.
389/6 4 Laferriere, Hist. du Droit. Franc. 442; Bracton, fol. 53 a.
390/1 Cf. Co. Lit. 322 b, et seq.; Y.B. 6 Hen. VII. 14, pl. 2 ad fin.
390/2 Daintry v. Brocklehurst, 3 Exch. 207.
390/3 Y.B. 5 Hen. VII. 18, pl. 12.
391/1 Y.B. 9 Hen. VI. 16, pl. 7.
391/2 Y.B. 14 Hen. VI. 26, pl. 77.
391/3 Y.B. 5 Hen. VII. 18, pl. 12.
391/4 Cf. Theloall, Dig. I. c. 21, pl. 9.
391/5 Buskin v. Edmunds, Cro. Eliz. 636.
391/6 Harper v. Bird, T. Jones, 102 (30 Car. II.).
391/7 Bolles v. Nyseham, Dyer, 254 b; Porter v. Swetnam, Style, 406; S.C., ib. 431.
391/8 3 Bl. Comm. 231, 232.
392/1 Yielding v. Fay, Cro. Eliz. 569.
392/2 Pakenham's Case, Y.B. 42 Ed. III. 3, pl. 14; Prior of Woburn's Case, 22 Hen. VI. 46, pl. 36; Williams's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 72 b, 73 a; Slipper v. Mason, Nelson's Lutwyche, 43, 45 (top).
392/3 F. N. B. 127; Nowel v. Smith, Cro. Eliz. 709; Star v. Rookesby, 1 Salk. 335, 336; Lawrence v. Jenkins, L.R. 8 Q.B.274.
392/4 Dyer, 24 a, pl. 149; F. N. B. 180 N.
393/1 F. N. B. 128 D, E; Co. Lit. 96 b. It is assumed that, when an obligation is spoken of as falling upon the land, it is understood to be only a figure of speech. Of course rights and obligations are confined to human beings.
393/2 Keilway, 145 b, 146, pl. 15; Sir Henry Nevil's Case, Plowd. 377, 381; Chudleigh's Case, 1 Co. Rep. 119 b, 122 b.
393/3 F. N. B. 180 N.; Co. Lit. 385 a; Spencer's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 16 a, 17 b; Pakenham's Case, Y.B. 42 Ed. III. 3, pl. 14; Keilway, 145 b, 146, pl. 15; Comyns's Digest, Covenant (B, 3).
394/1 Holms v. Seller, 3 Lev. 305; Rowbotham v. Wilson, 8 H. L. C. 348; Bronson v. Coffin, 108 Mass. 175, 180. Cf. Bro. Covenant, pl. 2.
394/2 Y.B. 21 Ed. III. 2, pl. 5; F. N. B. 180 N.
394/3 The action is case in the Prior of Woburn's Case, Y.B. 22 Hen. VI. 46, pl. 36. In F. N. B. 128 E, n. (a), it is said that a curia claudenda only lay upon a prescriptive right, and that if the duty to fence was by indenture the plaintiff was put to his writ of covenant. But see below, pp. 396, 400.
394/4 Y.B. 32 & 33 Ed. I. 430.
395/1 Y.B. 20 Ed. I. 360.
395/2 Y.B. 32 & 33 Ed. I. 516.
395/3 "Quia res cum homine [obviously a misprint for onere] transit ad quemcunque." Fol. 382, 382 b.
395/4 Lib. VI. c. 23, Section 17.
395/5 Pakenham's Case, Y.B. 42 Ed. III. 3, pl. 14.
395/6 Sugd. V. & P. (14th ed.), 587; Rawle, Covenants for Title (4th ed.), p. 314. Cf. Vyvyan v. Arthur, 1 B. & C. 410; Sharp v. Waterhouse, 7 El. & Bl. 816, 823.
396/1 Co. Lit. 385 a.
396/2 Cf. Finchden as to rent in Y. B, 45 Ed. III. 11, 12.
396/3 Cf. Y.B. 50 Ed. III. 12, 13, pl. 2.
397/1 Covenant, pl. 17.
397/2 There is a colon here in both editions of the Year Books, marking the beginning of a new argument.
397/3 Pakenham's Case, Y.B. 42 Ed. III. 3, pl. 14.
398/1 Bro. Covenant, pl. 5. Cf. Spencer's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 16 a, 17 b, 18 a.
398/2 Horne's Case, Y.B. 2 Hen. IV. 6, pl. 25.
399/1 "Quod conceditur." Cf. Spencer's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 16 a, 18 a.
399/2 It was quite possible that two liabilities should exist side by side. Bro. Covenant, pl. 32; Brett v. Cumberland, Cro. Jac. 521, 523.
399/3 1 Co. Rep. 122 b; S.C., sub nom. Dillon v. Fraine, Popham, 70, 71.
400/1 Essays in Ang. Sax. Law, 248.
400/2 Y.B. 22 Ed. I. 494, 496.
400/3 Y.B. 4 Ed. III. 57, pl. 71; S.C., 7 Ed. III. 65, pl. 67.
401/1 Bract., fol. 17 b, 37 b; Fleta, III. c. 14, Section 6; 1 Britton (Nich.), 223, 233, 244, 255, 312; Abbrev. Plac. p. 308, col 2, Dunelm, rot. 43 (33 I.); Y. B, 20 Ed. I. 232; Co. Lit. 384 b.
401/2 Hyde v. Dean of Windsor, Cro. Eliz. 552.
401/3 Spencer's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 16 a. Cf. Minshill v. Oakes, 2 H. & N. 793, 807.
402/1 Hyde v. Dean of Windsor, Cro. Eliz. 552, 553; S.C., ib. 457. Cf. Bally v. Wells, 3 Wilson, 25, 29.
402/2 Dean of Windsor's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 24 a; S.C., Moore, 399. Cf. Bro. Covenant, pl. 32. Cf. further, Conan v. Kemise, W. Jones, 245 (7 Car. I.).
403/1 F. N. B. 181 N; Sir Henry Nevil's Case, Plowden, 377, 381.
403/2 Ewre v. Strickland, Cro. Jac. 240. Cf. Brett v. Cumberland, 1 Roll R. 359, 360 "al comen ley"; S.C., Cro. Jac. 399, 521.
403/3 Cockson v. Cock, Cro. Jac. 125.
403/4 Sale v. Kitchingham, 10 Hod. 158 (E. 12 Anne).
403/5 Supra, pp. 396, 398, 400. Cf., however, Lord Wensleydale, in Rowbotham v. Wilson, 8 H. L. C. 348, 362, and see above, p. 391, as to rents.
404/1 4 Kent (12th ed.), 480, n. 1.
404/2 It is used in a somewhat different sense is describing the relation between a tenant for life or years and a reversioner. Privity between them follows as an accidental consequence of their being as one tenant, and sustaining a single persona between them.
406/1 Rowbotham v. Wilson, 8 H. L. C. 348, 362 (Lord Wensleydale).
406/2 Harbidge v. Warwick, 3 Exch. 552, 556.
406/3 Rowbotham v. Wilson, 8 El. & Bl. 123, 143, 144.
404/4 5 Co. Rep. 16, a.
407/1 Y.B. 8 Ed. IV. 5, 6, pl. 1; 22 Ed. IV. 6, pl. 18. Cf. 5 Ed. IV. 7, pl. 16.
407/2 Cf. Keilway, 42 b, 46 b; 2 Bl. Comm. 329.
408/1 Y.B. 14 Hen. VIII. 6, pl. 5. Cf. Chudleigh's Case, 1 Co. Rep. 120a, 122 b; S.C., nom. Dillon v. Fraine, Popham, 70-72.
408/2 Lewin, Trusts, Ch. I. (7th ed.), pp. 16, 15.
408/3 4 Inst. 85; Gilb. Uses (Sugd.), 429, n. (6); Lewin, Trusts (7th ed.), pp. 15, 228.
408/4 Burgess v. Wheate, 1 Eden, 177, 203, 246.
408/5 Lewin, Trusts, Introd. (7th ed.), p. 3.
408/6 1 Rich. III. c. 1. Cf. Rex v. Holland, Aleyn, 14, Maynard's arg.; Bro. Feoffements al Uses, pl. 44; Gilb. Uses, 26* (Sugd. ed., 50).
409/1 4th Inst. 85; S.C., Dyer, 869, pl. 50; Jenk. Cent. 6, c. 30. Cf. Gilb. Uses, 198* (Sugd. ed. 399).
409/2 Gilb. Uses, 35* (Sugd. ed. 70).
409/3 Theloall's Dig., I. 16, pl. 1.